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WHO’S AFRAID OF SECTION 1498? A CASE FOR
GOVERNMENT PATENT USE IN PANDEMICS AND OTHER
NATIONAL CRISES
Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan*
COVID-19 has created pressing and widespread needs for
vaccines, medical treatments, PPE, and other medical technologies,
needs that may conflict—indeed, have already begun to conflict—
with the exclusive rights conferred by United States patents. The
U.S. government has a legal mechanism to overcome this conflict:
government use of patented technologies at the cost of governmentpaid compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. But while many have
recognized the theoretical possibility of government patent use
under that statute, there is today a conventional wisdom that § 1498
is too exceptional, unpredictable, and dramatic for practical use, to
the point that it ought to be invoked sparingly or not at all, even in
extraordinary circumstances such as a pandemic.
Yet that conventional wisdom is a recent one, and it conflicts
with both history and theory. This Article considers the role of
§ 1498 in the context of national crises and emergencies like
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COVID-19, a context so far not addressed substantially in the
literature on the statute. We find that government patent use is not
nearly as exceptional as it is commonly made out to be, and indeed
has been not only used but expanded through statutory amendment
over the last century. Review of the development and use of the
statute during both world wars and the post–September 11 period
reveals widespread acceptance of government patent use as a tool
for addressing imminent national problems, and it illuminates
particular features of government patent use that become especially
pertinent in times of crisis. In the United States, government patent
use and national emergencies have a close and special relationship;
each has shaped the other.
Drawing from the lessons of history and analysis of the statute,
we develop a novel framework for comparing § 1498 to other policy
tools, including prizes, research grants, and patent buyouts. Under
this framework, four features of § 1498 stand out: speed of
invocation, flexibility in the scope of its use, post-crisis
determination of compensation, and use of an impartial adjudicator.
Whenever these four features are advantageous—which will be true
in most national emergency situations, as we demonstrate—the U.S.
government should strongly consider government patent use over
patent buyouts and other policy tools. We show the advantages of
these four features in a case study: government patent use to expand
supply and access to the COVID-19 treatment remdesivir.
Accordingly, and contrary to the conventional view of § 1498, we
conclude that government patent should be an ordinary tool of
government policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Among certain patent lawyers, one number generates some awe
and trepidation: 1498. It is the section number of a statute in Title
28 of the United States Code, a law that provides the U.S.
government with the power to manufacture and use any patented
invention at the cost of “reasonable and entire compensation for
such use and manufacture.”1 This seemingly unremarkable statutory
language has sat on the books for over a century. Yet 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 and government patent use are regularly characterized in the
language of extremity. Commentators describe the statute as
“breaking” patents,2 “seizure” of rights,3 “stealing,”4 “expropriating
private property,” 5 “taboo,” 6 “a radical change,” 7 a “specter,” 8 a
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Other current laws, most notably the march-in rights
provision of the Bayh–Dole Act, provide alternate pathways for the government
to make use of patented inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 831r (Tennessee Valley Authority power to use patented inventions); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2183(b)(2) (Atomic Energy Commission power to use and license patents). See
generally Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1513–16
(2015).
2
E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Breaking Patents, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 461, 465 n.15
(2011) (noting use of phrase “for hyperbolic effect”).
3
Michael Lehr, Federal Seizure of Patented Inventions: A COVID-19 Response,
DUNLAP BENNETT & LUDWIG (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.dbllawyers.com/
federal-seizure-of-patented-inventions-a-covid-19-response; see Chris Katopis,
Recognizing the Limits of Government Procurement in the Pharmaceutical
Industries, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://cpip.
gmu.edu/2018/12/20/recognizing-the-limits-of-government-procurement-in-thepharmaceutical-industries.
4
E.g., Elizabeth Wright, Stealing Patents Won’t Bring Down Drug Costs,
CITIZENS AGAINST GOV’T WASTE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cagw.org/
thewastewatcher/stealing-patents-won%E2%80%99t-bring-down-drug-costs;
Charles Sauer, Government May Attempt to Steal COVID Vaccine, REALCLEAR
HEALTH (June 17, 2020), https://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2020/06/17/
government_may_attempt_to_steal_covid_vaccine_111060.html.
5
James Edwards, A Protection, Not a Weapon, CONSERVATIVES FOR PROP. RTS
(May 27, 2020), https://www.property-rts.org/post/a-protection-not-a-weapon.
6
Natalie Shure, Force Drug Companies to Lower Prices, AM. PROSPECT (Sept.
26, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/force-drug-companies-to-lowerprices.
7
Adam Houldsworth, New York Times’ Seizure Call Shows How Far the Tide Is
Turning Against Pharma IP, IAM (July 13, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/
law-policy/new-york-times-pharma-patents.
8
Joel Wallace, Mad Dash to Coronavirus Vaccine May Face Legal Hurdles,
1
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“nuclear option,” 9 and equivalent to eminent-domain
condemnation. 10 Even supporters of invoking the law sometimes
characterize use of § 1498 as exceptional. 11 And the COVID-19
pandemic, despite having elicited numerous calls to invoke
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/03/12/maddash-coronavirus-vaccine-may-face-legal-hurdles/id=119790.
9
E.g., Michael Rosen, Running Roughshod over Intellectual Property Rights
Won’t Lower Drug Prices, AEIDEAS BLOG (July 24, 2018), https://www.aei.org/
technology-and-innovation/intellectual-property/running-roughshod-overintellectual-property-rights-wont-lower-drug-prices;
Valerie
Bauman,
Government May Have Ownership or Rights to Coronavirus Vaccines,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-andlife-sciences/government-may-have-ownership-or-rights-to-coronavirusvaccines.
10
In addition to the literature that analyzes § 1498 under a takings framework, see
infra note 20, there is significant commentary that invokes eminent domain
largely for rhetorical effect. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Sean O’Connor & Evan
Moore, Proposal for Drug Price Controls is Legally Unprecedented and
Threatens Medical Innovation, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Nov. 5,
2018),
https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/11/05/proposal-for-drug-price-controls-islegally-unprecedented-and-threatens-medical-innovation; Henry Grabowski,
Government Appropriation of Breakthrough Drug Patent Rights Would Deter
Biopharmaceutical R&D and Innovation, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 20, 2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160620.055440/full.
11
See, e.g., Letter from Bernard Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Robert A.
McDonald, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs 1 (May 12, 2015), https://www.
sanders.senate.gov/download/051215-letter (calling for Department of Veterans
Affairs to use § 1498 “to break the patents” on certain drugs); Joel Dodge, The
Government Can Legally Commandeer Drug Patents, PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT
(Oct.
2,
2017),
https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/10/02/thegovernment-can-legally-commandeer-drug-patents (quoting Sen. Bill Cassidy on
use of § 1498 to “commandeer” the drug industry); George Abi Younes et al.,
COVID-19: Insights from Innovation Economists, 47 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7
(2020) (describing “implementation of compulsory licensing” as “challenging but
a real option on the table”); Editorial Bd., How the Government Can Lower Drug
Prices, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/
opinion/prescription-drug-costs-naloxone-opioids.html (describing § 1498 as “a
sort of eminent domain”). In their authoritative analysis of § 1498 in the
pharmaceutical context, Brennan, Kapczynski, Monahan, and Rizvi advocate use
of § 1498 but conclude that the tool should be used relatively sparingly,
“suggest[ing] that the government only invoke its § 1498 power where drug
pricing has created sizeable deadweight loss.” Hannah Brennan et al., A
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for
Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 319 (2016). The authors also argue that, “[a]s
with eminent domain, where the government often purchases land on the private
market despite having the power to take it, so too should government use of
patents be invoked in the exceptional rather than routine case.” Id.
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§ 1498,12 has not changed the views of many that government patent
use is a destabilizing intervention, tantamount to “throw[ing] our IP
system out the window.”13
To be sure, § 1498 can be used in bold, interventionist ways.
For example, Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, along
with the New York Times editorial board, have called for the use of
§ 1498 to discipline the pricing of certain vital and best-selling
prescription drugs.14 Though the United States has not used § 1498
in this dramatic way, there is much merit to such bold use, which
could save billions in public and private drug spending.15
See, e.g., Michael Liu et al., March-in Rights and Compulsory Licensing—
Safety Nets for Access to a COVID-19 Vaccine, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 6,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200501.798711/full;
Amy Kapczynski, Paul Biddinger & Rochelle Walensky, Remdesivir Could Be in
Short Supply. Here’s a Fix, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/28/opinion/remdesivir-shortage-coronavirus.html.
13
Adam Houldsworth, IP Is Crucial to Finding Breakthrough Covid-19
Medicines, Novartis Policy Head States, IAM (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.iammedia.com/coronavirus/ip-crucial-finding-breakthrough-covid-19-medicinesnovartis-policy-head-states (quoting Corey Salsberg, Head of IP Affairs at
Novartis); see also Tom Giovanetti, Attempts to Degrade Drug Patents are
Counterproductive in This Pandemic, TOWNHALL (June 1, 2020), https://
townhall.com/columnists/tomgiovanetti/2020/06/01/progressive-activists-wantto-keep-meritless-obama-era-lawsuits-alive-n2569704 (invoking § 1498 during
pandemic “is to do away with the IP system for good”); Bauman, supra note 9;
Matt Rizzolo et al., What If Gov’t Allows Patent Infringement For COVID-19
Drugs?, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1258739/
what-if-gov-t-allows-patent-infringement-for-covid-19-drugs.
14
See Sanders, supra note 11; Maia Anderson, EpiPen, Humira Among Drugs
Warren Wants to Regulate, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.
beckershospitalreview.com/pharmacy/epipen-humira-among-drugs-warrenwants-to-regulate.html; Editorial Bd., supra note 11; see also Letter from Ro
Khanna, Member of Cong., House of Representatives, to Alex Azar, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://khanna.house.gov/sites/
khanna.house.gov/files/Final%20Letter%20-%20signed.pdf.
15
See, e.g., Christopher J. Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 280–81; Brittany S.
Bruns, The Pharmaceutical Access Act: An Administrative Eminent Domain
Solution to High Drug Prices, 106 CAL. L. REV. 2023, 2047–54 (2018); Amy
Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, “Government Patent Use”: A Legal
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 792–93 (2016);
Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public Health:
An Analysis of the CellPro March-in Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1115
(1999) (noting advantages of § 1498 over Bayh–Dole Act march-in rights);
Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, Assessing Drug Pricing Reform
12

Fall 2020]

Who’s Afraid of Section 1498?

7

But the statute is not limited to such uses, and our focus in this
Article is to show that § 1498 need not be at all extreme in its
operation or impact. Under its authority to have patented inventions
“used or manufactured by or for the United States” at the cost of
“reasonable and entire compensation,” the government can fine-tune
the scope and duration of its invocation of § 1498 to make modest
interventions in the market, perhaps with only limited disruption to
investment-backed expectations. And as a matter of history, § 1498
is not nearly as exceptional as some modern critics make it out to
be. The government has long exercised both § 1498 and even
stronger government patent-use powers, often with substantial
support from the stakeholder community.
To highlight this more modest, ordinary role that § 1498 can
play in national policy, we consider a specific class of uses: federal
responses to complex large-scale crises, including the COVID-19
pandemic that the world faces today. While the statute’s
effectiveness can go well beyond crisis management, a focus on
emergency contexts reveals particular aspects and advantages of
§ 1498 that illuminate its value and carry over into non-emergency
contexts as well. To be sure, national emergencies entail some policy
considerations different from those of non-emergency times, but
nevertheless they helpfully draw focus to latent features of § 1498
that might otherwise escape attention. We find that § 1498 is well
suited to a perfectly ordinary role as a crisis management policy tool,
on the same plane as other emergency powers such as the Defense
Production Act, the invocation of which many have supported to
tackle COVID-19.16
Proposals: The Real Leverage and Benefits of Competitive Licensing, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20191101.594551/full (noting unique benefits of compulsory licensing of
patents on prescription drugs); Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government
Patent Use to Address the Rising Cost of Naloxone: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio,
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 472 (2018).
16
See, e.g., Tim Hains, Nancy Pelosi: President Trump Must Use Defense
Production Act to Build More Ventilators Now, “Save Lives,” REALCLEAR POL.
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/03/31/pelosi_
trump_must_use_defense_production_act_to_build_more_ventilators_now.html;
Caleb Watney & Alec Stapp, Masks for All: Using Purchase Guarantees and
Targeted Deregulation to Boost Production of Essential Medical Equipment,
MERCATUS CTR. 3–5 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/
covid-19-crisis-response/masks-all-using-purchase-guarantees-and-targetedderegulation.
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This Article is, to our knowledge, the first to consider in detail
the special role of government patent use in cases of national
emergency in the United States.17 Past scholarship on the historical
development and use of § 1498 has tended to focus on judicial cases
where patents were actually used by the U.S. government under the
statute or its predecessors, 18 which are useful for explicating the
scope and nature of the statute but less helpful for assessing the
appropriateness of invoking it in the first place (since, after all, a
case about government patent use can only arise after the
government has used the patent). A handful discuss its legislative
history and note in passing its connection to American involvement
in World War I. 19 Turning to normative analyses, substantial
While this Article does not treat international or foreign law extensively, we
note that § 1498 is related to and consistent with international treaty provisions
and other nations’ laws that permit for compulsory licensing “in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use.” See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 31(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299;
Coenraad Visser, Patent Exceptions and Limitations in the Health Context, U.N.
Doc. SCP/15/3 (Sept. 2, 2010). For discussion of the international dimensions of
government patent use in emergency situations, see Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn,
Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration:
A Database Analysis, PLOS MED., 2012, at 3; Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation
Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and Immunity in the Development of
Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 151 (2005); Robert
Shapiro, Patent Infringement During a Time of National Emergency: Are
Canadian, American and Mexican Governments Permitted to Do So Under Their
Domestic Law, NAFTA and TRIPS; If So at What Cost?, 18 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL
& SOC. ISSUES 37, 44–56 (2004); and Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of
Patents During the Pandemic (Dec. 11, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3636456.
18
See, e.g., James E. Denny, Eminent Domain Aspects of 28 USC 1498, 4 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 257, 257–74 (1960); Lionel M.
Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government
Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 408–15 (1995); Richard J. McNeely,
Governmental Indirect Patent Infringement: The Need to Hold Uncle Sam
Accountable Under 28 U.S.C § 1498, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 1065, 1100–05, 1112–
18 (2007); Blake E. Reese, Note, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: An International and
Comparative Study of Governments’ Rights to “Infringe” Patents in Light of the
Federal Circuit’s Recent Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and a Call for
Congress to Modernize the Statute, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 84, 86–102 (2006).
19
See Colleen V. Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the
17
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literature addresses the question of whether government patent use
under § 1498 constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking of property,20 a
proposition that the Federal Circuit recently rejected. 21 That
literature does not generally distinguish emergency conditions from
other situations. 22 Others have considered the role of § 1498 in
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 853, 868 (2003) (“[T]he statute was originally conceived with wartime
urgency in mind”); Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right? The
Confused Early History of Government Patent Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 188 (2012); William Brownell Humphrey, A History and
Analysis of Section 1498 of Title 28 of the United States Code Dealing with
Unlicensed Use of Patents by the United States Government and Its Effect on
Procurement 9–12 (1974) (unpublished thesis), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/
AD0777985.pdf. Brennan and colleagues give a “brief” history of § 1498’s
application that is more extensive than most, though they consider use of the
statute broadly rather than its specific application to national emergencies. See
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 298–307.
20
For analysis contending that it is, see, for example, Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) and the Unconstitutional Taking of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5
(2011) (arguing that, being an act of eminent domain, exercise of § 1498 requires
compensation for litigation costs); Lavenue, supra note 18, at 506 (similar); David
R. Lipson, We’re Not Under Title 35 Anymore: Patent Litigation Against the
United States Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2003).
For contrary views, see, for example, Denny, supra note 18, at 274 (finding
eminent-domain treatment of § 1498 to be “unfortunate in the many problems that
have arisen” in the case law as a result); Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara,
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV. 963, 991–92 (2019)
(observing that government patent use “is described in terms of eminent domain
or takings when that characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at
hand”). Much of this commentary was prompted by a Federal Circuit panel
decision in Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek I) that government patent use was
not a Fifth Amendment taking. See 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc); Bradley M. Taub,
Why Bother Calling Patents Property—The Government’s Path to License Any
Patent and Maybe Pay for It, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 154
(2006); Justin Torres, The Government Giveth, and the Government Taketh Away:
Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 315, 338–
41 (2007); Reese, supra note 18, at 117–19. That decision was vacated when an
en banc court reversed the panel on different grounds. See Zoltek Corp. v. United
States (Zoltek II), 672 F.3d at 1318 (vacating Zoltek I); id. at 1327 (“[W]e need
not and do not reach the issue of the Government’s possible liability under the
Constitution for a taking.”).
21
See Golden v. United States, 955 F.3d 981, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also infra
notes 213–212–220.
22
Earlier commentary from about the 1960s, by contrast, does occasionally note
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specific fields such as health care, 23 government contracting and
procurement,24 and human rights.25
Commentators have, to be sure, considered the applicability of
§ 1498 to certain specific emergency contexts. 26 Several
commentators have suggested that § 1498 may be useful in a public
health emergency, for example.27 Some have specifically supported
government patent use as a relief measure during the COVID-19
pandemic. 28 Others have noted the statute’s relationship to war,
generally in service of concluding its use is inappropriate outside of

this distinction, perhaps because the active area of discussion at that time was the
role of § 1498 in government procurement. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 19,
at 21.
23
See references cited supra note 15.
24
See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 19, at 14–20; Lavenue, supra note 18, at 483–
87; Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in
Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
5, 9–14 (1967).
25
See Cahoy, supra note 2, at 501–07.
26
See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A
Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights,
40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 136 (2002) (rejecting “blanket arguments” against § 1498);
see also Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift
Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “SuperTerrorism,” 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 291 (2002) (calling for compulsory
licensing to respond to “super-terrorism”). Torrance provides a comprehensive
review of patent-related options, including § 1498, during a natural disaster, but
focuses on a new statutory proposal. See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the
Rescue—Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 354
(2007).
27
See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such
as an Influenza Pandemic, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2009); McGarey
& Levey, supra note 15, at 1115 (briefly noting speed advantages of § 1498 in
cases of “a public health need for the invention, particularly an immediate need”);
Neiloy Sircar, Public Health Emergencies: Reconciling Trips and IHR (2005), 41
HOUS. J. INT’L L. SIDEBAR 101, 120 (2018); cf. Amanda Mitchell, Tamiflu, the
Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses: An Exploration of the Government’s
Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95 CAL. L. REV. 535, 557–58 (2007)
(favoring condemnation of patents over § 1498 during an influenza epidemic).
One article considers several advantages and drawbacks of government patent use
during an emergency, but ultimately reaches no conclusion and recommends that
governments “continue to use their negotiating skills in hopes of securing
agreements” with patent holders. Shapiro, supra note 17, at 62.
28
See Kumar, supra note 17, at 27–30; sources cited supra note 12.
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wartime.29 But this research generally stops at observing that § 1498
could remediate (or not remediate) particular situations, without
developing a more comprehensive theoretical basis for when and
why the government should make use of third-party patents during
national emergencies. And some scholars, 30 including Hemel and
Ouellette, 31 have advocated for an alternative approach to
expanding access to patented anti-COVID-19 technologies—patent
buyouts of some sort—without (to our knowledge) weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of a buyout against those of
government patent use under § 1498.
This Article thus makes several contributions. First, it provides
an up-to-date primer on government patent use—what it is, how it
works, and how it compares to other policy tools to incentivize new
inventions and allocate access to those inventions. 32 Second, it
makes a novel descriptive contribution by synthesizing the history

See, e.g., Taub, supra note 20, at 171–72; Humphrey, supra note 19, at 21
(quoting speech by Leonard Rawicz, Patent Counsel, Goddard Space Flight
Center) (“[S]ome view that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 1498 was to assure patent
litigation free procurement only during a national emergency or war . . . .”);
Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman,
J., concurring).
30
See, e.g., Anton Howes, Bringing the Future Forward, ENTREPRENEURS
NETWORK (May 27, 2020), https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/bringing-thefuture-forward; Anton Howes, Innovation: Eyes on the Prize, ENTREPRENEURS
NETWORK (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/innovationeyes-on-the-prize; Thomas Pogge & Peggy Tse, Restructuring Pharmaceutical
Innovation, CHINA GLOBAL TELEVISION NETWORK (June 2, 2020), https://news.
cgtn.com/news/2020-06-02/Restructuring-pharmaceutical-innovation-QZq50NZ
Oxi/index.html.
31
See Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Pharmaceutical Profits and Public Health
Are Not Incompatible, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/08/opinion/coronavirus-drug-company-profits.html.
32
Others have covered large portions of this descriptive terrain before us, though
we see value in explaining the basics, particularly as a Cabinet Secretary professed
ignorance of § 1498 just last year (despite writing about the law in 2002). See Ari
Shapiro & Selena Simmons-Duffin, How HHS Secretary Reconciles Proposed
Medicaid Cuts, Stopping the Spread of HIV, NPR (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.
npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/08/711020181/how-trumps-hhsreconciles-medicaid-cuts-with-stopping-the-spread-of-hiv (quoting Secretary
Alex Azar as stating that “There’s no such thing as a legal right to break patents
in the United States.”). But see Alex Azar II, Cipro: Good Deal, Good Policy, AM.
LAW., Apr. 2002, at 141 (“Section 1498(a) permits the United States to procure
items without first obtaining a license, so long as it pays reasonable and entire
compensation.”).
29

12

Yale Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 23

of the use of § 1498 and related statutes in times of national
emergency. We include numerous early examples of government
patent use that have not been explored in the legal academic
literature. Even though the law has never been limited to those
contexts and has broader application, § 1498 and norms of
government patent use were shaped by national emergencies like the
two world wars, and government patent use was widely accepted to
be a valuable and critical tool during such emergencies. Third, the
Article makes a novel, general normative case for government
patent use in national emergencies, based on four key features of
§ 1498: (1) speed, (2) flexibility, (3) ex post determination of the
appropriate compensation and (4) determination of that
compensation by an impartial adjudicator. Whenever these four
features are advantageous—which will be true in most national
emergency situations, as we show, but may also apply in
peacetime—the U.S. government should strongly consider
government patent use over patent buyouts and other policy tools.
Government patent use under § 1498 can be used in many ways, big
and small, in a national emergency. Fourth, we provide a novel
roadmap to government patent use in one particularly practical use
case: ensuring adequate and affordable access to remdesivir, an
antiviral drug, in the COVID-19 pandemic.
While the focus of this Article is the utility of § 1498 in the
context of a national crisis, government patent use does not need to
be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. We aim to demonstrate
that government patent use is a flexible, highly useful policy tool.
As we show below, § 1498 can be used modestly as well as
massively to achieve various public benefits—lowering prices,
expanding supply, or shielding socially useful activity from the risk
of liability or injunction. The four key features of § 1498 that we
highlight are permanent features of the section, and their benefits
may warrant government patent use in ordinary circumstances as
well as extraordinary ones, and not just in times of crisis but in times
of relative calm, too. Ultimately, § 1498 is as much a Swiss Army
knife as a sledgehammer.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the historical
development of § 1498 and government patent use, particularly
from a legislative and policy perspective, to assess perceptions and
legislative expansions of the role of government patent use during
times of national emergency. Part II briefly describes the presentday nature of § 1498 and places it in the context of other policy tools
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relevant to technological development and national crisis
management. Part III then identifies several key advantages of
§ 1498 that are especially pertinent to large-scale crisis situations.
Those advantages can be used as factors to assess the utility of
§ 1498 in particular situations, which we demonstrate through a case
study of government patent use to expand supply and access to the
COVID-19 treatment remdesivir. Part IV briefly concludes.
I. HISTORICAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT PATENT USE IN
TIMES OF CRISIS
Throughout history, § 1498 has been closely tied to American
responses to national crises. In addition to reviewing the origins of
§ 1498, the discussion below focuses on three examples: the First
World War, the Second World War, and the bioterrorism threat
following September 11, 2001.
While the U.S. government used § 1498 extensively at these
times and others, 33 the purpose of this Part is not to catalog
invocations of § 1498. Instead, to discern the policy considerations
that motivate the legislative and executive branches to contemplate
government patent use, we focus on the complex and disputed cases,
namely situations where policymakers relied on powers broader
than § 1498, amended § 1498, or publicly contested the application
of that statute. Aside from there being better records of these
disputed cases,34 the arguments elicited best highlight lawmakers’
interests and motivations in ways that are instructive for future
situations of government patent use.
A. Origin of the Statute
Enacted in 1910, the first incarnation of § 149835 was not born
of any national emergency—it was triggered by Congress repaving
the Capitol building. In Schillinger v. United States, the owner of a
patent on a concrete pavement method brought an infringement suit
For articles reviewing cases under and invocations of § 1498, see generally
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 302–07; Denny, supra note 18, at 258–74;
Lavenue, supra note 18, at 452–72.
34
Because there is no formal process for invoking § 1498, see infra text
accompanying note 230, uses of the statute are not catalogued and may even go
unrecorded.
35
See Act of June 25, 1910 (1910 Act), ch. 423, 36 STAT. 851. The law was not
numbered “§ 1498” at the time, but the government patent use laws described
herein share a direct lineage to contemporary § 1498. See § 1498, hist. n. (noting
derivation from 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1940)); 35 U.S.C. § 68 (noting derivation from
1910 Act). Accordingly for purposes of simplicity, this Article uses that section
number to refer to the statute throughout.
33
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against the government, whose contractor had used the patented
method during the Capitol renovation. 36 The Supreme Court
rejected the suit on grounds of sovereign immunity.37 Despite the
Tucker Act having partially waived sovereign immunity for “claims
founded upon the Constitution . . . or upon any contract” with the
United States, 38 the Court found this waiver inapplicable. The
contract provision did not apply because the patent infringement
action was “one sounding in tort.”39 Nor was the action “founded
upon the Constitution” despite the patent holder’s protestations that
the government’s infringement was a “taking of private property,”
as the Court deemed that reading excessively broad;40 instead the
Court read the waiver of sovereign immunity for Constitutionfounded claims to exclude torts.41
In response to Schillinger, Congress enacted the Act of June 25,
1910 to “provide additional protection for owners of patents” by
offering them a cause of action for “reasonable compensation” (but
not injunctive relief) for any use of a patented invention “by the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to
use the same.”42 Contrary to how some have viewed the law, then,
the logic of § 1498’s predecessor statute was not that it cut back on
patentees’ remedies against the government; the baseline situation
was that no remedy was available at all in view of sovereign
immunity, and § 1498’s predecessor expanded patent protection by
offering a new, albeit partial, remedy for government use.43
155 U.S. 163, 171–72 (1894).
See id. at 167 (“The general principle which we have already stated as
applicable to all governments, forbids, on a policy imposed by necessity, that they
should hold themselves liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted by their officers
on the citizen, though occurring while engaged in the discharge of official
duties.”) (quoting Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1869)).
38
Tucker Act, ch. 359, sec. 1, 24 STAT. 505, 505 (1887), quoted in Schillinger,
155 U.S. at 167.
39
Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 169.
40
Id. at 168 (“Can it be that Congress intended that every wrongful arrest and
detention of an individual, or seizure of his property by an officer of the
government, should expose it to an action for damages in the Court of Claims?”).
41
Id. (“[Congress] added, ‘all claims founded upon the Constitution of the United
States,’ but that does not include claims founded upon torts . . . .”).
42
Act of June 25, 1910 (1910 Act), ch. 423, 36 STAT. 851.
43
See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 298-99; see also ADDITIONAL PROTECTION
FOR OWNERS OF PATENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, at 3 (1910) (“Our only purpose
is to extend the jurisdiction of [the Court of Claims] so that it may entertain suits
36
37
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While national emergencies did not cause § 1498’s original
enactment, at least some members of Congress recognized the law’s
close tie to one sort of emergency condition: national security. The
House report “conceded that the Government ought to have the right
to appropriate any invention necessary or convenient for natural
defense or for beneficent public use, and that, too, without previous
arrangement or negotiation with the owner.” 44 The congressional
debate record also reveals that Congress consulted with the War and
Navy Departments on the bill, and Representative Currier, the
leading proponent of the 1910 Act in the House, specifically called
out during the debate the possibility that “government officers can
be restrained in preparing the national defense.” 45 In subsequent
debate, Representative Dalzell, another proponent of the bill, was
asked what should happen if “one of our officers of the army or the
navy, having invented some useful implement of war, should decline
to allow the Government to have it.” Dalzell’s answer was that the
invention “ought to be appropriated by the Government by due
process of law.”46 Thus, § 1498 in its origins was plainly envisioned
to have applicability outside of national emergencies—repaving the
Capitol was rather clearly not one—but the statute’s authors
recognized its relevance to emergency conditions from the very
beginning.
B. World War I
Hypothetical national security and emergency response
concerns became reality during the First World War. As a war that
heavily exploited science in the service of combat and that arguably
invented the military public–private partnership,47 World War I set
and award compensation to the owners of patents . . . .”). One might wonder
whether the statutory language “without . . . lawful right to use” in the 1910 Act
undercuts this view of § 1498 as expanding conditions on the patent grant, the
argument being that if the government has a preexisting right to use a patent, then
the statute could not logically refer to situations where the government is
“without . . . lawful right to use” the patent. But the legislative history makes clear
that the aforementioned provision was intended to refer to a different form of
“lawful right to use,” namely shop rights arising from inventions of government
employees. See H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, supra, at 3.
44
H.R. REP. NO. 61-1288, supra note 43, at 2. The term “natural defense” is likely
a typographical error; it probably should have been “national defense.”
45
45 CONG. REC. 8759 (1910).
46
Id. at 8781 (1910).
47
See M. Anthony Mills & Mark P. Mills, The Invention of the War Machine, 42
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the stage for clashes between patents and national defense, clashes
that would sharpen the role of government patent use in times of
crisis. While patent disputes interfered with the war effort with
respect to multiple technologies, 48 the development of aviation
technology most clearly characterizes the role of government patent
use during war.
The Wright brothers’ solution to the lateral-roll problem in 1903
gave birth to a worldwide industry of powered aircraft.49 It also gave
birth to a massive tangle of patent litigation, as the Wrights’ main
competitor, airplane manufacturer Glenn Curtiss, sought to avoid
the Wrights’ patented twisting-wing design through a design-around
involving inflexible hinged ailerons.50 Across the early 1900s, the
brothers waged a forceful campaign of patent lawsuits against not
just Curtiss and other manufacturers but also individual aviators at
flying exhibitions, reportedly springing service on them
immediately after the shows. 51 And both Curtiss and the Wrights
engaged in patent licensing at rates that some historians have

NEW ATLANTIS 3, 3 (2014); see also KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN, TORPEDO:
INVENTING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN 2–3 (2014) (describing role of torpedoes “in the invention of the
military-industrial complex”).
48

Disputes over torpedo technology, for example, would drag the government
through almost a decade of litigation and arguably stall American torpedo
development. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 188–90 (1920);
EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 154; Charles Duan, Of Monopolies and Monocultures:
The Intersection of Patents and National Security, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 369, 388–89 (2020). The Chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance wrote that
its torpedo contractor, the E.W. Bliss Company, had used its patent-backed
“monopoly” to force the government “to accept the terms offered or get no
torpedoes,” which ultimately “influenced the E.W. Bliss Company in its prices,
deliveries and workmanship.” Letter from N.E. Mason, Chief of Bureau of
Ordnance, to Sec’y of the Navy, in Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the
Navy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 59th Cong. 433, 436
(1907), https://www.loc.gov/item/tmp92007441.
49
See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 3 ll. 12–30 (filed Mar. 23, 1903); see also Wright
Co. v. Herring–Curtiss Co., 177 F. 257, 259 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910) (noting
Wrights’ successful demonstrations), rev’d, 180 F. 110 (C.C.A.2d 1910).
50
See Wright, 177 F. at 259–60; Herbert A. Johnson, The Wright Patent Wars and
Early American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 21, 28–30 (2004) .
51
See Johnson, supra note 50, at 31–33 & note 39 (noting “resentment that the
Wright Company allowed flying events to occur, and decided whether to sue after
the exhibition had been staged”).
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described as “almost confiscatory” and “prohibitive.”52
The Wrights’ vigorous patent enforcement is generally
considered to have been a key impediment to aviation technology
innovation in the United States.53 By 1910, Europe had outstripped
the United States in airplane motor design, and had made great
strides in fixed single-wing aircraft while American manufacturers
remained fixated on the Wrights’ flexible two-wing configuration.
In 1913, on the eve of World War I, the United States was far behind
other nations in military aviation: France held 266 military airplanes
while the United States sported just six.54
With looming war and an industry impasse, the government’s
military branches found it necessary to take action. Congress in
1915 had formed a National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics,55
and in January 1917, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Acting Secretary of War W.M. Ingraham asked

LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS,
BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES 203 (2014); 1 ALEX ROLAND, MODEL
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 1915–
1958, at 38 (1985).
53
There is some debate as to the relationship between the Wrights’ patent activity
and American innovation lag. The conventional view is that American firms
eschewed investment in airplane technology out of fear of lawsuits or excessive
royalty demands. See, e.g., ROLAND, supra note 52, at 38; Phaedra Hise, How The
Wright Brothers Blew It, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2003), https://www.forbes.com/2003/
11/19/1119aviation.html; Johnson, supra note 50, at 42–43; Scott McCartney,
Wright Brothers’ Patent Battle Proved Costly in Aviation Race, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
17, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107159573141697200; Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890–91 (1990). But several dissenting scholars note that
there was substantial investment in airplane manufacturing during the pendency
of the lawsuits and immediately after. See Tom D. Crouch, Blaming Wilbur and
Orville: The Wright Patent Suits and the Growth of American Aeronautics, in
ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 290–91 (Peter Galison &
Alex Roland eds., 2000); Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of the
Early Aviation Patent Hold-up—How a US Government Monopsony
Commandeered Pioneer Airplane Patents, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1, 11
(2014). A potentially better explanation, as one of us has hypothesized elsewhere,
is that the Wrights’ litigation campaign, especially against foreign aviators,
dampened knowledge crossovers between the United States and Europe. See
Duan, supra note 48, at 391–92.
54
See TOM D. CROUCH, WINGS: A HISTORY OF AVIATION FROM KITES TO THE
SPACE AGE 147 (2003).
55
See ROLAND, supra note 52, at 24.
52
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NACA for a solution to the patent dilemma. 56 In response, the
committee’s chairman Charles D. Walcott petitioned President
Wilson in February to introduce legislation to appropriate $1 million
for acquiring aviation patents “by purchase, condemnation,
donation, or otherwise.” The legislation was enacted in a naval
appropriations bill on March 4, 1917.57
The ability to obtain patents by “condemnation”—that is,
seizure by eminent domain—was enough to bring the Wright-Martin
and Curtiss-Burgess companies into a cross-licensing agreement.58
Under the supervision of NACA and military representatives, the
aircraft manufacturers formed the Manufacturers’ Aircraft
Association and agreed to pay the MAA a royalty of $200 per
airplane—substantially less than Wright-Martin’s usual $1000
rate—to be distributed among the patent holders according to set
percentages.59 Even so, the War and Navy Departments found the
$200 royalty rate infeasible given the government’s expected
wartime needs for airplane manufacturing, and threatened “to
proceed to condemn the necessary patents” unless the MAA reduced
the royalty rates to $100 per plane, with a maximum payment of $2
million. 60 The MAA agreed, granting in March 1918 the
government the requested royalty “during the period of the present
war.”61
To be sure, the aviation patent arrangement is not necessarily a
model for future actions: Outright condemnation of patents is far
stronger than use under § 1498, 62 and the MAA, which would
outlive World War I by almost a half century, came to be the sort of
patent-backed industry cartel that antitrust reformers of the late
1930s would come to criticize strongly. 63 But the airplane patent
wars show how patents can cause problematic unpreparedness in the
face of a national crisis such as war, and the origins of the MAA
show the government’s once-unhesitating willingness to invoke the
See id. at 38.
See Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 180, 39 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1917);
ROLAND, supra note 52, at 39.
58
See ROLAND, supra note 52, at 39–41; Johnson, supra note 50, at 57.
59
See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 487 (1933);
Johnson, supra note 50, at 57.
60
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, 77 Ct. Cl. at 491.
61
Id. at 492.
62
See discussion infra notes 216–218 and accompanying text.
63
See Johnson, supra note 50, at 58–61.
56
57
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power of government patent use to bargain for satisfactory licensing
arrangements in times of crisis.
Coming off of its successes dealing with aviation patents, the
Navy Department next looked to expand government patent use
more broadly. In April 1918, Navy Secretary Roosevelt wrote to
Congress proposing an expansion of the government patent use
statute then in force.64 The occasion for Roosevelt’s letter was the
Supreme Court’s decision in William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine
Building Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. a month
earlier, which held that despite the 1910 Act, a government
contractor could be sued and enjoined for patent infringement. 65
Reasoning that the 1910 Act was intended “not to weaken the rights
of patentees, but to further secure them,” the Court concluded that
the statute could not have acted to eliminate suits against
government contractors. 66 The Navy, according to Roosevelt, had
been working on the opposite assumption that contractors were
insulated from suit, and the Court’s decision apparently was now
deterring contractors from working with the government.67
Roosevelt’s proposed amendment to the 1910 Act was
introduced in a Senate amendment to the House naval
appropriations bill on May 22, 1918.68 The amendment was brought
to the House floor by Representative Lemuel P. Padgett, chair of the
House Committee on Naval Affairs, on June 18.69 Padgett initially
expressed “great reluctance” about bringing a patent law
See Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Sec’y of the Navy, to Benjamin
R. Tillman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Naval Affairs, in Wood v. Atl. Gulf &
Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720, 720 (S.D. Ala. 1924).
65
See 246 U.S. 28, 42 (1918) (finding “want of foundation for the contention
that . . . the statute conferred upon all who contracted with the United States for
the performance of work a right to disregard and take without compensation the
property of patentees”).
66
Id. at 37.
67
See Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 721. The Navy’s justification was that it had
relied a prior case, Crozier v. Fried. Krupp AG, 224 U.S. 290 (1912), for the
proposition that the 1910 Act insulated government contractors from suit. See
Roosevelt, supra note 64, at 721. While Crozier involved infringement by a
federal officer, the Court reasoned that the statute applied because “the United
States shall be considered as having ratified the act of the officer and be treated as
responsible pecuniarily for the consequences.” Crozier, 224 U.S. at 305. It appears
that the Navy assumed (apparently wrongly, in light of Cramp) that this
ratification logic would apply to contractors as well.
68
56 CONG. REC. 6886 (1918).
69
Id. at 7960.
64
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amendment to a naval appropriations bill but defended its placement
based on the Navy’s need for the amendment.70 A colleague quickly
allayed his concerns:
Mr. [William E.] Cox. Does not the gentleman feel
that this is a law that would expedite the
manufacture of war material?
Mr. Padgett. That is what I am going to do.
Mr. Cox. I think the gentleman could get it in three
minutes.71
As Cox predicted, the amendment was agreed to, and enacted
into law on July 1.72
The 1918 amendment effected a recognition of government
patent use not just as a compensatory mechanism for patent holders
but also as a shield enabling the government to protect certain patent
users from injunctions and liability for patent infringement. That
such an amendment could pass “in three minutes” when it would
“expedite the manufacture of war material” shows that, at least in
emergency circumstances such as war, there was no objection to the
government limiting patent liability in the service of the public.
C. World War II
Government patent use would arise forcefully again at the start
of the Second World War. Here as well the historical events show
the unique relevance that the government use statute can play at a
time of national emergency. In particular, the start of American entry
into the war highlighted the immediacy and unpredictability of
needs with respect to patents—immediacy and unpredictability that
made § 1498 especially well-suited.
To see how the national emergency of a world war invited
government patent use, we begin with the pre-war conversation over
patents, which was closely tied to the conversation over competition
policy. Beginning in the late 1930s, concerns arose over dominant
firms and the role of antitrust law in policing oligopoly collusion. 73
See id. at 7961.
Id.
72
See id.; Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 114, 40 STAT. 704, 705 (1918).
73
President Roosevelt’s 1938 anti-monopoly speech to Congress is generally
considered to signal the opening of this period. See 1938 FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, Recommendations to the Congress to Curb Monopolies and the
Concentration of Economic Power, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 305, 306 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941), https://quod.
70
71
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The charge was led by Thurman Arnold, President Roosevelt’s 1938
appointee to the post of Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. 74 Arnold, a Yale law
professor, vigorously pursued an agenda of breaking up industry
cartels. 75 In his view, monopolistic and oligopolistic industries
encouraged higher prices, constrained supply, and slowed
innovation; the last point was exemplified by an agreement under
which lightbulb manufacturers agreed not to invent low-wattage
fluorescent bulbs so as not to cut into the electric utilities’ profits.76
Patents were seen, at the time, as a primary vehicle for bigbusiness abuse to bolster those cartels. In a 1942 essay in the Atlantic
Monthly, Arnold described the patent laws as the “principal smoke
screens under which domestic and international cartels have cloaked
their activities,” insofar as arrangements such as patent pools
enabled firms to divide up markets, fix prices, and restrict consumerbeneficial innovation. 77 These views were not unique: Roosevelt
himself criticized the use of patents “to create industrial
monopolies.” 78 Roosevelt’s call to end monopoly abuse led
Congress in 1938 to create the Temporary National Economic
Committee to “make a full and complete study and
investigation . . . on monopoly and the concentration of economic
power,”79 and it is indicative of the close tie between patents and
antitrust that the TNEC’s first formal non-introductory proceeding
was on “the effect of the use of patents upon industry.”80 In its final
lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus; see also Gene M. Gressley, Thurman Arnold, Antitrust,
and the New Deal, 38 BUS. HIST. REV. 214, 217 (1964).
74
See Gressley, supra note 73, at 217–18; Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust
Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 569, 574–77 (2004).
75
See Gressley, supra note 73, at 222–25 (describing Arnold’s approach to
antitrust enforcement); Waller, supra note 74, at 588–94 (listing cases brought).
In his later years, Arnold co-founded the law firm Arnold & Porter.
76
See Thurman W. Arnold, The Abuse of Patents, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 531, 539–
40 (1942); see also id. at 536–38 (industry agreement not to develop synthetic
rubber technology); id. at 538–39 (agreement not to improve flashlight bulbs in
service of battery manufacturers).
77
Id. at 536.
78
Roosevelt, supra note 73, at 318.
79
Joint Resolution to Create a Temporary National Economic Committee,
ch. 456, § 2(a), 52 STAT. 705, 705 (1938).
80
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Before the
Temporary National Economic Comm., 75th Cong. 253, 253 (1939–1941). Arnold
was a member of the committee and the initial witness at the patent hearing. See
id. at 254.

22

Yale Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 23

report in 1941, the TNEC’s lead suggestions for legislative changes
focused on patents, with the report finding that “[n]o one can read
the testimony developed before this committee on patents without
coming to a realization that in many important segments of our
economy the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been
shamefully abused.”81
While these concerns about patents arose independently from
the war, Arnold and others drew an immediate connection: Patents
enabled cartels, cartels enjoyed benefits from constraining supply
and limiting certain forms of technological advancement, and limits
on supply and innovation hampered the war effort.82 In March 1941
the House Committee on Patents held a hearing to consider a bill
that would enable the Commissioner of Patents to declare certain
patents “necessary to the national defense” and thereby restrict
injunctive relief on those patents “during the continuance of the
national emergency” that the president had declared as of September
1939. 83 There, Arnold testified on how patent arrangements
constrained military supply, describing in particular how a deal
between the dominant optical glass manufacturers, Bausch & Lomb
in America and Zeiss in Germany, was creating a shortage of
military-grade optical lenses: “our production goes down . . . and
German production goes shooting up.”84
At a time when American entry into the war was still
speculative, the Patents Committee found the war–patent connection
too speculative as well. Committee Chair Charles Kramer harshly
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, S.
DOC. NO. 77-35, at 36 (1941), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001430359.
The report specifically recommended compulsory licensing of patents,
prohibition on use-restricted licenses, recordation of assignments, limitations on
infringement actions, and forfeiture of patents for licensing violations. Id. at 36–
37. Well ahead of its time, the report also called for creation of a single patent
appeals court and a patent term of twenty years from filing rather than seventeen
years from issuance. Id. at 37.
82
See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 76, at 536–37.
83
H.R. 3360, 77th Cong. § 1 (1941), reprinted in Preventing Publication of
Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents: Hearings on H.R. 3359 and
H.R. 3360 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 55 (1941), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/002009460.
84
Preventing Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents,
supra note 83, at 119; see also id. at 148 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant
Att’y Gen.) (“Bausch & Lomb and Zeiss have unlawfully combined and conspired
to suppress and limit competition in military optical instruments . . . .”).
81
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criticized Arnold, questioning the accusations against Bausch &
Lomb85 and later flatly accusing Arnold of “attacking” the patent
system. 86 More importantly, the Committee asked military
representatives to assess the need for the bill; the representatives
could not identify any. Major Francis H. Vanderwerker, representing
the War Department, supported the patent bill based on the
possibility that “in some of the other Government departments there
may be a need for this type of legislation,” but testified that “the War
Department has no present need for a bill of this character.” 87
Lieutenant Commander K.C. Caldwell noted that the Navy
Department was conducting an investigation for problematic
patents, and knew of “instances” where patents had hampered the
Navy, but did not identify any specifically.88
Skepticism about the effect of patents on national preparedness
would quickly change once the threat of war became real on
December 7, 1941. Just months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Senate Committee on Patents took up a wartime measure that went
further than the House bill, giving the president power to mandate
compulsory licensing of any patent “upon such terms and for such
period of time as the President may prescribe,” and further power
“to acquire patents, applications therefor, inventions, or licenses
under any of the foregoing, by donation, purchase, taking or
otherwise.”89 Across April–August 1942, the Committee held thirtythree days of hearings on that bill and the patent system generally.90
The chair of the Committee, Senator Homer T. Bone, opened the
hearings with a strong statement on the role of government patent
use:
No right fashioned by law is superior to the
public welfare or national interest. The very fact that
men are to die to preserve our system and our way of
life leaves only one conclusion; that is, that patent
rights and every other form of property right must be
subordinated to the all-out effort confronting us. It is
See id. at 119–20.
Id. at 131.
87
See id. at 107.
88
Id. at 109.
89
S. 2303, 77th Cong. §§ 1(a), 2 (1942), reprinted in 1 Hearings on S. 2303
Before the S. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 1 (1942), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/001511288.
90
See 1 Hearing on S. 2303, supra note 89.
85
86
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crystal clear that in this hour of trial the profit motive
cannot be accented without inviting the destruction
of morale. . . .
The American patent system enters the trenches
and goes along on the battlefield with our boys. To
the extent that they achieve victory, to the same
extent do we achieve safety and security for our
social and economic system.91
The House Patents Committee, for its part, also revisited patents
during the exigencies of war in October 1942, as it considered an
emergency legislative proposal from the War and Navy
Departments. 92 The statutory proposal, subsequently enacted into
law, was intended “to aid in the successful prosecution of the War”93
and had two primary effects. First, the statute cleared up an
ambiguity as to whether subcontractors were covered under § 1498,
making explicit that “a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person,
firm, or corporation” could enjoy immunity to a patent infringement
suit based on government use. 94 Second, the statute enabled a
government department to identify patent royalties “which are
believed to be unreasonable or excessive” and to terminate payment
of such royalties, fixing an alternate rate that the department head
determined to be “fair and just, taking into account the conditions of
wartime production.”95 The patentee in that situation was not stuck
with the department-authorized royalty, but could bring suit in
federal court to recover any deficiency from “fair and just
compensation.”96 This provision responded to an observed situation
in which the government already had a licensing arrangement in
place with a patent holder, but the royalty rates, though reasonable
Id. at 3–4.
See Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United
States: Hearing on H.R. 7620 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 1-4,
31-32 (Oct. 13–15, 1942) [hereinafter Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing], https://
catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100669202.
93
Royalty Adjustment Act, ch. 634, § 1, 56 STAT. 1013, 1013 (Oct. 31, 1942).
94
Id. § 6, 56 STAT. at 1014. This defect in the statute had been identified in the
1941 House hearing, for example by Commissioner of Patents Conway Coe, who
testified that it was “open to doubt, I should say, as to whether or not a
subcontractor falls under the provisions” of the 1910 Act. See Preventing
Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents, supra note 83,
at 56; see also id. at 57 (testimony of Major Vanderwerker).
95
Royalty Adjustment Act § 1, 56 STAT. at 1013.
96
Id. § 2, 56 STAT. at 1013.
91
92
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in peacetime conditions, proved excessive in view of massively
increased wartime demands;97 in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Isherwood a court had held that § 1498 was inapplicable
where the government already had a license in place. 98 The new
royalty-termination provision was carefully limited: The statute
repeatedly called on agencies and courts to consider “the conditions
of wartime production,”99 and included a sunset of the provision six
months after termination of the war.100
In stark contrast to the 1941 House committee hearing, by 1942
the military had found numerous instances of patents interfering
with wartime production. The Secretaries of War and the Navy
wrote of “a number of instances” of existing patent royalty
arrangements that “when applied to the enormous quantities needed
for the prosecution of the war such royalty rates are regarded in
some cases as exorbitant, excessive, and unfair.”101 Colonel Earl S.
Patterson offered more detail on behalf of the War Department,
testifying as to the government’s difficulties with patents on airplane
parts, recoil springs, steel milling, and radio technology. 102 The
Senate report on the legislation acknowledges the “cost of patents in
war procurement” as the driving force behind the law.103 With this
evidence and general consensus in favor, the bill swiftly passed
Congress and was enacted into law.

See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 17.
See 5 F.2d 924, 934 (1925) (government use statute inapplicable where “[t]here
was no use of a patent by the United States, without license of the owner”).
99
Royalty Adjustment Act §§ 1–2, 56 STAT. at 1013–14.
100
See id. § 7, 56 STAT. at 1014.
101
Letter from Henry L. Stimson, Sec’y of War, to Speaker, House of
Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 3, 3;
accord Letter from James Forrestal, Acting Sec’y of the Navy, to Charles Kramer,
House of Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at
31, 32.
102
See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 18–19, 22. The Navy’s
representative similarly identified examples of problematic patent licensing
arrangements, though he did not identify specific technologies, perhaps out of
secrecy concerns. See id. at 42–44.
103
See ADJUSTMENT OF ROYALTIES FOR THE USE OF INVENTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. NO. 77-1640, at 2 (1942), https://books.google.
com/books?id=FNx8zn1cIfgC&pg=RA14-PA1&lpg=RA14-PA1.
97
98
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D. Bioterrorism Threats After September 11
Government patent use and § 1498 again took center stage
amidst an immediate national threat following the terrorist attacks
on the United States on September 11, 2001. 104 This historical
episode confirmed the nondisruptive and beneficial role that § 1498
can play and indeed suggests broad acceptance of use of § 1498 in
times of need.
In the two months following the September 11 attacks,
Congress, the Bush Administration, and the public became aware of
a likely possibility of bioterrorism, specifically in the form of
anthrax spores being blanketed over a large population. 105 At the
time, the only approved antibiotic for treating anthrax was
ciprofloxacin, sold under the brand name Cipro. The drug quickly
became a household name after news anchor Tom Brokaw, himself
the recipient of an anthrax-laden letter, ran a television segment
ending with the line, “in Cipro we trust.” 106 Calls for a federal
The episode described here has been covered generally a number of times. See,
e.g., Cahoy, supra note 26, at 126–27, 171–73 (focusing on monetary
compensation to patent holder); Duan, supra note 48, at 392–94 (national security
implications); Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the Evolution of
U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth
to Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 227, 239–42
(2005) (impact on access to AIDS treatments in Africa); Shapiro, supra note 17,
at 39–41, 59–61 (pharmaceutical industry impact). One particularly interesting
source describes the situation from the perspective of Bayer’s marketing and
brand management campaign, concluding that “Bayer AG was able to be a good
and ethical corporate citizen, placate the regulatory environment, impede entry
for competitors, and enable the US government to provide the public with lifesaving medicines.” Hagai Gringarten, Bayer, Ethics, and the Anthrax Scare:
Leveraging National Crisis for a Public Relations Bonanza, in ETHICAL
BRANDING AND MARKETING: CASES AND LESSONS 69, 76 (Hagai Gringarten &
Raúl Fernández-Calienes eds., 2019).
105
See, e.g., Effective Responses to the Threat of Bioterrorism: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 107th Cong. 5 (Oct. 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist).
106
Howard Kurtz, Tom Brokaw, Putting a Familiar Face on the Anthrax Story,
WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/
2001/10/18/tom-brokaw-putting-a-familiar-face-on-the-anthrax-story/d3b2c39b74b3-4e66-8357-291a3f55f4c5/; see Donald G. McNeil Jr., A Rush for Cipro, and
the Global Ripples, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/
10/17/world/a-nation-challenged-the-drug-a-rush-for-cipro-and-the-globalripples.html. Other treatments may have been equally effective or possibly
superior; the national focus on ciprofloxacin may have been a failure of messaging
104
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stockpile of the drug, however, met a roadblock: the German firm
Bayer AG held a patent on ciprofloxacin, but was unable to meet the
government’s requisition amount for a sufficient stockpile; the
company reported that it would require almost two years to
manufacture enough.107 While generic manufacturers estimated that
they could fulfill the requisition in three months, Bayer refused to
license the patent.108
Bayer’s patent standoff led to numerous calls to invoke § 1498
to enable generic manufacturing of the drug. Alfred Engelberg, a
“smart and tough-as-nails attorney” known for his role in the HatchWaxman Act governing pharmaceuticals, 109 authored a
memorandum to Senator Chuck Schumer, laying out the case for
invoking the law and a procedure for doing so. Engelberg proposed
that the Department of Health and Human Services provide a
blanket government authorization for generic firms to submit federal

consistency from federal health experts. See Elin Gursky et al., Anthrax 2001:
Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response, 1 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 97, 105 (2003) (noting
CDC’s recommendation of doxycycline rather than ciprofloxacin); UPMC CTR.
FOR HEALTH SEC., HOW TO STEWARD MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PUBLIC
TRUST IN AN EMERGENCY: A COMMUNICATION CASEBOOK FOR FDA AND ITS
PUBLIC HEALTH PARTNERS 111–12 (2016), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.
org/our-work/events/2016%20FDA%20MCM/Summary. Some have used the
availability of alternatives to suggest that the anthrax scare was not an actual
emergency, see, e.g., Azar, supra note 32, but that would appear to be hindsight
reasoning.
107
See Elisabeth Bumiller, Administration Won’t Allow Generic Versions of Drug,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/us/nationchallenged-response-administration-won-t-allow-generic-versions-drug.html.
108
See id. For its part, Bayer thought that its production capacity was sufficient
for U.S. demand and questioned whether generic manufacturers could ramp up
production so quickly, see Vanessa Fuhrmans & Ron Winslow, Bayer Works to
Meet Soaring Cipro Demand as It Starts Campaign to Keep Patent in U.S, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003698325298160000,
despite simultaneously “exploring whether to ask some rival drug companies to
produce some of its antibiotic Cipro to make certain an adequate supply of the
drug is available,” see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Bayer May Ask Its Rivals for Help
Producing Anthrax Antibiotic Cipro, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2001), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB100334769597877200.
109
148 CONG. REC. 15,356 (2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 32 (2001).
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bids for procurement. 110 Just days later, the senator called for
invocation of the law in a press conference,111 leading to national
interest in the possibility of invoking government use of Bayer’s
patent.112
Engelberg’s memorandum is succinct in its analysis of § 1498.
It simply observes “ample authority” and “overwhelming
precedents” supporting the use of § 1498 to procure a stockpile of
ciprofloxacin,113 quotes a few cases, and moves on to more detailed
analysis of practical questions of regulatory approval and dismissal
of ongoing patent infringement litigation. The memorandum does
not discuss effects on incentives to innovate or other policy
implications of invoking government patent use at all.
One can imagine a variety of reasons for this summary
treatment of § 1498, but the likeliest is the prior context. In the
decades prior to 2001, the appropriateness of § 1498 in the context
of federal procurement—in both emergency and non-emergency
situations—was settled. A 1958 decision of the Comptroller General
addressed the question of whether procurement officers should
consider patent or patent license holdings in the course of choosing
among bids.114 The Comptroller General’s answer was no, based on
an understanding that any standard procurement invitation
automatically provided the requisite authorization and consent
under § 1498. 115 The U.S. government was, and still is, free to
procure whatever it needs from whomever it wants without
permission from patent holders. The Comptroller General’s decision
Because the memorandum does not appear to be otherwise available in any
permanent form, it is reprinted as an appendix to this Article with permission from
Mr. Engelberg. See infra Part V.
111
See Senator Seeks Generic Cipro, CNN MONEY (Oct. 16, 2001), https://money.
cnn.com/2001/10/16/news/generic_cipro.
112
See Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, Drug Firm Plays Defense in Anthrax
Scare, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/2001/10/20/drug-firm-plays-defense-in-anthrax-scare/aa3b0b39-2cb34264-a360-aed1babbe8f8. A bill was introduced a few weeks later to enable the
HHS Secretary to authorize compulsory licensing of patents during a public health
emergency. See H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (Nov. 6, 2001); see also
Avedissian, supra note 26, at 261–62.
113
In a contemporaneous interview, Engelberg remarked, “[i]t boils down to
something very simple. . . . The government has the right to procure whatever it
needs for government purposes.” Bumiller, supra note 107.
114
See Herbert Cooper Co., 38 Comp. Gen. 276, 277 (1958), https://catalog.
hathitrust.org/Record/003100408.
115
Id. at 279.
110
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sparked a wave of patentee-friendly legislative proposals across the
1960s to restrict the U.S. government’s patent-blind procurement
practice; none of the bills succeeded.116 As government procurement
officers purchased patented technologies again and again in
subsequent decades, case law confirmed repeatedly that § 1498 is
automatically invoked and “the patentees’ sole remedy [is] a suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims.”117 Given this longsettled federal policy of using § 1498 as a routine part of government
contracting, there was no need to treat in depth the question of using
§ 1498 for procuring ciprofloxacin.
In the wake of Senator Schumer’s call, Bayer rapidly moved to
oppose any invocation of § 1498. Bayer immediately launched a
comprehensive branding campaign (including a $3 million buy for
full page advertising in all the major papers) promising that the
company would “stand ready to support the United States
government providing Cipro to meet emergency needs.” 118 Bayer
and other pharmaceutical industry representatives also lobbied
Congress and the administration heavily “to provide reassurance of
Bayer’s commitment.”119 Bayer also attempted to paint government
patent use as misguided, even illegitimate, “emphasiz[ing] the
importance of patents for research and investment.”120 Remarkably,
the Bush Administration initially sided with Bayer on the aptness of
§ 1498. Likely concerned about contradicting its international
opposition to compulsory patent licensing—having rejected calls to
invoke compulsory licensing on HIV/AIDS drug patents in the
Global South as the landmark 2001 Doha Declaration was being
See Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 24, at 16–27 (describing legislative
reform proposals).
117
TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1989); W.L. Gore
& Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Motorola,
Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 771–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Decca Ltd. v. United
States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166–67 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Rel-Reeves, Inc. v. United States,
534 F.2d 274, 298 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Roberts v. Herbert Cooper Co., 236 F. Supp.
428, 430 (M.D. Pa. 1959) (“No extended discussion is required on the question
whether this action falls within the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.”).
118
Paul Holmes, Bayer Responds to Cipro Crisis, PROVOKE (Nov. 19, 2001),
https://www.provokemedia.com/latest/article/bayer-responds-to-cipro-crisis.
119
See Paul Holmes, In Cipro We Trust, PROVOKE (Oct. 22, 2002), https://www.
provokemedia.com/latest/article/in-cipro-we-trust.
120
Id.; see also Fuhrmans & Winslow, supra note 108; Gringarten, supra
note 104, at 77–79.
116
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negotiated 121 —the Bush administration publicly rebuked calls to
invoke the statute. A spokesman for HHS said that “[w]e don’t feel
there’s a need to lift the patent at this time,”122 and HHS Secretary
Tommy Thompson more bluntly rejected calls to “break” Bayer’s
patent: “No. 1, it’s illegal,” the Wall Street Journal quoted him as
saying.123
As pressure mounted, though, the government appeared to
change course: Secretary Thompson “threatened to bypass Bayer’s
patent” and was “ready to ask Congress for special legislation that
would make the government exempt from paying any damages to
Bayer for breaking the patent.”124 Ultimately, Bayer agreed to make
substantial concessions in negotiations with the government,
including massive increases in manufacturing and a price cut on
ciprofloxacin to $0.95 or less per pill, compared to $1.83 that the
government had been paying previously and the wholesale price of
$4.67.125
What role § 1498 played in that ultimate deal is a Rashomon
question with at least three possible answers. The majority view, as
reported by almost all commentators at the time and subsequently,
was that Thompson did indeed threaten to invoke § 1498, which
“provide[d] the government with the necessary leverage” to force
Bayer into a concession. 126 Indeed, Bayer’s financial statements
See Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1299, 1313–16 (2002).
122
Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat
Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2001) https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/19/
business/nation-challenged-treatment-canada-overrides-patent-for-cipro-treatanthrax.html.
123
Fuhrmans, supra note 108; see also Bumiller, supra note 107.
124
Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price for
Anthrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/
10/25/business/nation-challenged-cost-bayer-agrees-charge-government-lowerprice-for-anthrax.html; see also Dan Ackman, A New Deal on Cipro, FORBES
(Oct. 24, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20040907005526/http://www.
forbes.com:80/2001/10/24/1024topnews_print.html (quoting Thompson saying
that Bayer is “going to meet our price, which is less than $1, or else we’re going
to go to Congress and ask for some support to go in and do some other business”).
125
See Bradsher, supra note 124.
126
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 303; see, e.g., Jennifer R. Andrew, Swine Flu,
Bird Flu, Sars, Oh My—Applying the Precautionary Principle to Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under Article 31 of Trips, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
121
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noted that “in response to anthrax bioterror attacks in the United
States in 2001, the U.S. and Canadian governments contemplated
compulsory licensing of our ciprofloxacin antibiotic,” which seems
to confirm that § 1498 did come up in Bayer’s negotiations. 127
Thompson’s general counsel Alex Azar, on the other hand,
contended that Thompson “never threatened to break Bayer’s
patent,” though Thompson did advise Bayer that he was willing to
ask Congress for “authority to procure generics” in a manner that
was “hardly the same thing as threatening a company.” Azar
repeated that statement at his 2018 nomination for HHS Secretary.128
Bayer’s CEO Helge Wehmeier advanced a third view and claimed
that Thompson had not even gone that far—according to Wehmeier,
the negotiation over Cipro took “less than ten minutes” with no
invocation of leverage, from § 1498 or Congress.129
The Wehmeier and Azar views that § 1498 played no role in the
negotiations have found little traction among historians. Even those
critical of § 1498 generally accept that HHS invoked it or some other
threat of government patent use en route to negotiating a favorable

405, 411 (2011); Bayer’s Reasons for Not Giving Cipro Away; USA Slammed for
“Double Standards,” PHARMA LETTER (Nov. 7, 2001), https://www.
thepharmaletter.com/article/bayer-s-reasons-for-not-giving-cipro-away-usaslammed-for-double (noting “USA’s threat to override Bayer’s patent”); Jill
Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees to Slash Price for Cipro Drug, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 25, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003966074330899280
(describing “high-stakes threat by Tommy Thompson . . . to break Bayer’s
patent”); Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 53;
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s Health:
Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 434, 435 (2006);
Mullenbach, supra note 104, at 227; Ho, supra note 17, at 113–14; Jennifer
Penman & Fran Quigley, Better Late than Never: How the U.S. Government Can
and Should Use Bayh-Dole March-in Rights to Respond to the Medicines Access
Crisis, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171, 187–88 (2017).
127
See Bayer AG, Registration Statement (Form 20-F), at 10 (June 24, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1144145/000115697302000306/
f00360e20vf.txt; James Love, Secretary Alex Azar’s Comment on 28 USC 1498
Submitted for the Record of the 2018 Confirmation Hearings, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.keionline.org/28631.
128
Azar, supra note 32; accord Nomination of Alex Michael Azar II: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 115th Cong. 119–20 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg34341/pdf/CHRG-115shrg34341.pdf
(“Bayer was never threatened with the use of section 1498 . . . .”).
129
Holmes, supra note 118; see also Carroll & Winslow, supra note 126.
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deal for the government,130 and Azar’s letter appears to not to have
been cited in any subsequent literature.131
But Bayer’s massive public relations push, coupled with the
Bush Administration’s initial vocal disavowal of the appropriateness
of § 1498, seems to have had an important (and
underacknowledged) legacy, shifting views of § 1498 from a
routine, beneficial government power commonplace in federal
procurement to a dramatic incursion too extreme for use even in the
face of a credible terrorist threat—or even “illegal.” Legal observers
at the time were left “scratching their heads” over this change.132
This history suggests that contemporary views of § 1498 are of
relatively recent vintage, rather than being any long-held
understanding about the statute. The now widespread “conventional
wisdom” that § 1498 is an “exceptional” remedy to be used only in
a vanishingly small set of circumstances133 seems to be a product of
just the last two out of the eleven decades the statute has been on the
See F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and
(Intended) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 25, 35 (2011) (discussing the “infamous” Cipro case in which “the
Government’s threat . . . was enough to get Bayer, the patentee, to drop its price”);
Natalie Goldberg, The Bayh-Dole Act: Is It the Proper Treatment for the Big
Pharma Price-Gouging Epidemic?, 29 FED. CIR. B.J. 387, 414 (2020) (discussing
arguments against compulsory licensing but observing that “the Government has
also taken or threatened to utilize compulsory licensing . . . to address anthrax
with Cipro”); Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza
Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1164 (2009) (“The
possibility that the U.S. government might issue a compulsory license under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 . . . was very real and represented a significant departure from
existing reluctance to exercise such power.”); see also Kirby W. Lee, Permitted
Use of Patented Inventions in the United States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not
Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REV. 175, 175–76, 196 (2003) (noting
calls to “override Bayer’s patent rights” but not indicating a view as to whether
§ 1498 was used); Jason D. Ferrone, Note, Compulsory Licensing during Public
Health Crises: Bioterrorism’s Mark on Global Pharmaceutical Patent Protection,
26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 385, 409–10 (2002) (criticizing the
“contemplation of compulsory licensing of ciproflaxin [sic]” as rendering “the
U.S.-championed TRIPS Agreement less effective”).
131
A search of the HeinOnline Law Journal Library for “Azar w/50 cipro*” and
JSTOR for “(Azar cipro* ~50) AND patent” produced no relevant results other
than one of our own articles.
132
Fleischer-Black, supra note 126 (quoting a “former Reagan administration
health official” saying, “They can’t seriously be suggesting that [the government]
can’t buy generic Cipro”).
133
See sources cited supra notes 2–13.
130
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books. For much more of our nation’s history, § 1498 was used
routinely, especially in times of national emergency.
At the same time, if Engelberg and Schumer had not put § 1498
on the table, Bayer may not have made that massive public relations
push or been as conciliatory to the federal government as it
eventually was. Bayer’s efforts were described as “[u]ncertain” and
“detached” in the days before Schumer proposed invoking § 1498,
and Canada not only threatened but actually ordered a compulsory
license. 134 The company’s media and lobbying salvo focused not
just on reassuring the public of Bayer’s manufacturing capacities,
but also on “the importance of the patent issue,”135 suggesting that
Bayer’s public response was likely triggered by an expectation that
§ 1498 might actually be used. If that was so, then the Cipro crisis
both confirmed the statute’s vitality and simultaneously
marginalized it in the years to come.
E. Lessons for the COVID-19 Pandemic
The foregoing history shows that for most of the last century,
§ 1498 and government patent use more generally have been viewed
as ordinary and integral policy tools with which the U.S.
government can face emergencies of national dimension, including
public health crises. The COVID-19 pandemic is not a war or a
threat of terrorism, but it presents exigencies of the same ilk.
Millions of human lives are at stake. Success depends on rapid,
collaborative technological developments. 136 A patent system that
favors single-firm control over a technological field clashes with
that demand. The promise of pecuniary gain from patent protection
is of course a strong motivator for innovation in emergencies as in
ordinary times. But this pandemic, like all other crises, may demand
that holders of patents, as with any other roadblocks to fast
deployment of technology, temporarily cede some pecuniary gain to
limit a crisis of national, existential dimensions.
In addition to this overarching point, several other lessons may
Edmund L. Andrews, Drug Maker Seems Uncertain in Response to Cipro
Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2001) https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/20/
business/nation-challenged-drug-maker-drug-maker-seems-uncertain-responsecipro-frenzy.html; see Gringarten, supra note 104, at 75 (noting “two weeks of no
decisive response to the crisis”).
135
Holmes, supra note 118.
136
See Matt Apuzzo & David D. Kirkpatrick, Covid-19 Changed How the World
Does Science, Together, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/01/world/europe/coronavirus-science-research-cooperation.html.
134
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be drawn about the role of government patent use in national crises.
First, there is consistent general recognition that emergency
conditions demand greater government involvement in directing use
of patents. The U.S. government’s creation of the Manufacturers’
Aircraft Association after a threat of condemnation of patents
exemplifies this, 137 as does the Royalty Adjustment Act, when
Senator Bone proclaimed that the “patent system enters the trenches
and goes along on the battlefield with our boys.”138
In the past, even the patent holders and lawyers who typically
opposed government patent use quickly came around to accepting it
in emergencies. Patent attorney Lawrence Langner offered a nearly
line-by-line rebuttal to Thurman Arnold’s 1942 patents-and-cartels
article in the Atlantic Monthly, but Langner nevertheless agreed that
“the grant of compulsory licenses under all patents during the war
period . . . can be accepted in principle if it is surrounded by the
proper safeguards and the license is limited to the war period.”139
Similarly, at the 1942 House hearing, the American Patent Law
Association “approve[d] Government regulation of royalties to be
paid by the Government under patents during the emergency of war
conditions,” 140 and the American Bar Association approved in
principle the “compulsory granting of licenses under patents in
furtherance of the war effort.” 141 In the 2001 anthrax scare, a
representative for the pharmaceutical industry agreed with
“[p]utting aside personal and company considerations in a time of
crisis,” which included “making some compromises,” 142 and
another industry executive found the Cipro negotiations to be
“completely legitimate” and even would have accepted “abrogation
of patents in the time of a true national emergency.”143 Despite the
See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
1 Hearing on S. 2303, supra note 89, at 4.
139
Lawrence Langner, We Depend on Invention: An Answer to Thurman Arnold,
Atlantic Monthly, July 1942, reprinted in 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 545, 561 (1942).
140
Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 52 (statement of Karl
Fenning, American Patent Law Association).
141
Letter from Chester L. Davis, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Charles Kramer, House of
Representatives, in Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 51.
142
Gardiner Harris, Bayer’s Cipro Will Be Profitable, Even on Discount Deal With
U.S, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100404895
4559116840 (quoting Jeff Trewhitt on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America).
143
Carroll & Winslow, supra note 126 (quoting Henry McKinnell, chairman and
chief executive of Pfizer Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
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post-2001 conventional wisdom that rejects use of § 1498 even in
moments of national emergency, history demonstrates nearuniversal acceptance of government patent use in furtherance of the
national interest in times of emergency.
Second, the driving motivation behind government patent use
was often not lowering costs but increasing supply and accelerating
technological development, a finding that is especially important in
response to the dominant criticism that use of § 1498 will be
deleterious to future innovation. 144 Patent squabbles were a key
cause of the lack of American aviation technology (and plain lack of
airplanes) prior to World War I,145 and in the 1930s and ’40s they
contributed to the supply constraints that Arnold criticized.146 The
impasse over steel milling patents, as noted in the 1942 House
hearing, acutely affected wartime supply, since the War Department
reported that “all mills of the noninfringing type are already loaded
to capacity.” 147 And the threat to invoke § 1498 on Bayer’s
ciprofloxacin patent stemmed largely from fears that Bayer could
not manufacture enough antibiotic to counter a terrorist attack. To
be sure, cost was often significant: The very purpose of the Royalty
Adjustment Act was to adjust royalties to save the government
money, 148 and Cipro tablet prices were central to the HHS
negotiation. 149 But the possibility that a patent could cause the
government simply to run out of materials during a crisis has
consistently been a focus of the conversation over government
patent use. The notion that government patent use will decrease
innovation, then, must be tempered by historical cases of
government patent use increasing both production and innovation
by overcoming patent impasses.
Third, national need for patented technologies may turn out to
be highly unpredictable in an emergency situation. Just months
before the United States entered World War II, neither Congress nor
the military departments could predict what patents would pose

Nearly all of the criticisms of § 1498 described supra notes 2–13 rely on this
proposition in some form.
145
See supra note 53.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 77–84.
147
See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 19.
148
See id. at 21 (“The War Department is today fully cognizant of the fact that
patent cost in war procurement is a vital problem.”).
149
See Bradsher, supra note 124.
144
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issues or if patents would indeed pose issues at all. 150 As late as
August 1942, Arnold and his Department of Justice colleague
Francis M. Shea hypothesized that the superiority of magnesium
over steel would render the former metal of greater importance to
the war effort. 151 By October 1942, though, the military had
identified specific patents of concern and identified patents on steel
as the actual holdup. 152 Pre-war hypothesizing over government
patent use in the abstract was no substitute for wartime knowledge
of concrete public needs. Once those exact needs were identified,
expediency was of the greatest concern: Between introduction of the
Royalty Adjustment Act in Congress and its enactment into law, a
single month elapsed.153
Fourth, in times of crisis the U.S. government and the public
have historically been willing to go far beyond § 1498 with respect
to government patent use. Under § 1498, the government effectively
receives a nonexclusive license to use a patented invention on its
own behalf at a judicially-set compensation rate; the patentee’s other
rights and exclusivities are unaffected. 154 Contrast this with the
World War I authorization to condemn aviation patents,155 the World
War II bill authorizing compulsory licensing at a presidentially set
royalty rate, 156 the Royalty Adjustment Act that undid existing
government patent licenses, and Secretary Thompson’s threat that
he would go to Congress to “make the government exempt from
paying any damages to Bayer.” 157 Compared to these far more
dramatic actions and threats, § 1498 is relatively tame, suggesting a
normative reason in favor of applying the statute more often. To the
extent that § 1498 is off the table in the run-up to an emergency, as
many critics of the statute would like it to be, lawmakers may be
pressured or compelled during the emergency to act more
See supra text accompanying notes 82–88.
See Preventing Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on
Patents, supra note 83, at 140–41; Arnold, supra note 76, at 542–43.
152
See Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 19.
153
H.R. 7620 was introduced on September 30, 1942, and enacted on October 31.
See 88 CONG. REC. 7661 (1942); Royalty Adjustment Act, ch. 634, 56 STAT. 1013,
1015 (Oct. 31, 1942).
154
See § 1498(a); see also infra Part II.D.
155
See Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 180, 39 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1917).
156
See H.R. 3360, 77th Cong. § 1 (Feb. 17, 1941), reprinted in Preventing
Publication of Inventions and Prohibiting Injunctions on Patents, supra note 83,
at 55.
157
Bradsher, supra note 124.
150
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aggressively toward patents than § 1498 permits.
Finally, § 1498 enhances the government’s bargaining power;
where it is absent patentees have proven willing to hold out even in
times of crisis.158 Even after the airplane manufacturers had formed
the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association to head off condemnation
of their patents, they still demanded a royalty in excess of what the
government found feasible.159 In view of the Newport News decision
that § 1498 could not affect preexisting government patent licenses
even to adjust for increased wartime production needs,160 the Navy
Department testified to Congress that most patent owners had
“patriotically agreed to take a greatly reduced royalty,” but at least
some “owners of inventions have insisted on receiving the full
royalty even though unreasonable.” 161 In other words, where
government patent use is not available as a backstop, patent owners
may not act in the nation’s best interests. By contrast, after Senator
Schumer and (probably) HHS proposed use of § 1498 in 2001,
Bayer ceded some profits and negotiated a deal with the U.S.
government. Indeed, starting in 2005, Roche, Inc. agreed to
sublicense the patent on Tamiflu to at least nineteen contractors and
made numerous pricing concessions to alleviate potential shortages
of the influenza treatment in preparation for a possible avian flu
pandemic; while not loudly proclaimed, § 1498 “may have played a
role in persuading Roche to enter the sublicensing agreements.”162
This quiet role of § 1498 as a motivator for negotiation and
“corporate patriotism” is frequently missed. Epstein suggested in the
wake of the Cipro deal that the government’s monopsony buyer
status was leverage enough to procure a price cut without resorting

See also Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 303 (§ 1498 “provides the
government with the necessary leverage to obtain major price reductions”). This
is consistent with Lemley’s finding that most government patent use cases are
settled in the shadow of § 1498 rather than resolved judicially. See Mark A.
Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 10 CAL. L. REV. 463, 473 (2012).
159
See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
160
See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924,
934 (4th Cir. 1925).
161
Royalty Adjustment Act Hearing, supra note 92, at 41 (statement of Ralph L.
Chappell).
162
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. RL33159, INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL
DRUGS AND PATENT LAW ISSUES 9 (2007), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/RL33159.html.
158

38

Yale Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 23

to § 1498, 163 but neither the airplane manufacturing firms in the
1910s nor the patent licensor holdouts in 1942 were swayed by that
status alone—nor was Bayer, until the prospect of § 1498 was
concrete. Others have suggested that some drug companies’
professed willingness to negotiate with the United States and other
governments during the COVID-19 pandemic refutes the need to
use § 1498.164 But this view ignores the fact that such willingness to
negotiate is likely a response to the possibility of § 1498 being used
otherwise. The oft-repeated sentiment that patents have not been a
barrier to the COVID-19 response 165 may be not so much an
See Richard A. Epstein, Respect Bayer’s Patent, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2001),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122660341966225183 (“It is equally clear that
wholly without resorting to this threat he had powerful leverage in price
negotiations with Bayer, just as any other volume purchaser whom a monopolist
can cheaply provide.”).
164
See, e.g., Valerie Bauman, States Demanding Gilead Drug Seizure Misread
Law, Attorneys Say, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/health-law-and-business/states-demanding-gilead-drug-seizure-misreadlaw-attorneys-say (disputing call for compulsory patent licensing on remdesivir
because its manufacturer “Gilead has already voluntarily licensed the drug to
generic drugmakers in Egypt, India, and Pakistan to boost global supply”). Gilead
and other firms have indeed made various pledges of reduced or free patent
licensing. See, e.g., Darrell Etherington, Medtronic Is Sharing Its Portable
Ventilator Design Specifications and Code for Free to All, TECHCRUNCH (Mar.
30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/30/medtronic-is-sharing-its-portableventilator-design-specifications-and-code-for-free-to-all; Diane Peters & Eric
Steuer, Tech Giants Join the CC-Supported Open COVID Pledge, CREATIVE
COMMONS (Apr. 20, 2020), https://creativecommons.org/2020/04/20/tech-giantsjoin-the-cc-supported-open-covid-pledge.
165
See, e.g., Richard Lloyd, No Evidence That Patents Are Acting as a Barrier to
Covid Research, Says Bristol Myers IP Head, IAM (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.
iam-media.com/coronavirus/bristol-myers-squibbs-henry-hadad-no-evidencepatents-are-acting-barrier-covid-research (interviewing Henry Hadad, deputy
general counsel of Bristol Myers Squibb) (“I have yet to hear one example of a
patent being enforced or litigation being threatened in a way that has been a barrier
to research with respect to covid.”); Nicholson Price et al., Are COVID-19 Vaccine
Advance Purchases a Form of Vaccine Nationalism, an Effective Spur to
Innovation, or Something in Between?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/08/are-covid-19-vaccine-advancepurchases.html (“[T]here’s no evidence that IP is being used to frustrate
competition or keep early-stage [COVID-19 vaccines] developers off the market.
Nor would patents likely be used to restrict the supply of any successful
vaccine.”). This view is questionable, given that at least one patent has already
been asserted against a COVID-19 testing service. See Mike Masnick, SoftBank
163
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argument against § 1498 as exemplification of the statute’s long
shadow.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S INNOVATION POLICY TOOLBOX
As seen above, government patent use has evolved across
history, as reflected in the legislative expansions of § 1498 and
policy debates in times of national emergency. That history brings
us to the law of government patent use in place today. This Part
describes § 1498 in its current formulation, and in particular places
the statute in the context of related innovation policy tools that have
featured prominently in the COVID-19 dialogue: research grants,
prizes, and patent buyouts. 166 All of these policy tools variously
incentivize the invention and development of new innovations or
allocate existing and prospective innovations to those who need or
want them, 167 so the overview presented in this Part tees up a
comparison of their relative merits in Part III.
A. Grants
One straightforward and hugely important means of
incentivizing innovation is directly funding innovators’ research and
development work. The U.S. government provides over $100 billion
Owned Patent Troll, Using Monkey Selfie Law Firm, Sues to Block Covid-19
Testing, Using Theranos Patents, TECHDIRT (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20200316/14584244111/softbank-owned-patent-trollusing-monkey-selfie-law-firm-sues-to-block-covid-19-testing-using-theranospatents.shtml.
166
See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual
Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1719–24 (2008). Many other policy tools
can incentivize new innovations and allocate existing ones; these include tax
incentives for R&D and outright government seizure of patents, patented
products, and the manufacturers themselves. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 321
(2013), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HemelOuellette.
pdf (explaining U.S. government tax incentives, such as tax credits and
deductions); discussion of patent condemnation infra notes 216–218 and
accompanying text.
167
For more on the dual roles of intellectual property as innovation incentive and
allocation mechanism, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 547 (2019), https://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss3/1. See also James Love & Tim
Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 155 (2009) (exploring the possibility of a hybrid patent-and-prize
system that would “de-link” the innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms
of the patent system); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for
Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005) (unpublished working paper), http://
www.keionline.org/misc-docs/drugprizes.pdf (same).
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per year in direct grants to federal laboratories, private and public
universities, private companies, and other entities.168 Grantmaking
is not monolithic; grants to recipients outside the government can,
for example, be conditioned on commitments to study a particular
research problem or to price affordably any inventions that result
from government-funded research. As Price has shown, the grant
system provides U.S. government policymakers with rich and
flexible tools to incentivize and disseminate innovation.169
Grant-making has been a primary—perhaps the primary—
innovation policy tool used by the U.S. government in its COVID19 response. For example, a single COVID-19 bill, the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, allocated over $3
billion to the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA) and over $700 million to the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to be spent on research
and development of COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and
diagnostics, mostly through grants to entities outside the U.S.
government. 170 As of writing, Congress has allocated the
Department of Health and Human Services’ “Operation Warp
Speed” a staggering total of almost $10 billion in funding for
grantmaking for and procurement of a COVID-19 vaccine.171
B. Prizes
Innovation prizes are an alternative policy tool that the U.S.
government could use—and already does use, to a limited

See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 166, at 320 (overview of grants); MATT
HOURIHAN & DAVID PARKES, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
FEDERAL R&D BUDGET TRENDS: A SHORT SUMMARY 4 (2019), https://www.aaas.
org/sites/default/files/2019-01/AAAS%20R%26D%20Primer%202019.pdf
(showing U.S. government spending on R&D in excess of $100 billion every year
since the early 1980s).
169
W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 31 (2019); see also
Danielle Conway-Jones, Research and Development Deliverables Under
Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs:
University Roles, Government Responsibilities and Contractor Rights, 9
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 181 (2004).
170
Kellie Moss et al., The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act:
Summary of Key Health Provisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-coronavirus-aid-relief-andeconomic-security-act-summary-of-key-health-provisions.
171
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Explaining
Operation Warp Speed (June 15, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/
06/16/fact-sheet-explaining-operation-warp-speed.html.
168
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extent 172 —to incentivize the creation of new technologies while
simultaneously ensuring widespread access to those technologies. In
a classic prize system, the government promises payment of some
set amount of money—$1 billion, say—to the first entity to create
some desired innovation, such as a cold fusion reactor or a
rechargeable battery manufactured without heavy metals. As a
condition of claiming the prize, the winner’s innovation is placed in
the public domain, permitting many competing manufacturers to
make and sell the innovation at near marginal cost and thereby
ensuring widespread access. Some notable legal scholars and
economists have endorsed prizes as a useful complement or
alternative to patents, including Abramowicz173 and Stiglitz.174
In the COVID-19 pandemic, several scholars and other experts
have suggested that the U.S. government use prizes to incentivize
development of the most critically needed technologies, first and
foremost a vaccine. 175 In March of 2020, Hemel and Ouellette
notably proposed a prize for a working COVID-19 vaccine of $500
per person—approximately $165 billion, assuming all Americans
receive it—to “ensure that a vaccine would be cheap—or even free”
to patients “while giving the private sector powerful incentives to
pour resources into vaccine research.”176
C. Patent Buyouts
Patent buyouts enable expanded access to already-patented
technologies. In a classic patent buyout—as in Kremer’s proposal—
a government purchases a patent from a private patent holder and
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 166, at 317 (describing the U.S. government’s
limited use of innovation prizes); MARCY E. GALLO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
REPORT NO. R45271, FEDERAL PRIZE COMPETITIONS (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R45271.pdf (same).
173
Michael B. Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 114
(2003).
174
Joseph Stiglitz, Prizes, Not Patents, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2007,),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/prizes--not-patents.
175
See, e.g., Charles Duan, Coronavirus Reveals Holes in American Innovation
Policy—and How to Fix Them, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/coronavirus-reveals-holes-in-americaninnovation-policy-and-how-to-fix-them; Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, We
Need a Coronavirus Vaccine. Patents Might Slow the Process, NAT’L INT. (Apr.
7, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/we-need-coronavirus-vaccinepatents-might-slow-process-141627.
176
Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus Vaccine, Fast? Here’s a
Solution, TIME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5795013/coronavirus-vaccineprize-challenge.
172
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then commits to license the patent non-exclusively for little or
nothing, or disclaims the patent altogether and thereby places the
patented invention in the public domain. 177 In so doing, the
government opens the floodgates for all to make, use, and sell the
patented invention, thereby driving down its cost to near marginal
cost. In order for the patent holder to consent to the buyout, the
purchase price of the buyout must be at or above the patent holder’s
expected profits from the patent.178
Despite their conceptual appeal and perennial attention in the
scholarly literature, true patent buyouts seem rare, or perhaps
altogether extinct. The U.S. government does not appear to have
purchased and taken title to any privately held patent in the last sixty
years.179
Nevertheless, some commentators have proposed patent
buyouts as a COVID-19 response to ensure widespread access to
therapeutics while preserving traditional patent incentives. Hemel
Michael R. Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1138 (1998) (explaining how the government
of France purchased the patent for Daguerreotype photography in 1839 and then
placed it in the public domain).
178
See id. (proposing that the government “buy out patents at [their] private value
times a fixed markup that would roughly cover the difference between the social
and private values of inventions”).
179
Michael Kremer’s influential 1998 paper discusses nineteenth century patent
buyouts in France, England, and several U.S. states, but it provides no modern
example of a U.S. government patent buyout. Id. at 1144. Kremer points out that
“[t]he United States Patent Compensation Board compensates developers of
innovations of military value relating to atomic energy,” but does not provide
examples. Id. at 1145. The most recent example we have been able to find of the
U.S. government purchasing or otherwise compensating an inventor for an atomic
energy patent is in 1953, when the Atomic Energy Commission purchased U.S.
Patent No. 2,206,634, entitled “Process for the production of radioactive
substances,” from a group of inventors that included Enrico Fermi. See Simon
Turchetti, “For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay”: Enrico Fermi’s Patent and the U.S.
Atomic Energy Program, 1938–1953, 97 ISIS 1, 2 (2006). Hemel and Ouellette
describe the U.S. government’s Medicaid program as “[t]he closest thing to a
large-scale patent buyout scheme in the United States.” Hemel & Ouellette, supra
note 167, at 594. But Medicaid and other federal programs under which the U.S.
government purchases authorized copies of prescription drugs and medical
devices at full or near-full price differ significantly from true patent buyouts, not
least because the government’s purchases of patented products under Medicaid
transfer no patent rights to the government and do not empower the government
to manufacture those products itself, nor to authorize competitor manufacturers to
do so.
177
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and Ouellette suggest that the United States and others could “offer
strong incentives to drugmakers while ensuring affordability by
committing to patent buyouts for effective treatments.”180 Kominers
has similarly proposed that the U.S. government “could purchase
medical-device patents and then place them in the public domain,”
which would “free manufacturers—with coordination from
government—to produce those devices and meet soaring demand”
during the COVID-19 crisis.181
D. Government Patent Use Under Section 1498
Today’s government patent use statute, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a), opens as follows:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by
a patent of the United States is used or manufactured
by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture
the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action
against the United States in the United States Court
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.182
The statute goes on to make clear, based on the World War II
amendments noted earlier, 183 that federal contractors,
subcontractors, and other authorized agents are immune to
infringement liability where they have “authorization and consent of
the Government.”184
The nature of “reasonable and entire compensation” under the
statute is worth some discussion. 185 The Supreme Court has
historically emphasized the “comprehensive character of the remedy
provided” under the law. 186 Courts have interpreted the statute
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 31.
Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Protection Should Take a Backseat in a Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2020-03-26/patent-protection-should-take-backseat-in-coronavirus-crisis.
182
§ 1498(a).
183
See supra note 94.
184
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
185
For more comprehensive discussions of compensation under § 1498, see
generally Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 310; Cahoy 2011, supra note 2; Cahoy
2002, supra note 26.
186
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343 (1928).
180
181
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generally to call for a reasonable royalty rather than other
remedies.187 Lost profits may be available “only after the strictest
proof that the patentee would actually have earned and retained
those sums in its sales to the Government”; 188 value to the
government is rarely the standard.189 Any royalty is premised upon
a nonexclusive license adequate to cover the goods and services
procured or authorized by the government, rather than the value of
an exclusive license or total appropriation of the patent.190
Belying the perception that government patent use is “stealing,”
“expropriation,” a “nuclear option,” or the like,191 surveys of past
§ 1498 cases confirm that reasonable royalty awards under § 1498
are “generally provided at a market rate,”192 such that the reasonable
royalty paid for government patent use is similar to compensation
for private infringement calculated using the standard factors of
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 193 Royalty awards
under § 1498 may, and often do, account for a patent holder’s riskSee Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1169 & n.22 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977)); Brennan et al.,
supra note 11, at 313; Cahoy, supra note 26, at 156–57; Mitchell, supra note 27,
at 542–43.
188
Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 349; accord Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d
958, 970–71 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 311 (“ ‘[L]ost
profits’ are strongly disfavored, and perhaps entirely unavailable, under § 1498.”);
Cahoy, supra note 26, at 155 (“[L]ost profits have apparently been out of reach to
plaintiffs in § 1498 actions since the mid-1930s.”).
189
See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 971; Decca, 640 F.2d at 1167 n.20.
190
See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(describing government as “a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee”).
191
See supra notes 2–13.
192
Cahoy, supra note 2, at 491; see also Bendix Corp. v. United States, 676 F.2d
606, 609 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Federal Circuit’s predecessor court describing “awards
against the private infringer, and against the government taker,” as “similar”); 7
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (2020) (describing § 1498
compensation as “construed and applied in a fashion similar to the measure of
compensatory damages in suits against infringers other than the United States”);
Laura Burson et al., Suing for Patent Infringement if the Government Takes Your
Intellectual Property During the COVID-19 Pandemic, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 24,
2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/24/suing-patent-infringementgovernment-takes-intellectual-property-covid-19-pandemic/id=120922 (noting
the use of “hypothetical negotiation” under Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp. to assess § 1498 damages).
193
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971).
187
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adjusted investments in research and development. 194 In other
words, government patent use will generally not “represent a
discount from the market price of the licensed good” unless the
patentee’s expectations are excessive;195 the public value of § 1498
may instead be accuracy and objectivity of compensation. As a
result, Cahoy observes that, rather than being “disruptive,”
government patent use and § 1498 “can fit within the broader goals
of the intellectual property system, encouraging fair and intelligent
pricing, and supporting access.”196 Government patent use does not
dramatically undercompensate patent holders and, as such, need not
upset patent holders’ investments or incentives to innovate (although
the timing of compensation under § 1498 is delayed, as we discuss
below197).
One way of understanding the operation of § 1498 is through
the distinction between “property rules,” where the price of an
entitlement is subjectively set by the holder, and “liability rules,”
where the price is set by an independent adjudicator.198 Patents are
See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 350 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (noting
relevance of patentee “which took the risks and bore the expense of developing
the [invention] and creating a market for them”); Brennan et al., supra note 11, at
314. Numerous scholars have suggested that royalties of 10% or less of the
infringers’ sales are common in § 1498 cases, and that royalties of over 10% are
rare. See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 310; Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra
note 15, at 793 (“Royalties are commonly set at 10 percent of sales or less” in
§ 1498 cases involving the Department of Defense); Richard J. McGrath, The
Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United States Government or Its Contractors,
18 AIPLA Q.J. 349, 352 (1991) (“Historically, the highest royalty rate that the
United States Claims Court has awarded is 10%.”); see also JAMES LOVE, WHO,
REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 18 (2005), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/
69199 (same). While we are not aware of a court-ordered royalty under § 1498 of
more than 10% of the revenues associated with the government’s use—e.g., the
sales revenues of a contractor authorized under § 1498—reasonable royalties
calculated under the Georgia-Pacific factors in routine patent infringement suits
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 sometimes exceed 10%. See 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR.,
ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST §§ 30:107–30:110 (2019) (documenting reasonable
royalties in recent § 271 cases of greater than 10% of the infringers’ sales
revenues, e.g., 14.5%, 17.5%, and 32%). It seems to us that the same may be true
in future litigation under § 1498.
195
Cahoy, supra note 2, at 494.
196
Id.
197
See infra Part III.A.3.
198
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
194
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ordinarily treated under a property rule, insofar as courts and
administrative tribunals may issue injunctions that prevent wouldbe infringers from using a patented invention without the voluntary
consent of the patent holder.199 While the desirability of applying a
property rule to patents is a topic of much debate,200 it has been long
recognized that injunctive relief is inappropriate where access to a
patented invention is necessary for public health or safety. 201
Section 1498 can thus be understood to give the U.S. government
discretion to waive the property rule remedy of patent injunctions in
appropriate situations.
Government patent use under § 1498 should be distinguished
from several other forms of public and private ordering of patent
interests. First, it is entirely distinct from arrangements involving socalled “FRAND” licenses. The latter concept relates to patentholder obligations to license certain patents on “Fair, Reasonable,
and Non-Discriminatory” terms, arising either out of a private
commitment to do so 202 or to satisfy a government regulation or
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092
(1972).
199
See Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (as amended); 35 U.S.C.
§ 283. In private patent infringement disputes, liability rather than property rules
often prevail, as courts frequently decline to order injunctive relief under the
Supreme Court’s test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC. See 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006). See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1984 (2016). Such
circumstances are somewhat less common with respect to pharmaceutical patents,
because courts tend to award injunctions to bona fide operating manufacturers.
See id. at 1988–90.
200
See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual
Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 255–56 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J.
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV.
783, 784 (2007); Doug Lichtman, Patient Patents: Can Certain Types of Patent
Litigation Be Beneficially Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2017); Carl Shapiro,
Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 308
(2010); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265,
278 (2011). See generally Seaman, supra note 199, at 1956–58 & nn.33–49 (citing
sources and reviewing arguments).
201
See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (citing examples); Seaman, supra note 199, at 1962, 1991.
202
Patent owners may commit to FRAND licensing in order to have their
technologies adopted into privately developed technical standards such as Wi-Fi
or mobile communications systems. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief
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benefit condition. 203 While FRAND arrangements also overcome
the property rule of patent remedies and indeed often enlist a court
to do so, the computation of such royalties is idiosyncratic and
subject to rules different from the traditional Georgia-Pacific
factors.204
Additionally, government patent use under § 1498 is distinct
from the Defense Production Act (DPA).205 The DPA, enacted at the
start of the Korean War206 and since expanded,207 permits the U.S.
government to take effective control of manufacturing when doing
so is “necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense,”208
broadly defined.209 The DPA also includes a variety of powers “to
help ensure that the nation has an adequate supply of, or the ability
to produce, essential materials and goods necessary for the national
defense.”210 This makes the DPA complementary to § 1498, in that
History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust
Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42 (2015); Herbert
Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683 (2020); Mark A.
Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 607, 610 (2019).
203
See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and
the ONC Health IT Certification Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 25642, 25960–61 (May
1, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 171.303) (requiring licensing of certain
electronic health record technology on “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory”
terms); AT&T Commc’ns of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atl.-Va., Inc., 197 F.3d 663, 670–71
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding telecommunications statute requiring “access to network
elements” on terms that are “reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” 47 U.S.C. § 251,
to require provider “to renegotiate its existing intellectual property licenses”);
Narechania, supra note 1, at 1517–23.
204
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2015);
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–32 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
205
Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568.
206
Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 STAT. 798.
207
See J. Michael Littlejohn, Using All the King’s Horses for Homeland Security:
Implementing the Defense Production Act for Disaster Relief and Critical
Infrastructure Protection, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2006) (tracing gradual
expansion of the DPA).
208
50 U.S.C. § 4511(a).
209
§ 4552(14) (defining “national defense” to encompass “programs for military
and energy production or construction, military or critical infrastructure assistance
to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and any directly
related activity”).
210
MICHAEL H. CECIRE & HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO.
R43767, THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 9, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf;
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the former can force a firm to engage in certain manufacturing,
while the latter removes patent-infringement barriers to that
manufacturing.211 But the U.S. government can use patents under
§ 1498 without invoking the DPA, and government patent use is, in
many ways, a milder intervention than coordinated production under
the DPA. For example, if a manufacturer refuses to sell a particular
patented product to the U.S. government, the government might
choose to procure the product from a competitor authorized under
§ 1498, or it might instead choose to invoke the DPA and compel the
manufacturer’s own factories to supply the government. The
government patent use option would protect the manufacturer’s
existing contracts and business relationships; the DPA option would
upend them.
Finally, § 1498 must be distinguished from eminent domain, or
takings, under the Fifth Amendment. The Federal Circuit recently
reaffirmed this distinction in Golden v. United States, holding that
“a patent owner may not pursue an infringement action as a taking
under the Fifth Amendment,” because patent infringement actions
against the U.S. government “sound in tort and are to be pursued
exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.” 212 The court deemed this
see also James A. Durham, The Present Status of Price Control Authority, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 868 (1952); Littlejohn, supra note 207; Note, The Defense
Production Act: Choice as to Allocations, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 350 (1951).
211
See Rick Longton et al., Intellectual Property Considerations for
Manufacturers Contracted Under the Defense Production Act, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP 2 (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/
insights/2020/04/intellectual-property-considerations-for-manufacturerscontracted-under-the-defense-production-act. The DPA alone likely cannot affect
patents. See Defense Production Act of 1950: Hearing on H.R. 9176 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong. 35 (July 24–25, 1950), https://
catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/102432877 (testimony of Mr. Kendall, National
Security Resources Board).
212
955 F.3d 981, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2020). While Golden did not answer the
question of whether application of § 1498 itself is an eminent domain action, the
opinion is irreconcilable with that view in describing government patent use as
sounding in tort. Golden further repeatedly approves of Zoltek I, which squarely
rejected § 1498 being an eminent domain statute. See Zoltek I, 442 F.3d 1345,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Had Congress intended to clarify the
dimensions of the patent rights as property interests under the Fifth Amendment,
there would have been no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity
waiver [of the 1910 Act].”), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc),
cited with approval in Golden, 955 F.3d at 987-88. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Golden in December 2020. Golden v. United States, No. 20-5532,
2020 WL 7132384 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020).
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holding “mandate[d]” by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Schillinger that patent infringement could not be remedied as a
taking. 213 Eminent domain may serve as a helpful analogy for
government patent use, but it is a distinct act. 214 Indeed, outright
government condemnation of patents was historically contemplated
with regard to aviation technology215 and commentators have called
for the government to invoke eminent domain on patents, 216 but
condemnation has distinctly different consequences from
government patent use: In the former case but not the latter, the
owner of the condemned patent loses the ability to license the patent
to third parties and indeed may lose the ability to practice the
invention at all.217 To be sure, a substantial line of Supreme Court
and other cases describe § 1498 in terms of eminent domain,218 as
do multiple commentators.219 But, as Masur and Mortara observe
from review of those § 1498 cases, those judicial statements have
consistently been in dicta with “no effect whatsoever on the success
or failure of the claims”; in other words, government patent use “is
described in terms of eminent domain or takings when that
characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at hand.”220
Golden, 955 F.3d at 988.
See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 307–09.
215
See supra notes 55–61.
216
See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 126, at 435; Mitchell, supra note 27,
at 548–49 (distinguishing takings of patents from § 1498); cf. Fran Quigley, Tell
Me How It Ends: The Path to Nationalizing the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 755, 804-05 (2020) (suggesting that seizure of patents may
not require significant Fifth Amendment compensation).
217
As one of us has noted, the government could use intellectual property
condemnation as a mechanism for suppressing information, with obvious and
troubling consequences for speech interests. See Charles Duan, Copyright Law
Could Stop 3-D Printed Guns. Should It?, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/copyright-law-could-stop-3-d-printed-guns-should-it.
Government patent use cannot effect this result.
218
See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882); Leesona Corp. v.
United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964–65 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Contra De Graffenried v.
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 387 (1993) (“[T]he far more compelling argument
is that Section 1498(a) actions are not ‘eminent domain proceedings’ . . . .”);
Charles Pfizer & Co., 39 Comp. Gen. 760, 763 (1960) (“Clearly, [the 1910] act is
an amendment to the patent laws and restricts the rights of a patentee by providing
for government use of patents . . . .”).
219
See sources cited supra note 20.
220
Masur & Mortara, supra note 20, at 990–92. James provides a striking
example: The Court digresses for a page and a half on the takings nature of
213
214

50

Yale Journal of Law & Technology
III.

SECTION 1498 AS POLICY TOOL

[Vol. 23
IN A

NATIONAL

EMERGENCY
The history and nature of § 1498 suggest a useful framework
for weighing the role of government patent use, in national
emergencies and otherwise. In particular, we discern four generally
underappreciated features of § 1498: (1) speed, (2) flexibility, (3) ex
post determination of the appropriate compensation (occurring not
only after not only invention but after the government’s use), and (4)
determination of that compensation by an impartial adjudicator. The
salience of these four factors to any particular situation, in our view,
is indicative of whether § 1498 will likely be advantageous in that
situation over other tools such as patent buyouts for ensuring access
to critical technologies. That is not to say that § 1498 is always
preferable to, or should be used to the exclusion of other innovation
policy tools; it is instead a complement that can be freely mixed and
matched with the others when appropriate.221
These features of § 1498 do not depend on the presence of a
national emergency, and we do not find the existence of emergency
conditions to be a prerequisite to use of § 1498. Besides the obvious
difficulties in defining national emergencies, 222 the identified
advantages of § 1498 can be relevant to plainly non-emergency
situations. The flexibility of government patent use, for example,
can be highly relevant to the operations of financial markets. 223
Furthermore, we intend this analysis to be one of sufficiency rather
than necessity: Where none of these advantages is especially salient,
use of § 1498 may still be warranted, but that use could be justified
on other factors outside of the scope of the present analysis, such as
deadweight loss from monopoly pricing224 or human rights.225
government patent use, only to then flatly note that “the conclusion which we
have reached in this case does not render it necessary to decide this question.” 104
U.S. at 357–59.
221
For an analysis of intellectual property’s two distinct elements—innovation
incentive and allocation mechanism—and the ways in which patent-based
innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms can be mixed and matched with
other incentives and mechanisms, such as tax credits and prizes, see Hemel &
Ouellette 2019, supra note 167, at 563–74.
222
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646–47 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (describing “[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives”
such as “emergency,” “without fixed or ascertainable meanings”).
223
See infra note 232 (describing use of § 1498 for check clearing transactions).
224
See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 317–18.
225
See Cahoy, supra note 2, at 500–07.
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That these features have indeed been salient in past national
crises shows that § 1498 will continue to be an advantageous and
sometimes indispensable policy tool. Indeed, as we describe below,
the advantages of § 1498 are highly relevant to COVID-19
technologies, including diagnostic tests, ventilators, and medical
treatments.226 To highlight these advantages and their relevance, we
develop a roadmap for one use case today: ensuring adequate and
affordable access to remdesivir, an antiviral drug that has shown
promise as a treatment for COVID-19. Our roadmap illuminates the
four underappreciated features of § 1498 and highlights how
government patent use can protect public health, patent holders, and
the public purse.
A. Four Key Features of Government Patent Use in a
National Emergency
1. Speed
Government patent use is quick—a feature particularly valuable
in a national emergency. The U.S. government can exercise its
powers under § 1498 instantly, without any procedure—not even
notice to the holder of patent rights in the product being used or
manufactured by the government. 227 (In this regard, “election” or
“invocation” of government patent use are perhaps the wrong terms
to use—the U.S. government’s power to use privately held patents
is always on, by default.228)
A comment that applies to all of Section IV: this Article was researched and
written in the spring and summer of 2020 and edited in the fall of 2020. The
COVID-19 pandemic is fast-changing, but we have done our best to ensure that
the facts herein were accurate as of mid-September 2020.
227
According to the 1995 Resource Book published by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and International Centre on
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) on the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), “under U.S. law, the government
may use any patented invention (or authorize its contractor to use such invention)
without providing prior notification to the patent holder, subject only to the patent
holder’s right to initiate a proceeding before the Court of Claims for
compensation.” UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. & INT’L CTR.
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005); see also Cahoy, supra note 2, at 494 (observing that
“the U.S. essentially engages in” “compulsory licensing without negotiation”).
228
In this respect, the U.S. government’s patent rights under § 1498 differ from—
and are more powerful and versatile than—its march-in rights under the Bayh–
Dole Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a). To exercise march-in rights and issue a
compulsory license on a Bayh–Dole patent, a federal agency must first make a
226
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Indeed, the U.S. government can exercise its rights under
§ 1498 unwittingly—for example, if it unknowingly purchases
products from a supplier that turn out to be covered by another
party’s patents. 229 Section 1498 even arguably enables the
government to absolve third parties of their liability for past acts of
infringement: § 1498 applies to acts performed (1) “by or for” the
government and (2) with the government’s “authorization or
consent.”230 In Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Circuit recognized that private activity
that confers “significant benefits to the United States” satisfies the
“by and for” the government prong of the test, and “post hoc”
consent by the government can constitute the requisite
“authorization or consent.” 231 This absolution can be achieved
quickly—in the same case, a Treasury official simply sent a letter to
the infringer, confirming that the U.S. government condoned the
infringer’s use of the patented technology.232
Government patent use’s instantaneity is particularly valuable
determination that certain statutory conditions have been met, such as a
determination that public “health or safety needs . . . are not reasonably satisfied
by the [patent rights-holding] contractor, assignee, or their licensees.” § 203(a)(2).
No such determination is necessary under § 1498.
229
See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text. A 1958 opinion of the United
States Comptroller General acknowledged as much, and seems indeed to actively
encourage a kind of willful blindness on the part of U.S. government procurement
officers: “[Section 1498] is not consistent with any duty on the part of a
contracting agency of the Government to protect the interests of patentees or
licensees with respect to articles which it proposes to purchase, since the statute
itself defines and provides an exclusive remedy for enforcement of the patentee’s
rights as to the Government.” Herbert Cooper, 38 Comp. Gen. 276, 278 (1958).
This opinion appears to remain in effect and govern U.S. government procurement
even today, despite substantial efforts to undo the decision legislatively across the
1960s. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 771 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 305; Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 24, at
16–27 (describing legislative reform proposals).
230
§ 1498(a).
231
583 F.3d 1371, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In Advanced Software, the patented
technology was a method of detecting fraudulent bank checks, and the “significant
benefits” to the United States that met the “by and for” the government prong of
the test was reduced fraud and financial benefits to the Federal Reserve Banks, as
well as to private banks. Id. at 1373, 1378; see also Brennan et al., supra note 11,
at 332-33 (reviewing case law on “authorization and consent”).
232
See Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1377; see also Madey v. Duke Univ., 413
F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“§ 1498 does not require the authorization
to take any specific form.”).
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when the government must move quickly to disseminate patented
products needed to combat a national crisis. By contrast, a patent
buyout with even a willing, good faith patent holder could take
weeks to negotiate—weeks the government and the American
public may not have to spare.233 Moreover, the government may not
know all the patents that cover a particular product, and thus it may
not know which patents it needs to buy, and from whom. For
example, as of writing, many different firms are now developing—
and likely patenting—new ventilator designs designed to protect the
lungs of COVID-19 patients. In April 2020, CNET reported that
“newly designed, cutting-edge ventilators may be on the way from
the likes of tech giant Dyson, General Motors, MIT and a British
consortium led by Airbus.”234 In situations like this, a wide-ranging
search of active patents and full-fledged “clearance” study (also
known as a “freedom to operate” study) by the government would
be necessary to identify all relevant patents and their owners before
the government could confidently undertake buyout negotiations.
Even a single study on a single product can be “time-consuming and
costly.”235
In practice, the government may choose to try to negotiate a
buyout or other deal first, in the same way that the government
negotiated royalty rates with the Manufacturers’ Aircraft
Association in 1918 and HHS negotiated the Cipro deal in 2001.
Section 1498 nevertheless serves as an important backstop: it
prevents “hold-up” or “hold-out” situations where a single patent
holder demands a buyout far in excess of the investment costs for
developing the invention and a “reasonable” profit.236 Hold-ups can
occur even in times of national emergency, as occurred in 2001’s
anthrax scare, when Bayer initially refused to budge on the price of

The same defect seems true of auctions, which Kremer proposes as a
mechanism to elicit the market value of patents purchased by the government in
patent buyouts. See Kremer, supra note 177, at 1146-48.
234
Jackson Ryan, In the War Against Coronavirus, One Device Can Be the
Difference Between Life and Death, CNET (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/
features/coronavirus-ventilators-why-one-machine-is-pivotal-in-the-battleagainst-covid-19.
235
See Linda J. Thayer, When is a Freedom to Operate Opinion Cost-Effective?,
FINNEGAN (March 2013), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/whenis-a-freedom-to-operate-opinion-cost-effective.html.
236
See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 309.
233
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ciprofloxacin until HHS threatened to use § 1498.237 Hold-ups are
socially harmful, as they cause delay and inefficient public
overspending on the patented technology.238 Indeed, there may be
hold-up situations that delay, even derail, dissemination of needed
patented products to the public that arise not from any intentional
gamesmanship on the part of the patent holder but simply from the
patent holder’s genuine overvaluation of its own patent. If there is
no zone of agreement between the patent holder and the
government—if the patent holder’s reserve price exceeds the
government’s willingness or ability to pay—then no buyout deal
will ever be reached.
2. Flexibility
Government patent use under § 1498 can be used flexibly, in
numerous ways. We highlight two here.
(a) “Surgical strikes” to expand supply and relieve
shortages. Section 1498 is particularly well-suited to relieve limits
on production and supply created by patents, especially in times of
national emergency. In past emergencies of infectious disease, for
example, suppliers that hold patents on important technologies have
been unable to keep up with demand, even while they have declined
to license their patents to competitor manufacturers. The story of
Bayer and ciprofloxacin (Cipro), told above, is one vivid instance.239
Roche and oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is another; in 2005, a global
outbreak of avian flu led to a spike of demand in the United States
and around the world.240 Roche’s own manufacturing capacity was
See supra Part I.D; see also Leslie Wayne & Melody Petersen, A Muscular
Lobby Rolls Up Its Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/11/04/business/a-muscular-lobby-rolls-up-its-sleeves.html (reporting that,
to the pharmaceutical industry, “any threats to [patent] protection, even at a time
of national crisis, is a clarion call to action” and that Bayer initially refused to give
the U.S. government any discount on large-scale purchases of ciprofloxacin).
238
See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 309-10.
239
See supra Part I.D.
240
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 162, at 2-3. Somewhat ironically,
independent researchers later uncovered clinical trial data (which Roche had
withheld from the medical literature) revealing that the billions of dollars spent
on oseltamivir by governments around the world were largely wasted: oseltamivir
failed to prevent the spread of the flu, reduce hospital admissions, or minimize
complications significantly. See Richard Van Noorden, Report Disputes Benefit of
Stockpiling Tamiflu, NATURE NEWS & COMMENT (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.
nature.com/news/report-disputes-benefit-of-stockpiling-tamiflu-1.15022 (citing
237
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unable to meet demand, but Roche declined to license its patents to
Cipla, saying it “fully intend[ed] to remain the sole manufacturer of
Tamiflu.” 241 This led to shortages, to several senators calling for
invocation of § 1498, and ultimately to Roche making an “aboutface” and agreeing to multiple licenses.242
The same phenomenon—a patent-holding manufacturer
apparently unable to meet demand and yet unwilling to voluntarily
license its patents—has already occurred in the COVID-19
pandemic. One significant example is the field of anti-COVID-19
therapeutic drugs: Gilead, which holds patents on the COVID-19
treatment drug remdesivir, was unable to meet demand (both within
the United States and overseas) and yet (to date) is largely unwilling
to license its patents to other manufacturers. We tell the story of
remdesivir in detail below and make a case for use of § 1498 to
expand supply.243
Another example of the phenomenon seems to have occurred in
diagnostic testing. The molecular diagnostics company Cepheid has
drawn praise for developing what is, as of writing, among the most
reliable, sensitive point-of-care diagnostic tests for COVID-19, sold
under the Xpert Xpress SARS CoV-2 brand name. 244 These tests
Tom Jefferson et al., Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and Treating
Influenza in Adults and Children, in 2014 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC
REVIEWS, https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD008965.pub4). Oseltamivir does
appear, however, to shorten some symptoms. See What You Should Know About
Flu Antiviral Drugs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last visited
Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/treatment/whatyoushould.htm.
241
See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indian Company to Make Generic Version of Flu
Drug Tamiflu, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/14/
health/indian-company-to-make-generic-version-of-flu-drug-tamiflu.html.
242
Sabin Russell, About-Face on Influenza Drug / Manufacturer Says It Will
Consider Licensing Tamiflu, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 19, 2005), https://www.sfgate.
com/health/article/About-face-on-influenza-drug-Manufacturer-says2575819.php; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 162, at 13–14.
243
See infra Part III.B.
244
See Bruce Japsen, FDA Approves More “Rapid” COVID-19 Coronavirus Tests
for Use on Frontlines, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucejapsen/2020/03/24/us-approves-more-rapid-covid-19-tests-for-use-onfrontlines/ (describing FDA’s emergency use authorization for the Xpert Xpress
SARS CoV-2); Giorgia Guglielmi, The Explosion of New Coronavirus Tests That
Could Help to End the Pandemic, NATURE (July 17, 2020), https://www.nature.
com/articles/d41586-020-02140-8 (explaining that Cepheid’s test “take[s] less
than one hour to perform”); Rachana Pradhan, As Problems Grow with Abbott’s
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provide results in less than hour, making them particularly useful in
hospitals and other “point-of-care” locations where rapid results are
needed to provide appropriate medical care. HHS has spent millions
in public money to purchase Cepheid’s test machines through the
Strategic National Stockpile for public health emergencies 245 and
distribute them to hospitals in need. 246 Each Xpert Xpress SARS
CoV-2 test uses a single disposable plastic cartridge, pre-filled with
the appropriate chemicals to run the test.247 Cepheid has struggled
to manufacture and distribute enough of the disposable cartridges
tests to meet demand through the summer of 2020.248
A third example of shortages of (presumably) patented antiCOVID technologies has occurred with personal protective
equipment (PPE). In the spring of 2020, 3M’s patented N95
respirators were widely demanded by health care providers across
Fast COVID Test, FDA Standards Are Under Fire, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June
22, 2020), https://khn.org/news/abbott-rapid-test-problems-grow-fda-standardson-covid-tests-under-fire/ (describing Cepheid’s test as more accurate than a
competitor’s point-of-care test). Cepheid has also drawn some criticism for its
pricing. See Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières Int’l, Cepheid Charging
Four Times More than It Should for Coronavirus COVID-19 Tests (July 28, 2020),
https://www.msf.org/diagnostic-company-cepheid-charging-more-it-shouldcovid-19-tests.
245
See FDA standards under fire as problems grow with fast COVID-19 tests,
HEALTHCARE PURCHASING NEWS (Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.hpnonline.com/
sourcing-logistics/lab-pharmacy-supply-management/article/21143494/fdastandards-under-fire-as-problems-grow-with-fast-covid19-tests.
246
See Pradhan, supra note 244; Contracts for April 10, 2020, U.S. DEP’T DEF.
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/
2146301/ (“Cepheid, Sunnyvale, California, was awarded a $32,788,420 firmfixed-price contract for the purchase of up to 137 Cepheid GeneXpert instruments,
105 GeneXpert 16s instruments, and up to 472,000 emergency-use-only assays to
detect novel coronavirus disease in human clinical samples.”).
247
See Michael J. Loeffelholz et al., Multicenter Evaluation of the Cepheid Xpert
Xpress SARS-CoV-2 Test, 58 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (2020), https://jcm.
asm.org/content/58/8/e00926-20.
248
See Lauren Dunn, COVID-19 Tests: There’s an Insurmountable Backlog of
Virus Tests. A Rapid Test Could Help, NBC NEWS (July 23, 2020), https://www.
nbcnews.com/health/health-news/covid-19-tests-there-s-insurmountablebacklog-virus-tests-rapid-n1234622; Craig LeMoult, Hospitals Can’t Get Enough
COVID-19 Tests, WGBH NEWS (Jun. 29, 2020), https://www.wgbh.org/news/
local-news/2020/06/29/hospitals-cant-get-enough-covid-19-tests; see also Joel
Rose, Coronavirus Testing Machines Are Latest Bottleneck in Troubled Supply
Chain, NPR (May 28, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/863558750/
coronavirus-testing-machines-are-latest-bottleneck-in-troubled-supply-chain
(describing shortages of other COVID-19 tests).
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the United States, but the company proved unable to meet demand,
leading Governor Beshear of Kentucky to call on 3M to voluntarily
license its patents to competitor manufacturers to increase supply.249
Shortages of drugs, diagnostic tests, and PPE in the COVID-19
pandemic suggest a valuable use of § 1498: to break logjams like
these and increase supply, and quickly. 250 Government patent use
can be used to make focused “surgical strikes” in places where there
is a need to move quickly to expand supply of patented products—
e.g., supplying COVID-19 diagnostic tests to emerging rural virus
hotspots where there is little existing testing capacity.251 HHS could,
for example, continue to purchase and distribute as many Xpert
Xpress SARS CoV-2 cartridges and test machines from Cepheid as
the company can manufacture while simultaneously soliciting bids
for further supply of diagnostic tests that mimic Cepheid’s. Assume
that Cepheid holds one or more patents on its tests and can
manufacture up to about 500,000 Xpert Xpress test cartridges per
week.252 Assume further that Cepheid declines to license its patents
See Morgan Watkins, Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear Calls on 3M to Release
Patent for N95 Respirator Amid Pandemic, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 3,
2020), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/04/03/beshear-calls-3m-release-patent-n-95-respirator-amid-pandemic/5112729002.
250
We do not mean to suggest here that patents or other intellectual property
protection are the sole source of shortages of goods used against COVID-19.
Shortages are caused by a large number of factors—scarcity of raw materials,
breakdown in supply chains or distribution systems, customs and regulatory rules,
etc. See, e.g., Erin R. Fox et al., Drug Shortages: A Complex Health Care Crisis,
89 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 361 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013.11.
014. Shortages of simple, presumably off-patent commodities like nasal swabs
have also plagued the United States’s COVID-19 response. See, e.g., David Lim
& Brianna Ehley, Inside America’s Unending Testing Snafu, POLITICO (Apr. 22,
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/22/coronavirus-testing-problemamerica-201372. Our point is simply that whenever a shortage arises from, or is
aggravated by, a patent holder’s reluctance to voluntarily license its patents and
inability to manufacture enough of its patent products to meet demand,
government patent use offers a straightforward solution.
251
Reis Thebault & Abigail Hauslohner, A Deadly “Checkerboard”: Covid-19’s
New Surge Across Rural America, WASH. POST (May 24, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/24/coronavirus-rural-america-outbreaks.
252
This was, roughly speaking, the case as of June 2020, when Cepheid
anticipated its cartridge manufacturing capacity over the summer of 2020 would
be approximately 2 million tests per month (6 million tests per quarter). See Susan
Kelly, Cepheid Developing Test to Distinguish COVID-19 from Flu,
MEDTECHDRIVE (June 10, 2020), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/cepheiddeveloping-test-to-distinguish-covid-19-from-flu/579524.
249
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voluntarily to competitor manufacturers (as, so far, it seems to have).
National demand for reliable point-of-care COVID-19 tests is, as of
writing, running much higher than 500,000 tests per week; some
public health experts estimate that the United States must administer
millions of tests per day to contain future outbreaks.253 Under these
circumstances, Cepheid might ordinarily sell its Xpert Xpress test
cartridges at a high price to the highest-bidding users as it gradually
ramps up its manufacturing capacity, leaving everyone else without
access to Cepheid’s testing technology, which is purportedly bestin-class. HHS could expand supply more quickly—and deal with the
COVID-19 testing crisis plaguing the United States as we write—
by invoking § 1498 to enable generic manufacturing even as it
continues to buy tests at Cepheid’s monopoly price.
The above hypothetical “surgical strike” to increase supply of
and expand access to Cepheid’s point-of-care diagnostic test for
COVID-19 illustrates how the U.S. government can tailor its use of
§ 1498 to make relatively small interventions in the marketplace and
the “normal” operation of patents and patent incentives. Such use of
§ 1498 would protect Cepheid’s investments and expectations, as
Cepheid would receive compensation under § 1498 for the
government-authorized generic manufacturing in addition to its
profits on all of the tests it is able to manufacture and sell at full
price. In specific circumstances—even in whole fields of
technology—where the U.S. government is particularly concerned
about patent holders’ investment expectations and incentives for
future innovation, such modest interventions with § 1498 may be
most appropriate.254 The possibility of using § 1498 in this flexible,
modest way belies the conventional wisdom 255 that government
patent use is necessarily disruptive.
(b) Shielding beneficial activity from infringement liability.
Section 1498 could also be used to shield specific socially useful
activities from the threat of unexpected patent infringement liability.
See Alexis C. Madrigal & Robinson Meyer, A Dire Warning From COVID-19
Test Providers, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2020/06/us-coronavirus-testing-could-fail-again/613675. This number
includes both rapid point-of-care testing and slower laboratory testing.
254
See, e.g., Rizzolo et al., supra note 13 (expressing concern over the possibility
that exercise of § 1498 on patented anti-COVID-19 drugs could “have a chilling
effect on biopharmaceutical research and drug development”).
255
See supra notes 3–13.
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For example, in March 2020, a non-practicing entity, Labrador
Diagnostics LLC, filed a patent infringement suit seeking injunctive
relief against a company whose equipment is used in some COVID19 diagnostic testing, raising concern over the (admittedly remote)
possibility that the lawsuit would reduce or delay testing. 256 As
Moss and Harmon of the Electronic Frontier Foundation have
argued, HHS could conceivably intervene in situations like this,
providing post hoc authorization for the allegedly infringing activity
under § 1498 and shifting onto the government any liability for
patent infringement, thereby ensuring the activity continues.257 Such
intervention occurred in Advanced Software, where the Treasury
Department retroactively authorized patent-infringing activity. 258
(This diagnostic testing scenario would satisfy the first prong of
Advanced Software’s test: a use of patented technology that confers
“significant benefits to the United States” constitutes use “by and
for” the government, as required by the text of § 1498.259 “When the
government requires private parties to perform quasi-governmental
functions, . . . there can be no question that those actions are
undertaken ‘for the benefit of the government.’”260)
Recall that Congress revised § 1498’s predecessor statute in
1918 and again in 1942 to permit precisely this type of government
patent use: protecting and encouraging socially useful third-party
activity that is, or might be, patent infringing from the risk of an
injunction and monetary liability. 261 As an appellate panel of the
Court of Claims held in 1967 (in a case concerning the Department
of Defense’s purchase of third-party anti-G suits and valves to
prevent military pilots from blacking out in flight), “[i]t is clear that
[§ 1498] was enacted for the purpose of enabling the Government to
See Masnick, supra note 165.
See Elliot Harmon, How Patent Abuse Could Hurt the Fight Against the
Pandemic, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/patentabuse-government-research-coronavirus.html; Alex Moss & Elliot Harmon, The
Feds Can Stop Patent Trolls from Endangering COVID-19 Testing and Treatment,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2020/03/feds-can-stop-patent-trolls-endangering-covid-19-testing-andtreatment.
258
See supra text accompanying note 232.
259
Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d
1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
260
Iris Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Iris,
the quasi-governmental function was detection of fraudulent passports.
261
Supra text accompanying notes 47–103.
256
257
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purchase goods for the performance of its functions without the
threat of having the supplier enjoined . . . .”262
Government patent use to protect, even encourage, socially
beneficial but patent-infringing activity may have wider import and
application than generally appreciated. We are not aware of other
scholars who have drawn the connection, but it seems to us that such
use of § 1498 could even serve a fair use-like function within patent
law, in emergency and normal periods alike. Prominent scholars
have proposed that patent law should, through statutory reform or
perhaps through judicial intervention, develop a fair use doctrine
comparable to copyright law’s. 263 Strandburg, for example, has
observed that “there are situations in which the social costs of
exclusivity in a particular context simply outweigh the social
benefits of the additional patent incentive provided by infringement
liability in that context, such that use in that context should be
permitted without conditions.”264 Government patent use allows the
U.S. government to do just that, making government authorization
under § 1498 a rough surrogate for a judicial determination that fair
use applies.265
In addition, though we are not aware of a historical example or
proposal, it seems clear to us that government patent use under
§ 1498 could be deployed as a shield in connection with a non-patent
innovation incentive: innovation prizes set by the U.S.
government.266 Prizes as an innovation incentive encourage many
competitors to race all at once to solve a problem, but if one
competitor obtains and enforces patents on a technology needed to
reach or commercialize the prize goal, then they may be able to
extract royalties or even enjoin the prizewinner, reducing the value
of the innovation incentive. A straightforward way to avoid this
problem would be for the government to guarantee § 1498 as a
shield: it could authorize the use of any patents needed to develop,
Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (1967).
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Strandburg, supra note 200.
264
Strandburg, supra note 200, at 278.
265
Jacob Victor has argued, in the copyright context, that compulsory licensing
and fair use provisions of the Copyright Act ultimately similarly serve the same
ends of maximizing social utility. See Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing
Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72 STAN. L. REV. 915 (2020); Jacob Victor,
Utility-Expanding Fair Use, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
266
Supra Part II.B.
262
263
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test, or commercialize the prizewinning innovation. This would
enable those vying for the prize to use any and all existing
technology freely in solving the prize problem, increasing the
effectiveness of the prize.
Like government patent use, a patent buyout could also shield
socially beneficial third-party activity, but a buyout will often be
inferior to government patent use. When the government knows
precisely which patents stand in the way of that activity—as when
the company that makes COVID-19 testing equipment was sued for
infringement—it could purchase or license them from the patent
holders and then extend the necessary licenses to the third-party
infringer. In this situation, the benefits of a buyout would be
comparable to those of § 1498. However, when the relevant patents
have not been identified in advance of the infringing activity—as in
the prize-setting scenario—buyouts will generally be more difficult
than government patent use, as they will require the government to
undertake a lengthy and expensive search to find those patents
before it can begin the buyout negotiation. Separately, when a patent
holder has already brought suit against an alleged third-party
infringer—or is negotiating a buyout with the U.S. government to
immunize that infringer—the hold-up or nuisance value of the suit
may lead the patent holder to demand a price higher than the value
of the patented technology, making a buyout more expensive for the
government than use of § 1498.267
3. Ex Post Remedy Determination
Under § 1498, the appropriate compensation due to the patent
owner is determined ex post, when the injured patent holder brings
a claim for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims. In this
regard, the remedy is determined not just ex post but “extra” ex
post—that is, not merely after the invented technology is
successfully reduced to practice and becomes worthy of a patent,268
but after, and often long after, the government and the public at large
actually make use of the patented invention. Given the typical
See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often
Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 242,
255 & nn.22 & 80 (2017) (describing “nuisance-value settlements” in patent
infringement cases); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent
Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 403 (2014).
268
It is in this sense that Hemel and Ouellette use the phrase “ex post.” See Hemel
& Ouellette, supra note 167, at 544.
267
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pendency of a lawsuit under § 1498,269 this could mean several years
elapse between the government’s first use of a patent and the
determination of appropriate compensation. Sufficient time passes
that when the Court of Federal Claims awards the “reasonable and
entire compensation” owed under § 1498, it often adds interest on
the reasonable royalty, to make the patent holder whole for the time
passed since government patent use began. 270 This patience is a
feature, not a bug, of government patent use.
In our view, patience in determining compensation has
numerous benefits in a fast-moving national crisis like COVID-19.
Sober patent valuation is hard amidst a pandemic or other national
emergency.271 For example, estimates of the value of a vaccine or
treatment may be wildly variable until its therapeutic properties—
e.g., its side effects, its efficacy, and, in the case of a vaccine, its
duration of effect—are fully established, years after first approval
and the first purchases. (As the FDA has stated, “the true picture of
a product’s safety actually evolves over the months and even years
that make up a product’s lifetime in the marketplace.” 272) In that
sense, § 1498 may actually end up offering the patent holder a better
deal, in the end, than a buyout: if the emergency takes a turn
substantially for the worse or the invention turns out to be especially
useful, the compensation paid under § 1498 would be greater than a
one-time ex ante payment.
A separate benefit of patience is that it avoids any potential
problems with “royalty stacking”: the situation where a single
See Michael J. Schaengold & Robert S. Brams, Choice of Forum for
Government Contract Claims: Court of Federal Claims vs. Board of Contract
Appeals, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 321 (2008) (suggesting that across all cases in the
Court of Federal Claims, “[b]arring extensive filing of pretrial motions, it will
take approximately two years for a case to progress from the filing of the
complaint to the issuance of a decision”).
270
See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1168 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (“The other
component of ‘reasonable and entire’ compensation for a patent license taken by
the Government is delay compensation. Delay compensation is recompense for
the Government’s delay in paying for the license.”); 7 CHISUM, supra note 192,
§ 20.03 (“[A] patent owner may recover prejudgment interest as delay
compensation . . . .”)
271
For a broader analysis of how delaying the calculation of damages in patent
infringement cases can improve courts’ analysis and accuracy, see Lichtman,
supra note 200.
272
Step 5: FDA Post-Market Drug Safety Monitoring, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-5fda-post-market-drug-safety-monitoring.
269
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product infringes multiple patents held by multiple patent owners,
increasing the risk of hold-up by one or more of those patent holders,
as well as the risk of overcompensation of patent holders whose
technology contributes only a small portion of the product’s
value.273 Given the flurry of inventive activity directed to COVID19, it is very possible that we will see overlapping patent rights on
important technologies like ventilator designs (as noted above) and
research tools for vaccine development. (While less common in
pharma, royalty stacking problems sometimes emerge there, too,274
especially with biologic drugs, whose manufacture may be more
complex than that of small molecules drugs.) If there are multiple
patent holders with patents infringed by products used by the
government under § 1498, they can all bring claims to the CFC, and
(in a consolidated case) the judge could apportion the value of each
patent holders’ contribution to the product and allocate
compensation accordingly. By contrast, in a buyout situation, the
government risks overpaying if it negotiates a buyout with one
patent holder without recognizing that other patent holders hold
additional relevant patents. (The government could undertake a
comprehensive search of others’ patents and buy those out, too, but
this would impose unnecessary search costs on the government and
slow it down unnecessarily, as noted above.)
Of course, if a patent holder in fact thinks it would get a better
deal from determination of the value of the patent after the
government uses it, it could achieve the same result—or any of a
flexible array of outcomes—through a patent buyout. For example,
the patent holder for an effective COVID-19 treatment could offer
rights to its drug for $X upfront plus $Y per use plus $Z on the basis
of patient outcomes (as determined through, say, an arbitration
process). But such a negotiation would take time—and could thus
cost additional lives—to produce an effective ex post evaluation
system comparable to what already exists under § 1498.
Indeed, these same problems—uncertainty and time wasted in
attempting to predict the value of the government’s use before it has
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of
FRAND Licensing Practices: Towards “Interoperable” Legal Standards, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 429, 432 (2016).
274
See, e.g., Leila Abboud, Abbott’s Bid to Squeeze Royalties May Carry Wider
Impact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB110108567498880474.
273
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occurred—afflict not only patent buyouts but government-funded
direct grants and prizes, too. Government grants are disbursed to
innovators before their inventions are complete and are therefore an
example of what Hemel and Ouellette term ex ante incentives—
monetary incentives whose incentive value is set before results are
achieved. 275 Prizes are “ex post” incentives in the Hemel and
Ouellette sense—they are disbursed only after an invention proves
successful. Yet prizes turn out to share a common Achilles heel with
grants: they require the government to set the value of the incentive
long prior to the government’s use, and typically before inventions
have been reduced to practice. For a prize to have any utility in
incentivizing innovation, the government must set and announce the
prize, and commit itself to a payout, before innovators have begun
experimenting. It is true that the incentive size of a prize, like that a
patent buyout, is flexible and can be conditioned on the value of the
patented technology and the government’s use thereof—e.g., $X
upon proof of a functional prototype plus $Y per government use
plus $Z on the basis of patient outcomes. Such conditions can limit
the government’s risk of overpaying for an invention that proves
only marginally useful. But these conditions only reduce risk; they
cannot eliminate it. When setting the size of a prize, the government
must always hazard some estimates about the costs of developing an
invention and its social utility. In a fast-moving emergency, this is a
serious drawback. The government needs time and resources to
gather information to make those estimates—time and resources it
may not have. Use of § 1498 eliminates this uncertainty inherent in
prizes, since the court-ordered reasonable and entire compensation
always coincides with the precise extent of the government’s use.276
The fact that compensation under § 1498 coincides with the
precise scope of the government’s use produces another advantage
of government patent use as compared to buying a patent outright:
by choosing government patent use, the government will likely
spend less of the public’s money. Any time the government uses a
patent under § 1498, the patent holder retains substantial rights in
the patent: a right to continue practicing the patent, a right to license
it to third parties, a right to enforce it against third parties not
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 167, at 556.
Indeed, one might consider compensation under § 1498 “to effectively set an
ex post prize” with the advantage that the adjudicator may “examine evidence of
market share” before setting it. Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 317.
275
276
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authorized by the government, and so on. And government patent
use is typically time-limited. As soon as the government ceases
using the patent, the patent holder’s ability to exploit the patent is
restored in full. As such, even expansive government patent use
necessarily leaves a significant fraction of the total value of the
patent in the hands of the patent holder, and the reasonable and entire
compensation the government pays under § 1498 should always be
less than the price the government would pay in an outright buyout
of the patent.277
To be sure, ex post determination of the appropriate
compensation can have drawbacks, too, in some contexts. Small
innovative companies may rely primarily or entirely on revenues
from their patents to raise capital and sustain themselves, and they
may not be able to wait years for compensation. In such
circumstances, the U.S. government might voluntarily choose to pay
compensation for government patent use sooner to keep the
companies afloat, or it might decide to use another policy tool (such
as a buyout) instead. The government should weigh potential
impacts on the patent holder, its investors, and broader incentives in
the sector before deciding to use § 1498, and whether to make a large
intervention or a small one.278
If HHS does elect to use § 1498 to procure drugs, tests,
ventilators, and other technologies necessary to navigate the
COVID-19 crisis, it could take steps from the start to ensure a deep
evidentiary record to support the determination of appropriate
compensation when the day comes. For example, HHS could ask
that the recipients of products procured through § 1498 document
who uses these products and how well these products work. HHS
could also put known patent holders on notice as to its exercise of
§ 1498 and encourage them to collect and keep data that will be
useful if the CFC must later determine the appropriate level of
compensation under § 1498, such as data on the patent holder’s
R&D costs and the patent holder’s perception of the value of its
invention. Asking patent holders to collect and retain such data is
efficient—the patent holder is likely best positioned to generate
useful evidence about the value of the invention—and patent holders
See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 553 (“The fair market value indicates what a
willing buyer would pay for ownership, while a reasonable royalty is simply what
a licensee would pay for ongoing use of the patent as a licensee.”).
278
See supra Part III.A.2.
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have good incentives to collect reliable evidence that will hold up to
court scrutiny, as we discuss in the next subpart.
4. Determination of Compensation by an Impartial
Adjudicator
Finally, a fourth key feature of government patent use under
§ 1498 is the adjudicator of the remedy: when the U.S. government
uses patents, the appropriate compensation is decided not by the
government or the patent holder but by impartial judges. As noted
above, this makes § 1498 a liability rule: the value of the patent is
objectively determined (by a court) rather than subjectively
determined by the patent holder and the government’s negotiator.
Placing the question of patent valuation in the hands of an
independent arbiter has numerous benefits. First, many of the
entities likely to hold important patents on COVID-19 technologies
are the same set of pharmaceutical, medical device, and
biotechnology companies who wield some of the most powerful
lobbies in the United States 279 and who have been accused for
decades of government and media capture, 280 price-gouging, 281
strategic gamesmanship of the patent and data exclusivity

Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Big Pharma Continues to Top Lobbying Spending,
OPENSECRETS (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/10/bigpharma-continues-to-top-lobbying-spending/; see also Wayne & Petersen, supra
note 237 (observing that, as of 2001, the pharmaceutical industry’s lobby had
“managed to stave off many actions that would harm them, like violating patents
or forcing them to supply free drugs”).
280
See, e.g., JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN & DEVIN DUFFY, THE COST OF CAPTURE:
HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY HAS CORRUPTED POLICYMAKERS AND
HARMED PATIENTS, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF 2019 (May 2019), https://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RI_Pharma_Cost-ofCapture_brief_201905.pdf; Gringarten, supra note 104, at 74–76 (describing
Bayer’s “crisis management” lobbying efforts to shape media coverage and the
U.S. government’s response to the anthrax crisis); Alexander Zaitchik, How Big
Pharma Was Captured by the One Percent, NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/149438/big-pharma-captured-one-percent.
281
See, e.g., KEVIN T. RICHARDS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO.
R46221, DRUG PRICING AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING PRACTICES 2 (2020)
(“critics argue that these patenting practices are used to keep drug prices high,
without any benefit for consumers or innovation”); MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES,
LIVES ON THE EDGE: TIME TO ALIGN MEDICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WITH PEOPLE’S HEALTH NEEDS 17 (2016) (collecting examples of alleged
pharmaceutical industry price-gouging and profiteering).
279
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systems, 282 and antitrust violations. 283 (And others may be nonpracticing patent assertion entities like Labrador Diagnostics, noted
above.284) As noted earlier, there is a real risk of gamesmanship and
hold-up by this set of patent holders in the event of a rushed buyout
precipitated by an ongoing public health crisis.285 Hold-up in patent
buyouts can lead not only to harmful delay but also to the
government overpaying.
In a patent buyout, patent holders are not the only worry. As
noted above, 286 the U.S. government does not appear to have
negotiated a patent buyout in over 60 years. As such, the
government’s own negotiators are likely inexperienced and ill
prepared to enter a high-stakes buyout negotiation, whether in a time
of emergency or not. Indeed, the government’s IP negotiators may
not even have deep expertise in other types of IP valuation, such as
licensing the government’s own patent portfolio. For example, the
Department of Defense’s intellectual property negotiators were, as
of 2018, sufficiently inexpert that Congress demanded formation of
a “cadre of IP experts” to help.287
By contrast, the judges of Court of Federal Claims have deeper
and recent experience in valuing patents in § 1498 cases, as

See generally Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCE 590 (2018); RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 281. For specific examples
of alleged gamesmanship and misuse of patent and data exclusivity, see Allergan,
Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 (Oct.
16, 2017) (court expressing “serious concerns about the legitimacy of” Allergan’s
efforts to immunize its patents from challenge by transferring ownership to a
Native American tribe); Michael Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring
the Mission to Rare Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210 (2016).
283
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Higher Drug Prices from Anticompetitive
Conduct: Three Case Studies, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 151 (2019) (documenting
examples of anticompetitive conduct by pharmaceutical companies); C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568 (2006) (describing widespread
anticompetitive “pay-for-delay” tactics by pharmaceutical companies).
284
Supra notes 256–260.
285
Supra notes 236–238 and accompanying text.
286
See supra note 179.
287
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802(b), 10
U.S.C. § 2322; see also Adam Bartolanzo & Keith Szeliga, Contractors Beware:
The 2018 NDAA Ushers In New Changes Affecting IP Rights, GOV’T CONT. &
INVESTIGATIONS BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.governmentcontractslaw
blog.com/2018/01/articles/department-of-defense/ndaa-ip-rights.
282
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numerous cases are brought every year.288 This experience means
there is a body of law on the reasonable and entire compensation
under § 1498 that helps to anchor the calculation and provide some
consistency and predictability—something missing in a patent
buyout. While we are not aware of a recent, in-depth empirical
review of the consistency and predictability of damages awards in
§ 1498 cases decided by the Court of Federal Claims, some
anecdotal evidence suggests that they are at least on par with those
in the federal district courts. 289 While calculation of damages in
patent cases is inherently complex and somewhat unpredictable—
reasonable royalties very much included—the expertise and
experience of the judges of the Court of Federal Claims should allay
concerns somewhat.
Other benefits flow from § 1498’s use of the Court of Federal
Claims as impartial adjudicator to determine compensation. 290
A Westlaw search for Court of Federal Claims cases returned 134 decisions
decided between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2019 that reference “28
U.S.C. § 1498” and “patent.” In the 1990s, Lavenue calculated that “[s]ince the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessor
courts have decided an average of five and one-half cases a year.” Lavenue, supra
note 18, at 496.
289
In an empirical study published 2001, Chu concluded that judgments of the
Court of Federal Claims in patent cases are affirmed by the Federal Circuit at a
higher rate (and reversed at a lower rate) than is true for any district court in the
nation. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1124–25 (2001). In Return
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, the Supreme Court suggested that
remedies in § 1498 cases are at least as predictable as remedies in 35 U.S.C. § 271
cases brought in district court, though the Court’s analysis focused on the simple
fact that injunctions are not available in § 1498 cases but are in 35 U.S.C. § 271
cases. See 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1867 (2019) (“[A]lthough federal agencies remain
subject to damages for impermissible uses, they do not face the threat of
preliminary injunctive relief that could suddenly halt their use of a patented
invention, and they enjoy a degree of certainty about the extent of their potential
liability that ordinary accused infringers do not.”).
290
One significant cost flows from § 1498’s use of a court to determine
compensation: the costs of litigation. We are not aware of specific estimates of the
costs of litigation under § 1498, but district court patent infringement suits and
Section 337 investigations at the International Trade Commission cost a median
of $700,000 to $4 million in 2019. See Scott McBride, Strategies For Controlling
Costs in Patent Litigation, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1198463/strategies-for-controlling-costs-in-patent-litigation. These costs
are real, but we think them acceptable, for four reasons. First, small patent holders’
288
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Federal judges of the CFC appointed to 15-year terms291 are also
insulated from the pernicious influence of industry lobbying in a
way that the U.S. government’s negotiators may not be. Discovery
in litigation will disgorge otherwise secret information relevant to
the calculation of compensation—on the patent holder’s R&D costs,
on others’ (including the government’s) contributions to that R&D,
on the value of the patented invention (e.g., a drug’s safety and
efficacy), and so on. 292 And the critical issues of patent validity,
enforceability, and infringement can be properly ventilated and
decided. (Like any defendant in standard infringement litigation, the
government owes no compensation whatsoever if the asserted patent
turns out to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.) Patent
holders may benefit from this independent adjudicator, too, insofar
as the government cannot use its vast media and regulatory powers,
or its sometime monopsony purchaser status, to strong-arm an
unduly cheap deal.
B. A Case Study for the Use of § 1498: Remdesivir in the
COVID-19 Pandemic
To exemplify how policymakers can weigh these four
advantages of § 1498 to assess its applicability, this Part considers
how these advantages apply to the COVID-19 pandemic and the
experimental drug remdesivir, one of the few treatments for

costs are typically paid by the government in a successful § 1498 action. See
§ 1498(a) (“Reasonable and entire compensation shall include the owner’s
reasonable costs, including reasonable fees for expert witnesses and attorneys, in
pursuing the action if the owner is an independent inventor, a nonprofit
organization, or an entity that had no more than 500 employees at any time during
the 5-year period preceding the use or manufacture of the patented invention by
or for the United States.”). Second, from the public’s perspective, even paying
both a successful patent holder’s costs and the government’s will be cost-effective
in situations where the value of the patented technology used—potentially worth
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars—will dwarf those costs. Third, the costs
of litigation are, to some extent, simply the unavoidable costs of gathering
(through discovery and judicial fact-finding) useful information on the value of
the patent; collecting the same information prior to a patent buyout, for example,
would also incur costs. Fourth, like any litigants, the patentee plaintiff and the
U.S. government can settle at point prior to or during litigation and thereby avert
further litigation costs. See Lemley, supra note 158, at 473.
291
See 28 U.S.C. § 172.
292
See Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 316 (discussing the value of discovery and
expert testimony in actions brought under § 1498 to determine “R&D outlays and
the risk of failure at each stage of investment” in the patented invention).
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COVID-19 currently available.293 Remdesivir is also economically
significant—the potential U.S. market for the drug has been
estimated in the billions of dollars per year for years to come.294 We
trace below how the U.S. government could use § 1498 to expand
supplies of the drug while simultaneously spending less (and
produce savings for private payers, too).
We select remdesivir largely because it is a “ripe” example: a
fully developed anti-COVID-19 technology about which we now
have meaningful information on manufacturing costs, supply
limitations, retail pricing, patent protection, and so on. 295 But the
logic of government patent use to expand supply and lower prices
could apply equally to other currently experimental and patented
technologies useful against COVID-19, such as monoclonal
antibodies, 296 new diagnostics, and, perhaps most important, a
vaccine. The United States and other countries have invested
unprecedented sums to accelerate vaccine development,297 but there
currently are profound concerns that the public may not get access

See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Covid-19 Study Details Benefits of Treatment with
Remdesivir, and Also Its Limitations, STAT (May 22, 2020), https://www.
statnews.com/2020/05/22/covid-19-study-details-benefits-of-treatment-withremdesivir-and-also-its-limitations.
294
Cristin Flanagan, Gilead Upgraded With Covid Sales Seen Reaching $7.7
Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-06-03/gilead-loses-a-skeptic-with-remdesivir-sales-seen-at-7-billion.
295
One of us (C.J.M.) published earlier, briefer analyses of potential exercise of
government patent use to expand access to and lower prices on remdesivir. See
Christopher Morten, Christian Urrutia & James Krellenstein, A Powerful Law
Gives HHS the Right to Take Control of Remdesivir Manufacturing and
Distribution, STAT (July 2, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/02/
powerful-law-gives-hhs-right-to-control-remdesivir-manufacturing-distribution;
James Krellenstein & Christopher J. Morten, U.S. Government’s Apparent CoOwnership of Patents Protecting Remdesivir, PREP4ALL (May 20, 2020), https://
www.prep4all.org/news/remdesivir.
296
Janet Woodcock, the Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
at the FDA, has publicly expressed concern about inadequate supplies of antiCOVID-19 monoclonal antibodies and the possible need to draw on global
monoclonal antibody manufacturing capacity. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Operation
Warp Speed Is Pushing for Covid-19 Therapeutics by Early Fall, WASH. POST
(July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/13/operationwarp-speed-is-pushing-covid-19-therapeutics-by-early-fall.
297
See Mapping of Global Public Funding for Covid-19, UNIVS. ALLIED FOR
ESSENTIAL MEDS. (2020), https://www.publicmeds4covid.org.
293
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to a vaccine despite this public funding,298 should global demand
overwhelm the manufacturing and distribution capabilities of patent
holders. 299 Our analysis of § 1498 and remdesivir would likely
apply with equal force to a hypothetical vaccine patent, but vaccines
exhibit additional considerations that we discuss briefly in this
Part.300
1. Remdesivir: An Experimental Drug That Promises
Modest but Important Benefits
What is remdesivir? It is a small molecule experimental
antiviral drug manufactured by Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“Gilead”),
under the brand name Veklury.301 Gilead holds patents on remdesivir
and is the sole supplier in the United States. Remdesivir was
originally developed through a collaboration by Gilead, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and was
tested against numerous viruses, including Ebola, but proved
ineffective against them.302
See, e.g., Will Feuer & Noah Higgins-Dunn, WHO Warns Against Coronavirus
“Vaccine Nationalism and Risk of Price Gouging”, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/who-warns-against-coronavirus-vaccinenationalism-and-risk-of-price-gouging.html; Elisabeth Rosenthal, How a Covid19 Vaccine Could Cost Americans Dearly, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine-cost.html.
299
See, e.g., Damien Garde & Helen Branswell, 6 Burning Questions Congress
Could Push Covid-19 Vaccine Makers to Answer Today, STAT (July 20, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/20/covid19-vaccines-merck-modernacongress; Christopher Rowland et al., Even Finding a Covid-19 Vaccine Won’t Be
Enough to End the Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 11, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/11/coronavirus-vaccine-global-supply;
Julie Steenhuysen & Kate Kelland, Vaccine Makers Face Biggest Medical
Manufacturing Challenge in History, REUTERS (June 25, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-vaccines-manufactu-idUSKBN23W1
ND.
300
See infra text accompanying notes 359–366. See generally Ana Santos
Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property,
Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3656929.
301
Gilead Scis., Fact Sheet for Health Care Providers: Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) of Veklury (remdesivir) (July 2020), https://www.gilead.
com/-/media/files/pdfs/remdesivir/eua-fact-sheet-for-hcps.pdf.
302
See Dustin Siegel et al., Discovery and Synthesis of a Phosphoramidate
Prodrug of a Pyrrolo[2,1-f][triazin-4-amino] Adenine C-Nucleoside (GS-5734)
298
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Remdesivir’s safety and therapeutic benefits in COVID-19
patients are still being investigated, 303 but as of writing, those
benefits appear both modest and significant. One clinical trial
sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) has shown that remdesivir helps hospitalized
patients with severe COVID-19 recover and leave the hospital more
quickly than a placebo—a median of 4 days more quickly. 304
Another trial showed some statistically significant benefit in
recovery time in patients whose COVID-19 symptoms were
moderate (rather than severe) and who received 5 days of treatment
with the drug. 305 A third trial that terminated early due to underenrollment showed no statistically significant improvement in
COVID-19 patients treated with remdesivir compared to placebo.306
Remdesivir has not been shown in any rigorous clinical trial to
reduce mortality in COVID-19 patients—that is, to save lives.307
Although the clinical trial data supporting remdesivir’s use in
COVID-19 patients is limited, doctors have few good
alternatives.308 Based on the NIH trial, FDA granted an emergency
for the Treatment of Ebola and Emerging Viruses, 60 J. MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY
1648 (2017); Travis K. Warren et al., Therapeutic Efficacy of the Small Molecule
GS-5734 Against Ebola Virus in Rhesus Monkeys, 530 NATURE 381 (2016). For
remdesivir’s failure as a treatment for Ebola, see Helen Branswell, Two Ebola
Treatments Yield “Substantial Decrease” in Mortality, Landmark Trial Shows,
STAT (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/11/27/two-ebolatreatments-mortality-decrease/; Gina Kolata, How Remdesivir, New Hope for
Covid-19 Patients, Was Resurrected, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/05/01/health/coronavirus-remdesivir.html.
303
See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Missed Opportunities on Emergency Remdesivir
Use, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 331 (2020).
304
See John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of Covid-19—
Preliminary Report, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1813 (2020).
305
See Christoph D. Spinner et al., Effect of Remdesivir vs Standard Care on
Clinical Status at 11 Days in Patients with Moderate COVID-19: A Randomized
Clinical Trial, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1048 (2020).
306
See Yeming Wang et al., Remdesivir in Adults with Severe COVID-19: A
Randomised, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled, Multicentre Trial, 395 LANCET
1569 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)31022-9.
307
Matthew Herper, Major Study Finds Common Steroid Reduces Deaths Among
Patients with Severe Covid-19, STAT (June 16, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/06/16/major-study-finds-common-steroid-reduces-deaths-among-patientswith-severe-covid-19.
308
See Denise Grady, Malaria Drug Promoted by Trump Did Not Prevent Covid
Infections, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
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use authorization (EUA) to the drug on May 1, 2020.309 Remdesivir
has been described by Dr. Anthony Fauci, an infectious disease
expert and one of the leaders of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force, as the current “standard of care” for COVID-19,310 and the
drug has already been used in thousands of patients.311
Should further clinical trial data prove that remdesivir is indeed
safe and effective at reducing COVID-19 mortality, it will be an
indispensable tool in the COVID-19 response in the United States
and around the world. Even if the drug saves no lives but merely
accelerates recovery in patients with severe disease, it will
nonetheless be valuable, considering the enormous social benefits
of keeping people out of the hospital. A single day in an American
intensive care unit (ICU) costs thousands of dollars, 312 so
accelerating recovery by even a day has significant economic

2020/06/03/health/hydroxychloroquine-coronavirus-trump.html. In June and July
2020, a group at the University of Oxford reported clinical trial results suggesting
that the widely available steroid dexamethasone successfully reduced mortality in
patients with moderate or advanced COVID-19 disease who were receiving
mechanical ventilation or oxygen. See Nancy Lapid, Steroid’s COVID-19 Benefits
Confirmed; Spotlight on Immune Cells, REUTERS (July 18, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-science-idUSKCN24I2SY.
309
See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Potential COVID-19
Treatment (May 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announce
ments / coronavirus - covid - 19 - update - fda - issues - emergency - use - authorization potential-covid-19-treatment. In August 2020, the FDA expanded the EUA to
cover hospitalized COVID-19 patients with more moderate disease. See Press
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., COVID-19 Update: FDA Broadens
Emergency Use Authorization for Veklury (Remdesivir) to Include All
Hospitalized Patients for Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.
fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/covid-19-update-fda-broadensemergency-use-authorization-veklury-remdesivir-include-all-hospitalized.
310
Sue Hughes, Remdesivir Now “Standard of Care” for COVID-19, Fauci Says,
HOSPITALIST (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/
221518/coronavirus-updates/remdesivir-now-standard-care-covid-19-fauci-says.
311
See Laurie McGinley & Christopher Rowland, FDA Authorizes Use of Gilead
Sciences’ Remdesivir for Patients Severely Ill with Covid-19, WASH. POST (May
1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/01/fda-authorizesuse-gilead-sciences-remdesivir-severely-ill-patients-with-covid-19.
312
See Joseph S. Dasta et al., Daily Cost of an Intensive Care Unit Day: The
Contribution of Mechanical Ventilation, 33(6) CRITICAL CARE MED. 1266 (2005),
https://journals.lww.com/ccmjournal/Abstract/2005/06000/Daily_cost_of_an_
intensive_care_unit_day__The.13.aspx.
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benefits on that basis alone 313 —not to mention the benefits of
allowing people to return to their jobs, homes, and loved ones.
Accelerating recovery also frees ICU beds, equipment, and
personnel to treat more patients. ICU shortages have plagued many
countries’ early COVID-19 responses, exacerbating mortality, 314
and experts suggested in spring and summer 2020 that the United
States risks a new wave of ICU bed shortages in late 2020.315
2. Two Problems: Shortages and Overpricing
The United States’s COVID-19 response faces two problems
vis-à-vis remdesivir: the problem of shortage and the problem of
overpricing.
The United States faced deep shortages of remdesivir through
the spring and summer of 2020, causing physicians to ration the drug
and patients to go without—shortages apparently caused at least in
part by Gilead’s inability to manufacture enough. 316 Gilead has,
Gilead’s CEO, Daniel O’Day, justified the price Gilead intends to charge for
remdesivir on this basis. See Press Release, An Open Letter from Daniel O’Day,
Chairman & CEO, Gilead Sciences (June 29, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/
news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/6/an-open-letter-from-danieloday-chairman--ceo-gilead-sciences (“Taking the example of the United States,
earlier hospital discharge would result in hospital savings of approximately
$12,000 per patient. Even just considering these immediate savings to the
healthcare system alone, we can see the potential value that remdesivir
provides.”). There is some irony in a pharmaceutical company—a member of one
oft-criticized sector of America’s oft-criticized health care system—using high
prices of hospital care—another oft-criticized sector of the same—to justify its
own high prices.
314
See Shadman Aziz et al., Managing ICU Surge During the COVID-19 Crisis:
Rapid Guidelines, 46 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1303 (June 8, 2020); Alberto
Zangrillo & Luciano Gattinoni, Learning from Mistakes During the Pandemic:
The Lombardy Lesson, INTENSIVE CARE MED. (June 5, 2020).
315
See Will Feuer, CDC Says U.S. Has “Way Too Much Virus” to Control
Pandemic as Cases Surge Across Country, CNBC (June 29, 2020), https://www.
cnbc.com/2020/06/29/cdc-says-us-has-way-too-much-virus-to-controlpandemic-as-cases-surge-across-country.html; Nolan D. McCaskill, Rising ICU
Bed Use “a Big Red Flag”, POLITICO (May 28, 2020), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/05/28/rising-icu-bed-use-red-flag-287552.
316
See Elizabeth Cohen, Covid-19 Drug Rationed in the US Is Plentiful in
Developing Countries, CNN (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/
health/covid-remdesivir-us-vs-other-countries/index.html; Cristin Flanagan,
Gilead’s Virus Drug Seen in Short Supply for Americans, BLOOMBERG (May 11,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-11/gilead-s-covid-19drug-seen-in-short-supply-for-americans; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Gilead Says It
313
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rather gradually, voluntarily licensed its patents to competitor drug
manufacturers in the United States and overseas,317 which expanded
its supplies, but not quickly enough.318
As the federal department ultimately responsible for navigating
the country through the COVID-19 crisis, HHS has taken on itself
the job of distributing of remdesivir to the hospitals in greatest need
throughout the United States. 319 But despite purported
“coordination,” HHS proved consistently unable throughout the
spring and summer of 2020 to allocate the nation’s (short) supplies
efficiently or effectively. 320 In an effort to address ongoing
shortages, in June of 2020, HHS announced that it had contracted
with Gilead to dedicate over 90% of Gilead’s supply of remdesivir
from July through September 2020 to the United States alone—
about 500,000 treatment courses. 321 The deal was striking in its
Will Be Able to Make Enough Remdesivir to Meet Global Coronavirus Demand
in October, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/06/gileadsays-it-will-be-able-to-make-enough-remdesivir-to-meet-global-coronavirusdemand-in-october.html; Sydney Lupkin, How Feds Decide on Remdesivir
Shipments to States Remains Mysterious, NPR (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.npr.
org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/19/903946857/how-feds-decide-onremdesivir-shipments-to-states-remains-mysterious.
317
See Valerie Bauman, Gilead Gives Royalty-Free Remdesivir Licenses to Five
Drugmakers, BLOOMBERG L. (May 12, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
pharma-and-life-sciences/gilead-gives-royalty-free-remdesivir-licenses-to-fivedrugmakers; Peter Maybarduk, Remdesivir Should Be in the Public Domain;
Gilead’s Licensing Deal Picks Winners and Losers, PUB. CITIZEN (May 12, 2020),
https://www.citizen.org/news/remdesivir-should-be-in-the-public-domaingileads-licensing-deal-picks-winners-and-losers/.
318
After shortages were reported in the summer of 2020, Reuters reported in midSeptember 2020 that U.S. hospitals were turning away new shipments of
remdesivir, suggesting that they had ample supplies and that shortages and
rationing had ended. See Deena Beasley, Exclusive: U.S. Hospitals Turn Down
Remdesivir, Limit Use to Sickest COVID-19 Patients, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-remdesivir-exclusiidUKKBN2622UM.
319
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces
Shipments of Donated Remdesivir for Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19
(May 9, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/09/hhs-ships-firstdoses-of-donated-remdesivir-for-hospitalized-patients-with-covid-19.html.
320
See Kapczynski, Biddinger & Walensky, supra note 12 (describing HHS’s
distribution as “uneven and opaque,” and leading to shortages); see also Lupkin,
supra note 316.
321
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Trump Administration
Secures New Supplies of Remdesivir for the United States (June 29, 2020)
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nationalism and disregard of COVID-19 patients outside the United
States—billions of people sick and at risk in countries outside
Gilead’s network of authorized generic suppliers 322 may have no
access to remdesivir. 323 (And even those 500,000 doses proved
insufficient to meet demand within the United States.324) In August
2020, Gilead announced that it expects, finally, to be able to
manufacture enough remdesivir to meet global demand by early
October,325 but despite projecting manufacture of two million doses
this year, Gilead acknowledged to investors that “there is no
assurance that we will be able to meet global supply needs for
remdesivir.”326 Some experts, including former FDA Commissioner
Gottlieb, have predicted new peaks of infections and
hospitalizations in the fall of 2020 and winter of 2021;327 if their
fears come to pass, then shortages of remdesivir may continue.
Besides shortages, the other problem is price. On June 29, 2020,
Gilead announced what it plans to charge for remdesivir once
donated doses run out in July 2020: $3,120 for a typical course of
treatment for patients with private insurance as well as those covered
by Medicare and Medicaid, and $2,340 for a smaller number of
patients covered by certain other U.S. government insurance
programs.328 The $3,120 price tag is over ten times what an expert
independent organization (the Institute for Clinical and Economic
Review (ICER)) deems to be remdesivir’s cost-effective value
[hereinafter HHS Press Release], https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/29/
trump-administration-secures-new-supplies-remdesivir-united-states.html.
322
See Ed Silverman, Gilead Signs Deals for Generic Companies to Make and
Sell Remdesivir, STAT (May 12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/
2020/05/12/gilead-generics-remdesivir-covid19-coronavirus-licenses.
323
Sarah Boseley, US Secures World Stock of Key Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir,
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/30/
us-buys-up-world-stock-of-key-covid-19-drug.
324
See Cohen, supra note 316; Lovelace, supra note 316; Lupkin, supra note 316.
325
See Lovelace, supra note 316.
326
Gilead Scis., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 30, 44 (Aug. 6, 2020),
http://investors.gilead.com/static-files/5648e7dd-c981-4d5b-8c8f22342d60a946.
327
See Joseph Guzman, America Could Have a Third Act of Coronavirus and It
Will Likely Be “More Pervasive,” Says Top Health Expert, HILL (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://thehill.com/changing-america/well-being/longevity/513125-americacould-have-a-third-act-of-coronavirus-and-it; see also Feuer, supra note 315.
328
See Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19
Drug Remdesivir, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/
gilead-announces-remdesivir-price-covid-19.
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($310)329 and perhaps over three hundred times its manufacturing
cost (which has been estimated at less than $10330). The $3,120 price
tag that most Americans will pay is the highest in the world (despite
U.S. taxpayers’ contributions to the drug); other wealthy countries
will pay $2,340. 331 Experts corroborate the view that the $3,120
Gilead will charge most American patients is unfairly high, given
the drug’s moderate therapeutic value, its low manufacturing costs,
and the American public’s substantial contributions—at least
$70,500,000—to its discovery and development.332 Gilead’s prices
for remdesivir will likely generate enormous revenue for the
company333 but strain the budgets of federal and state public health
See Melanie D. Whittington & Jonathan D. Campbell, Alternative Pricing
Models for Remdesivir and Other Potential Treatments for COVID-19, 2020 INST.
FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV. 1, 6 (June 24, 2020), https://icer-review.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/ICER-COVID_Revised_Report_20200624.pdf
(concluding that $310 is the appropriate cost-effectiveness price for remdesivir,
given that it speeds recovery but has not been proven to reduce mortality).
330
Andrew Hill et al., Minimum Costs to Manufacture New Treatments for
COVID-19, 6 J. VIRUS ERADICATION 61 (Apr. 2020).
331
See Michael Erman et al., Gilead Prices COVID-19 Drug Remdesivir at $2,340
per Patient in Developed Nations, REUTERS (June 29, 2020), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-health-coronavirus-gilead-sciences-idUSKBN2401C8.
332
See, e.g., Damian Garde & Ed Silverman, Less than a Movie Ticket or
“Impossible to Overpay”? Experts Name Their Price for Remdesivir, STAT (May
15, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/15/gilead-remdesivir-pricingcoronavirus (quoting expert Peter Bach, director of Memorial Sloan Kettering’s
Center for Health Policy and Outcomes, as suggesting a price of about $1,000 per
patient as fair); Angus Liu, New Fair Price for Gilead’s Remdesivir? Below
$2,800 if Dexamethasone Lives up to Its COVID-19 Promise, FIERCE PHARMA
(June 24, 2020), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/new-fair-price-forgilead-s-remdesivir-below-2-800-if-dexamethasone-lives-up-to-its-covid-19;
Jing Luo et al., Treatments Don’t Work If We Can’t Afford Them: The Global Need
for Open and Equitable Access to Remdesivir, BMJ OPINION (June 3, 2020),
https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/06/03/treatments-dont-work-if-we-cant-affordthem-the-global-need-for-open-and-equitable-access-to-remdesivir (“In higherincome countries, until more robust mortality data becomes available, existing
evidence suggests that a price between ‘at cost’ ($10) and the lower of ICER’s
cost-effective estimates ($390) is appropriate.”). Public Citizen has documented
that the United States and other governments have contributed at least
$70,500,000 to the development of remdesivir. See The Real Story of Remdesivir,
PUB. CITIZEN (May 7, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/article/the-real-story-ofremdesivir/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=9bdafb07-71bb-41dc-8726f80183f3f648.
333
See Ed Silverman, Gilead’s Pricing for Remdesivir Raises Questions About the
329
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agencies, insurers, and individual patients. 334 HHS’s plan to
distribute 500,000 doses of remdesivir between July and September
2020 committed parts of the U.S. government and all private payers
to paying full price.335
3. Patents Are the Sole Significant Barrier to Access
Government patent use can be effective in solving shortages
and overpricing, but only if there are no other insurmountable
barriers to competition. We consider three candidates for non-patent
barriers to remdesivir manufacturing and distribution and find that
none of them will likely be impassable.
First, although § 1498 is limited to government patent use rather
than generalized compulsory licensing, § 1498 would still suffice to
expand public access to remdesivir because the government could
distribute the drug broadly. HHS’s distribution of remdesivir (or any
therapeutic or vaccine used against COVID-19) would satisfy the
statute’s requirement that authorization under § 1498 be limited to
products “used or manufactured by or for the United States.” 336
Accelerating the recovery of people sick with COVID-19 and
safeguarding hospital bed capacity clearly provides “significant
benefits to the United States” and therefore meets the standard set
out in Advanced Software. 337 As of writing, HHS is already
coordinating distribution of remdesivir throughout the United States
and has been since the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic.338
HHS could, if it desired, purchase and distribute remdesivir through
Drug’s Long-Term Prospects, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
pharmalot/2020/06/29/gilead-remdesivir-covid19-coronavirus-drug-prices
(quoting a Wall Street prediction that Gilead could earn $2.3B from remdesivir in
2020 alone).
334
Garde & Silverman, supra note 332.
335
Libby Watson, Big Pharma’s Got a Brand New Coronavirus Grift, NEW
REPUBLIC (June 30, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158337/big-pharmacoronavirus-grift; see also Peter B. Bach, Remdesivir Less Expensive for
‘Government Programs.’ Not So Fast, Drug Pricing Lab (2020), https://
drugpricinglab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Remdesivir-Paper-1.pdf
(alleging that most U.S. government programs will pay full price for remdesivir).
336
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
337
Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d
1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
338
See, e.g., HHS Press Release, supra note 321(Announcing that remdesivir
“will be allocated [in July, August, and September 2020] in the same way that
Gilead’s donation of approximately 120,000 treatment courses of remdesivir were
allocated: HHS allocates product to state and territorial health departments based
on COVID-19 hospital burden, and health departments allocate it to hospitals.”).
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the Strategic National Stockpile for public health emergencies,
which would qualify as “use[] or manufacture[] by or for the United
States,” as Wang and Kesselheim have noted.339
Second, trade secrets and internal know-how will pose minimal
barriers to generic manufacturing. Remdesivir is a small molecule
drug with a relatively simple formulation: the active ingredient is
combined with an excipient that improves its stability and solubility
to form a powder and then dissolved in water to form an injectable
solution.340 Making remdesivir is nontrivial in practice: the active
ingredient is somewhat complex to synthesize, as small molecules
go, and formulation involves a days-long step—lyophilization—that
requires specialized equipment. 341 Yet the drug can be reverse
engineered, and generic manufacturers overseas have already been
able to develop formulations bioequivalent to Gilead’s, quickly.342
For example, as of July 2020, one generic company in Bangladesh
(Beximco) had scaled up its manufacturing of remdesivir from zero
to 80,000 vials per month in less than three months, without
authorization or assistance from Gilead. 343 The same company
Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 15, at 478.
Gilead Scis., supra note 301.
341
See Himani Chandna, Govt Steps up Pressure on Remdesivir-Makers to
Increase Output, Crack down on Black Marketing, THEPRINT (July 23, 2020),
https://theprint.in/health/govt-steps-up-pressure-on-remdesivir-makers-toincrease-output-crack-down-on-black-marketing/466887; Lisa M. Jarvis, Scaling
up Remdesivir Amid the Coronavirus Crisis, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/infectious-disease/
Scaling-remdesivir-amid-coronavirus-crisis/98/web/2020/04.
342
See India’s CDSCO Approves Generics of Favipiravir and Remdesivir for
Covid-19 Treatment, PHARMACEUTICAL BUS. REV. (June 22, 2020), https://www.
pharmaceutical-business-review.com/news/covid-19-india-favipiravirremdesivir/ (describing two generic formulations of remdesivir approved for sale
in India); Zeba Siddiqui, Bangladesh’s Beximco to Begin Producing COVID-19
Drug Remdesivir, REUTERS (May 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-bangladesh-remdesi/exclusive-bangladeshs-beximco-tobegin-producing-covid-19-drug-remdesivir-coo-idUSKBN22H1DD (describing
approval of generic remdesivir in Bangladesh, developed without Gilead’s
authorization or assistance); Ed Silverman, First Generic Version of Gilead’s
Remdesivir Will Be Sold by a Bangladesh Drug Maker, STAT (May 22, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/22/gilead-remdesivir-covid19coronavirus-beximco-patent/ (same).
343
See A.Z.M. Anas, Bangladesh’s Beximco Thrives on Coronavirus Challenges,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (July 26, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/
Pharmaceuticals/Bangladesh-s-Beximco-thrives-on-coronavirus-challenges.
339
340

80

Yale Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 23

stated that it intends to expand production further, to 160,000 vials
per month by the end of August 2020, and that it has already
exported the drug outside of Bangladesh to five other countries.344
Another Bangladeshi generic company, Eskayef, has also developed
a generic formulation of remdesivir without authorization or
assistance from Gilead and has likewise exported the drug outside
of Bangladesh. 345 Numerous brand-name, generic, and contract
drug manufacturers within the United States have the expertise and
equipment necessary to manufacture remdesivir. For example,
Pfizer announced in August 2020 that it would begin manufacturing
remdesivir at a McPherson, Kansas factory that specializes in
injectable medicines, under a contract with Gilead, as Gilead
gradually (too gradually) responded to shortages.346
Third, manufacturers other than Gilead will likely be able to
obtain the regulatory permission they need to distribute and sell
remdesivir within the United States. 347 Generic firms may not be
Perhaps counterintuitively, generic drug companies are often more, not less,
innovative and successful than “innovator” brand-name drug companies at
improving drug manufacturing processes, eliminating inefficiencies, and driving
down the costs of production. Generics earn much smaller profit margins than
brand-name drug companies and often compete fiercely with one another on price,
sparking innovation in manufacturing processes that drives costs down. See
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), https://
www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/
genericsupplement0809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 (“[G]enerics innovate, often
obtaining ‘design-around’ patents or a more efficient manufacturing process, new
formulations, or new forms of the active ingredient”). For example, it was Cipla,
a low-margin generic manufacturer, that figured out how to manufacture and sell
HIV drugs for $1 a day, a fraction of the manufacturing costs brand-name
companies had incurred. See Sarah Boseley, Yusuf Hamied, Generic Drugs Boss,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/18/
aids.sarahboseley13.
344
See Anas, supra note 343.
345
Eskayef Pharma’s Remdesivir Is a Headache for Indian Drugmakers, BUS.
STANDARD (June 9, 2020), https://tbsnews.net/coronavirus-chronicle/eskayefpharmas-remdesivir-headache-indian-drugmakers-90691.
346
Press Release, Pfizer Inc., Pfizer Announces Agreement with Gilead to
Manufacture Remdesivir for Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://
www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-announcesagreement-gilead-manufacture-remdesivir.
347
Regulatory questions are admittedly complex and especially unpredictable in
this moment of declared public health emergency. See G. Caleb Alexander, Aaron
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able to use the normal Abbreviated New Drug Application pathway
for FDA approval based on any New Drug Application approval that
Gilead receives, because Gilead is likely to receive, upon approval,
some data exclusivity that will preclude such abbreviated
applications.348 Instead, we see two distinct alternative paths for a
competitor manufacturer to obtain permission. The first is an
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). At least as of writing, the
FDA has not actually approved Gilead’s remdesivir product; instead,
the FDA has provided an EUA, which enables the HHS secretary to
“authorize the introduction . . . of a drug, device, or biological
product intended for use in an actual or potential emergency,” even
when that product “is not approved, licensed, or cleared for
commercial distribution.” 349 Gilead’s EUA was authorized by the
FDA on the basis of two trials, 350 one of which was the earlierS. Kesselheim & Thomas J. Moore, Searching for an Effective Covid-19
Treatment: Promise and Peril, STAT (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/04/10/searching-for-an-effective-covid-19-treatment-promise-and-peril/;
Reynald Castaneda, FDA May Be Risk-Averse to Grant Emergency Use for Covid19 Vaccines, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA (July 2, 2020), https://www.
clinicaltrialsarena.com/comment/fda-covid-19-vaccines/; Leigh Turner, Could
Pressure for COVID-19 Drugs Lead the FDA to Lower Its Standards?,
CONVERSATION (June 10, 2020), https://theconversation.com/could-pressure-forcovid-19-drugs-lead-the-fda-to-lower-its-standards-139013.
348
Gilead announced in August 2020 that it is seeking full FDA approval of
remdesivir, based on the same trials that supported its EUA. See Press Release,
Gilead Scis., Inc., Gilead Submits New Drug Application to U.S. Food and Drug
Administration for Veklury (Remdesivir) for the Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug.
10, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/
2020/8/gilead-submits-new-drug-application-to-us-food-and-drugadministration-for-veklury-remdesivir-for-the-treatment-of-covid19. In the event
that Gilead’s application is approved, the FDA will grant Gilead a period of socalled “data exclusivity” that prohibits the filing of “abbreviated” applications on
remdesivir for several years. See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and
Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 2, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patentsand-exclusivity.
349
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 564(a)(1)–(a)(2)(A), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360bbb–3; see OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM & EMERGING THREATS, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF
MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 4 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download.
350
See Letter from Denise M. Hinton, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ashley
Rhoades, Gilead Scis., Inc. (May 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137564/
download; see also Gilead Scis., supra note 301, at 33 (summarizing data from
NIAID trial).
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mentioned clinical trial conducted (and paid for) by NIAID, which
showed that remdesivir helps hospitalized patients with severe
COVID-19 recover and leave the hospital more quickly than a
placebo.351 According to news reports, this trial was apparently the
more important of the two trials that supported the authorization,352
and it recently formed the sole basis of conditional approval by
Canada’s drug regulator. 353 NIAID has committed to sharing the
“[c]omplete de-identified patient data set” from its trial with any
who ask for it, once the clinical study report has been finalized.354
As such, it seems likely to us that a generic manufacturer seeking an
EUA from the FDA for its own remdesivir product will be able to
obtain one by obtaining and submitting the complete data set from
the NIAID trial along with proof that its product is bioequivalent to
Gilead’s.355 Generic manufacturers may also be able to submit, and
rely on, clinical trial data from other publicly funded trials of
remdesivir.356 A second path would be for a generic to file a full New
Drug Application. Any FDA-granted data exclusivity for Gilead
would not prevent a competitor manufacturer from submitting a
complete (rather than an abbreviated) application for full FDA
approval of its own, based on the NIAID trial and other publicly

See supra notes 303–307.
See, e.g., Maggie Fox et al., FDA Will Reportedly Authorize Use of Remdesivir
for Covid-19 After Trial Shows “Positive Effect” on Recovery Time, CNN (Apr.
30, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/29/health/gilead-sciences-remdesivircovid-19-treatment/index.html.
353
See Health Canada Authorises Remdesivir as First Covid-19 Treatment,
PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (July 29, 2020), https://www.pharmaceuticaltechnology.com/news/canada-approval-remdesivir-covid/ (describing conditional
approval); Gilead Sciences Canada, Inc., Product Monograph Including Patient
Medication Information: Veklury, VEKLURY 1, 13 (July 27, 2020), https://pdf.hres.
ca/dpd_pm/00057134.PDF (referring to the NIAID trial, and only the NIAID
trial).
354
See Data Sharing Statement, https://www.nejm.org/doi/suppl/10.1056/
NEJMoa2007764/suppl_file/nejmoa2007764_data-sharing.pdf, in Beigel et al.,
supra note 304.
355
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 320.21-.63.
356
See, e.g., “Solidarity” Clinical Trial for COVID-19 Treatments, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (last updated July 6, 2020), https://www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019ncov/solidarity-clinical-trial-for-covid-19-treatments; Trial of Treatments for
COVID-19 in Hospitalized Adults (DisCoVeRy), U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (last
updated July 22, 2020), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04315948.
351
352
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available data.357
That legal, logistical, and regulatory barriers are traversable
makes remdesivir perhaps unlike some other anti-COVID medical
products. In particular, with respect to vaccines, several scholars
have focused on trade secret knowledge of manufacturing processes,
observing that “the more significant impediments to producing a
successful coronavirus vaccine lie on the manufacturing side” and
are not patents themselves.358 (Vaccines and other biological drug
products are often more difficult for competitors to reverse engineer
than small molecule drugs.359) As a result, these scholars contend
that use of § 1498 could be counterproductive; it could, they argue,
erode a patent holder’s financial incentives to scale up
manufacturing and distribution of the patented vaccine without
concomitantly empowering competitors to make it, leaving the
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (permitting filing of applications based on “full
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug
is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467, 488
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (“[R]egulatory
exclusivity defers the filing and approval of ANDAs, but not of NDAs. An
applicant who is able to submit ‘full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use’ need not wait until the end of the exclusivity period, when the
statute permits the use of an ANDA, but could instead file an NDA. . . . [I]f the
data were publicly available, the competitor could file its own NDA at reasonable
cost.”); Erika Lietzan, A New Framework for Assessing Clinical Data
Transparency Initiatives, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 33, 67 (2014)
(“[W]here the [clinical trial] data is released and available, an abbreviated
application may not be required by the regulator. A full application can be
submitted. This effects an end run around regulatory exclusivity, which prohibits
only approval, or sometimes submission, of abbreviated applications.”).
358
Nicholson Price et al., Are COVID-19 Vaccine Advance Purchases a Form of
Vaccine Nationalism, an Effective Spur to Innovation, or Something in Between?,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Aug. 5, 2020), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/
2020/08/are-covid-19-vaccine-advance-purchases.html; accord Ken Shadlen,
Speeding up the Development and Distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines, ISSUES
SCI. & TECH. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://issues.org/covid-vaccines-developmentdistribution-patenting-shadlen/ (“For some COVID products (vaccines in
particular), the [principal] barriers to access will be related to their
production . . . .”).
359
See Sara Eve Crager, Improving Global Access to New Vaccines: Intellectual
Property, Technology Transfer, and Regulatory Pathways, 108 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S414, S415 (2018), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdfplus/10.
2105/AJPH.2014.302236r.
357
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world with less supply than ever. 360 These scholars specifically
contend that use of § 1498 and other compulsory patent licensing
could impede transfer from the patent holder to those competitors of
the vital knowledge those competitors need.361
There are several reasons to think that knowledge transfer will
not be as much a problem in the context of COVID-19 vaccines as
these commentators suggest, even if § 1498 is on the table. The
premise is that government patent use will lead patent holders to
refuse knowledge transfer, but in fact history repeatedly shows that
government patent use leads patent owners to be more conciliatory
in negotiations; lack of government power has tended to give rise to
patentee recalcitrance.362 In our view it is more likely that exercise
of § 1498 or the threat of its exercise would encourage patent
holders to make deals with the government that include elements of
knowledge transfer. Furthermore, in cases of extreme impasse, the
government may be able to compel technology transfer—including
transfer of trade secret manufacturing information—via authority to
“allocate materials” under the Defense Production Act.363
In a larger sense, the fact that § 1498 cannot overcome trade
secrets, regulatory exclusivities, and other barriers to emergency
response reflects an ongoing failure to consider how these nonpatent forms of intellectual property intersect with crises. Even
§ 1498 itself was not the product of thinking about patents in
national emergencies; it arose out of a very non-emergency Capitol
renovation. 364 That § 1498 has ended up playing a role in past
national emergencies suggests a need for Congress to consider
§ 1498-like statutory authority on trade secrets, regulatory
exclusivities, and other competition barriers, as some scholars have
argued it should,365 so that the U.S. government can better accelerate
competition in the event of shortages, price-gouging, or other
See Shadlen, supra note 358; Price et al., supra note 358.
See Shadlen, supra note 358; Price et al., supra note 358.
362
See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text.
363
50 U.S.C. §§ 4511(a)(2) & 4552(13) (defining “materials” to include
“technical information”); Quigley, supra note 216. Of course, the government
would need to weigh the costs and benefits before exercising the DPA, just as it
should with exercise of § 1498.
364
See supra Part I.A.
365
See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of Biologics Manufacturing
Information, 47 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 54 (2019); Ameet
Sarpatwari et al., The US Biosimilar Market: Stunted Growth and Possible
Reforms, 105 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 92 (2018).
360
361
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problems.
4. Government Patent Use Offers a Way Forward
Patents, then, are the major barrier to competitive
manufacturing of remdesivir, and there is a straightforward solution
to overcoming shortages and excessive pricing: The U.S.
government, and HHS specifically, could use government patent use
under § 1498 to permit other manufacturers to make and sell
remdesivir in the United States. HHS can and should publicly
commit now to using § 1498, so that the United States’ supply of
affordable remdesivir is assured.366
The normative case for the U.S. government use of § 1498 to
procure remdesivir is based on our framework. All four advantages
of government patent use are highly salient in the case of remdesivir
and COVID-19. Government patent use is clearly preferable to a
U.S. government buyout of Gilead’s patents, which other scholars
have proposed.367
First, speed is critical. As noted above, as of writing, the United
States and other countries have already faced shortages of
remdesivir that hinder doctors’ ability to treat their patients, and
these shortages could continue into the fall and beyond. 368 HHS
must do whatever it can to get additional supply of remdesivir into
the marketplace as quickly as possible. To this end, HHS can and
should announce its intent now to authorize other manufacturers
(besides Gilead) under § 1498 to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, and sell remdesivir. HHS can do this instantly. By
contrast, negotiating a patent buyout or licensing deal with Gilead
could take many months. Some delay in getting alternative
manufacturers to market is inevitable; Gilead’s competitors will
need to scale up manufacturing and clear the regulatory hurdles
One of us (C.J.M.) has previously advocated in shorter pieces for government
patent use to expand access to remdesivir. See supra note 295. In July 2020, the
legal scholar Amy Kapczynski and the medical researchers and practicing
physicians Paul Biddinger and Rochelle Walensky published an op-ed advocating
the same. Kapczynski, Biddinger & Walensky, supra note 12. To be clear,
committing to use § 1498 does not require actually using it if the patent holder
puts an appropriate deal on the table, in the same way that the threat of invoking
§ 1498 prodded Bayer to negotiate on Cipro. See supra notes 124–125. But
without a clear commitment, patent holders may not feel the same need to
negotiate in good faith or with expediency. See supra notes 158–165.
367
Hemel & Ouellette 2020b, supra note 31 (proposing that HHS buy the patent
rights to remdesivir from Gilead).
368
See supra notes 316–327 and accompanying text.
366
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noted above. But these practical hurdles will arise regardless of
whether a buyout or government patent use is used. A buyout simply
introduces extra delay.
Second, the flexibility of government patent use is
advantageous here. We trace here two options for HHS—an
ambitious intervention, under which all of the government’s need
for remdesivir is met through government patent use, and a modest
one, under which the government would authorize generic
manufacturing under § 1498 and stockpile a smaller supply of doses,
to keep on hand in case of shortages.
Under the more ambitious option, HHS could bypass Gilead
altogether and contract with one or more generic drug companies
who are able to supply the drug cheaply, much closer to
manufacturing cost than the thousands of dollars per course of
treatment that Gilead is charging. To bypass Gilead altogether would
mimic what the U.S. government threatened to do when Bayer
refused to reduce the price or increase supply of ciprofloxacin in the
2001 anthrax crisis.369 It would also mimic the proposals of Brennan
et al., 370 Senators Bernie Sanders 371 and Elizabeth Warren, 372 and
the editorial board of The New York Times, 373 all of whom have
called on the U.S. government to use § 1498 to move its spending
from expensive brand-name to cheap generic versions of certain
drugs. A generic manufacturer in Bangladesh is manufacturing and
selling a generic version of remdesivir at a cost of between $295 and
$781 (USD) per course of treatment, 374 and generics in India are
selling remdesivir at a similar price.375 (The marginal cost is surely
Supra Part I.D.
Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 346 (calling on government procurement
officers to contract directly with generic companies to purchase hepatitis C drugs
instead of purchasing any such drugs from Gilead).
371
Sanders, supra note 11.
372
Anderson, supra note 14.
373
Editorial Bd., supra note 11.
374
See Silverman, supra note 342; Siddiqui, supra note 342.
375
See Sohini Das & Vinay Umarji, Covid-19: At Rs 2,800 per Dose, Zydus
Launches Cheapest Remdesivir Brand, BUS. STANDARD (Aug. 13, 2020), https://
www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/zydus-cadila-s-cheapestremdesivir-brand-to-disrupt-indian-market-120081301528_1.html; Angus Liu,
WuXi NextCODE Rebrand; Remdesivir Generic Prices; Sinopharm COVID-19
Vax Phase 3, FIERCEPHARMA (June 26, 2020), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma-asia/fiercepharmaasia-wuxi-nextcode-rebrand-remdesivir-generic369
370
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even lower, and costs of manufacturing may decline further as
generics grow more experienced.) Should these generic
manufacturers supply the United States at similar prices to those in
South Asia, then payers would reap enormous savings compared to
Gilead’s current prices of $2,340 to $3,120. (Even HHS and the U.S.
government, which would be required to pay Gilead “reasonable and
entire compensation” for use of its patents, would come out far
ahead, as we show below.)
Alternatively, HHS could make a more modest intervention
under § 1498, one that would trouble Gilead’s business expectations
only minimally while simultaneously protecting the American
public from a shortage of remdesivir. Under this proposal, HHS
could continue to purchase remdesivir from Gilead at Gilead’s full
price, at whatever rate Gilead is able to supply and sell, while
simultaneously contracting with a generic manufacturer to build a
stockpile. The stockpile could be reserved to ameliorate shortages
and deployed (and replenished) only as needed. HHS would provide
compensation to Gilead for its purchases of the generic. And
Gilead’s existing business—selling remdesivir to HHS and other
buyers around the world—would continue.
Third, ex post determination of the appropriate compensation is
highly beneficial in the case of remdesivir. Because of skimpy
clinical trials and only a few months of real-world evidence,
remdesivir’s value is currently highly uncertain. 376 Remdesivir
could prove our best therapeutic weapon against COVID-19, or it
could be supplanted by drugs that are more effective or cheaper—or
by a vaccine. 377 That makes a patent buyout particularly difficult
from both Gilead’s and the government’s perspective: how to factor
all that uncertainty? Use of § 1498 would helpfully defer the
question of patent valuation and compensation until after more
evidence of remdesivir’s therapeutic properties and sales has been
prices-sinopharm-covid-vax, (explaining that generic remdesivir in India will cost
“around $350 to $700 per treatment course, depending on which doses a patient
needs”); Anuron Kumar Mitra & Siddharth Cavale, India’s Cipla Prices Its
Generic Remdesivir at $53.34 per Vial, Below Rivals, REUTERS (July 8, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-cipla-idUSKBN2492Q3.
376
See Garde & Silverman, supra note 332; Sarpatwari et al., supra note 303.
Perhaps the most critical currently unanswered question is whether remdesivir
reduces mortality—i.e., saves lives—or merely accelerates recovery in patients
who would survive even without the drug.
377
See Silverman, Gilead’s Pricing, supra note 333.
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gathered. Indeed, to ensure a solid evidence base, HHS could
concomitantly work with the FDA (a constituent agency) to create a
patient registry that collects information on patient outcomes from
doctors who prescribe the drug, as Sarpatwari, Kaltenboeck, and
Kesselheim have suggested.378 HHS could also sponsor new clinical
trials through the National Institutes of Health (another constituent
agency) to generate better evidence of remdesivir’s therapeutic
properties.
Finally, the fourth key feature of § 1498, determination of that
compensation by an impartial adjudicator, is likely to be
advantageous as well. Placing the question of compensation in the
hands of an objective judge rather than Gilead’s negotiators is likely
preferable from the government’s (and public’s) perspective, as
Gilead has a reputation for price gouging and bad faith, even in its
dealings with the U.S. government.379 Given Gilead’s track record,
a patent buyout raises the prospect of hold-up and worse.
What compensation would HHS pay if chose to use § 1498 to
authorize generic manufacturers to make and sell remdesivir?
See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 303; see also Peter B. Bach, U.S. Hospitals
Need to Study How Well Remdesivir Really Works, BLOOMBERG L. (July 13,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-13/u-s-hospitalsneed-to-study-how-well-remdesivir-really-works.
379
In 2015, a bipartisan investigation of Gilead’s Hepatitis C drug portfolio by
Senators Wyden (D-OR) and Grassley (R-IA) concluded that “Gilead’s
marketing, pricing, and contracting strategies were focused on maximizing
revenue—even as the company’s analysis showed a lower price would allow more
people to be treated—not only for [its first FDA-approved Hepatitis C product],
but more importantly for its follow-on . . . product pipeline.” STAFFS OF RANKING
MEMBER RON WYDEN & COMM. MEMBER CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, 114TH CONG.,
THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 117
(Comm. Print 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/the-price-ofsovaldi-and-its-impact-on-the-us-health-care-system-full-report. The same report
criticized Gilead’s lack of candor, observing that “despite the company’s
assurances of cooperation, Gilead failed to produce all relevant documents and
supporting materials.” Id. Gilead is also currently embroiled in a patent
infringement lawsuit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), which alleges that Gilead acted in bad faith
in negotiating a patent license to government-held patents with HHS and one of
its constituent agencies, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See
Complaint at 1–4, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-2103 (D. Del.
Nov. 6, 2019) (“Gilead’s conduct was malicious, wanton, deliberate, consciously
wrongful, flagrant, and in bad faith. This is especially true because . . . the
Government has attempted to negotiate [a patent license] in good faith . . . .”);
id. at 69.
378
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Assuming conservatively that HHS pays a sale price of $800 to the
generic for a standard course of treatment (higher than the highest
generic prices currently charged overseas) and pays to Gilead a very
generous court-set royalty of 50% of that sale price380 HHS would
still spend a total of only $1,200 per course of treatment—far less
than Gilead currently charges. HHS, and American taxpayers, would
come out ahead.
And Gilead itself would fare well at the Court of Federal
Claims; despite “breaking” Gilead’s patent, this scenario is no
“nuclear option.” After going to court to claim its compensation
from the U.S. government, Gilead would collect a royalty that could
run to the hundreds of millions,381 even billions,382 of dollars, all
while foregoing the manufacturing and distribution costs it would
incur if it made the infringing doses itself—while simultaneously
selling remdesivir at whatever price it pleases to payers in other
countries around the world, and perhaps to private payers in the
United States not supplied by HHS. Between royalties and its own
sales, Gilead should quickly recoup the “up to $1 billion or more” it
has contended (without documentation) that it ultimately plans to
invest in remdesivir.383
Determination of compensation at the Court of Federal Claims
has another interesting advantage in the case of remdesivir: the court
can adjudicate not only compensation but also ownership of the
patents that cover remdesivir. A report recently co-authored by
Krellenstein and one of the authors concluded that the U.S.
government likely co-owns (with Gilead) the patents on remdesivir
itself as well as the method of treating COVID-19 with

A 50% royalty would be extraordinarily high, making our estimates
conservative (from the government’s perspective). See supra note 194 (observing
that royalties of over 10% are rare in § 1498 cases).
381
Assuming a royalty of $400 on 500,000 doses, Gilead would receive
$200,000,000.
382
Assuming a royalty of $400 of 5,000,000 doses, Gilead would receive
$2,000,000,000.
383
Sydney Lupkin, Putting a Price on COVID-19 Treatment Remdesivir, NPR
(May 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/08/851632704
/putting-a-price-on-covid-19-treatment-remdesivir. HHS’s contract with Gilead to
distribute 500,000 doses of remdesivir at Gilead’s full monopoly price between
July and September 2020 may alone suffice to guarantee Gilead a payout of over
$1B, likely sufficient to cover all of Gilead’s purported costs. See Bach, supra
note 335.
380
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remdesivir.384 This rather unusual feature of remdesivir arises from
the fact that it was co-developed by Gilead and U.S. government
scientists rather than by Gilead alone. This feature makes
government patent use particularly appealing from the government’s
(and public’s) perspective: for any patents that the U.S. government
is able to prove it co-owns, the “reasonable and entire
compensation” the government will owe under § 1498 for use of
these patents will be zero.385 HHS would owe compensation only
for use of any patents that Gilead owns outright, without coownership by the U.S. government.386 Under U.S. patent law, HHS
would owe no compensation to Gilead for use of any patent of which
the U.S. government turns out to be rightful co-owner. 387 The
consequent savings to HHS would represent a kind of compensation
for the U.S. government’s investment in that patent—and, more
broadly, compensation for the more than $70,000,000 that the
American public invested in the early, riskiest days of remdesivir’s
development.388
All four of the key beneficial features of government patent use
under § 1498 thus weigh in favor of its use on remdesivir. The end
result of government patent use on remdesivir would be increased
competition, greater supply, and lower prices—much lower for
patients and private payers, who would pay only the price that
generic makers charge, and substantially lower even for the U.S.
government, who would pay that price plus court-set compensation
to Gilead. Given the unique circumstances around remdesivir—not
Krellenstein & Morten, supra note 295; see also Dani Kass, Activists Say Gov’t
Should Have Rights to Remdesivir Patents, LAW360 (May 27, 2020), https://www.
law360.com/ip/articles/1277114/activists-say-gov-t-should-have-rights-toremdesivir-patents.
385
If the U.S. government co-owns these patents, it has a legal right to license
them as it pleases, including to generic pharmaceutical companies, without
permission from or payment to Gilead. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of
any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the
patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without
accounting to the other owners.”).
386
Krellenstein & Morten, supra note 295, at 15.
387
See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of
the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented
invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the
United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other
owners.”).
388
See supra note 332.
384
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least the scale of the public health crisis posed by COVID-19 and
the deep involvement of HHS scientists in remdesivir’s invention
and clinical development—HHS should commit now to using this
policy tool to protect public health.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Section 1498 has long played and ought to continue playing its
part in U.S. patent policy. In emergencies past, it has resolved widescale tragedies, and it has clear applications, large and small, in the
COVID-19 crisis. Section 1498’s long pedigree and theoretical
advantages dispel the notion that it is antithetical to the modern
patent system. It is part and parcel of our patent system, and its
advantageous features recommend its use alongside other policy
tools for driving innovation and expanding access to patented
technologies.
While we conclude that § 1498 has an important role in patent
policy and thus reject the view that invocation of the statute is
exceptional, impractical, or extreme, we have not established a
specific test for when § 1498 should or should not be used, and we
do not purport to. Instead, we have identified neglected features of
§ 1498 that make it a valuable policy tool that could be applied more
widely than it has been in recent decades and yield significant social
and economic benefits in a wide set of situations, especially—but
not only—in times of national emergency. An important area of
further research will be the development of more detailed and
specific guidance on when invocation of § 1498 is wise as a matter
of policy, in view of those advantages and disadvantages that we and
others have identified.
That the role of § 1498 in the context of national emergencies
has not been explored in depth to date suggests a larger need for
research on the relationship of the patent system generally with
imminent conditions that require federal response. As one of us has
observed in a study of patents and national security,389 traditional
narratives of patent policy, though applicable in usual
circumstances, do not necessarily hold up when there are nationalscale interests at stake. It is our hope that the calamitous
circumstances that we face today with COVID-19 will encourage
further research into how a system as complex and broad-reaching
as U.S. patent law can accommodate the challenges—emergency
and routine—that may lie ahead.
389

See Duan, supra note 48.
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V. APPENDIX: MEMORANDUM FROM ALFRED B. ENGELBERG
TO SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER
Alfred B. Engelberg
INCREASING ACCESS TO CIPRO
A Strategy for Rapid Creation of a Government Stockpile
October 13, 2001
1. Background Facts
Panic buying of CIPRO in response to recent threats of bioterrorism involving Anthrax has caused massive shortages of this
antibiotic. The ability to create new supplies is limited by the fact
that the drug is patented until at least December 2003 and is only
available from a single source. A challenge to the validity of the
patent which might have resulted in the widespread availability of a
low cost generic alternative was settled when the patent owner,
Bayer Corporation, reportedly paid Barr Laboratories and others in
excess of $200 million to drop the challenge. The FTC is
investigating this settlement as a possible anti-trust violation and
several class action antitrust cases have been commenced on behalf
of consumers. At the present time at least five generic drug
manufacturers have been tentatively approved to manufacture
ciprofloxacin, the generic version of CIPRO but, due to the
existence of the Bayer patent, they cannot begin the commercial
manufacture and sale of generic product until the Bayer patent
expires more than 2 years from now.
2. Current Law Permits the United States to Purchase
Generic Ciprofloxacin Now
The United States government and its suppliers are immune
from suits for patent infringement in the Federal District Courts The
sole and exclusive remedy for an act of infringement by or for the
government is a suit against the United States in the Court of Claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a). The statute reads as follows:
(a) Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right
to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by
action against the United States in the United States Claims Court
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such
use and manufacture.
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For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation
for the Government and with the authorization or consent of the
Government, shall be construed as use or manufacture for the
United States.
No injunction is available under § 1498 and the only remedy is
reasonable compensation for the unauthorized use of an invention.
But the government has the right to assert any defense to
compensation that a private party could assert, namely that the
patent is invalid, not infringed or unenforceable. Under federal
procurement regulations, the government is often (although not
always) indemnified against claims for compensation by its
suppliers and the suppliers assist in asserting these defenses.
Accordingly, the government may assert the same challenges to the
CIPRO patent that have been asserted by Barr and are now being
asserted by others.390
There is ample authority for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a) prevents a Federal District court from issuing an injunction
against a government supplier that would interfere with the right of
that supplier to bid on and participate in the sale of products to the
government. Gore v. Garlock, 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In fact, that principle has been applied by the courts even in cases
where the same supplier was actually enjoined from making
commercial sales of the same product. As stated by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals in Garlock:
The patentee takes his patent from the United States subject to
the government’s eminent domain rights to obtain what it needs
from manufacturers and to use the same. The government has
graciously consented in the same statute, to be sued in the claims
court for reasonable and entire compensation, for what would be an
infringement by a private person. The same principles apply to
injunctions which are nothing more than the giving of aid of the
courts to the enforcement of the patentees right to exclude. Though
injunctions may seem to say that making for and selling to the
It is noteworthy that the U.S. government has actually used its authority under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to procure a less expensive generic version of a patented drug
(Miltown) from abroad. See Carter Wallace v. United States, 449 F2d 1374 (U.S.
Ct. Clms. 1972).
390
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government is forbidden, injunctions based on patent rights cannot
in reality do that because of §1498(a).
Quoting the foregoing paragraph in Trojan v. Shat-R-Shield,
885 F.2d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the Federal Circuit further stated:
In short, a patent owner may not use its patent to cut the
government off from sources of supply, either at the bid stage or
during performance of a government contract.
In the face of these overwhelming precedents, Bayer is likely to
argue that § 1498 is not applicable to generic drug purchases because
a mere applicant for approval of an ANDA is not yet a legitimate
competitor for a government contract and, therefore, the act of filing
and seeking approval for an ANDA does not have the “authorization
and consent” from the government that is a prerequisite to invoking
28 U.S.C. § 1498. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a
similar argument in TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). As the Federal Circuit noted, § 1498 protects government
procurement activities, including acts required to satisfy
government procurement requirements and that authorization and
consent can be implied and need not be expressly stated by the
government.
Despite the foregoing precedents, the government could easily
moot any possibility of protracted litigation by issuing a blanket
“authorization and consent” for generic manufacturers holding
tentative ANDA approvals to submit bids to the appropriate
agencies. Such an authorization, which could be issued by OMB,
HHS or some other agency with responsibility for drug
procurement, would eliminate any basis for litigation. At least five
companies now have tentative approvals to manufacture
ciprofloxacin and are prevented from full approval solely because
of the Bayer patents.
3. Generic Versions of Licensed Drugs Can Be Approved
By the FDA Notwithstanding the Patent Certification
Procedures Required Under Current Law
Under current law, the FDA will not approve a generic version
of a drug for which unexpired patents are listed in the Orange Book
unless the applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification alleging that
a patent is invalid, unenforceable or will not be infringed. When
such a certification is made the FDA is prohibited from approving
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the generic drug for 30 months unless a court issues a judgment in a
shorter time. An applicant seeking approval for the purpose of
marketing a drug solely to the United States government can file a
paragraph IV certification and state “Applicant will not infringe U.S.
Patent No. ___ because the product of this application will only be
sold to the United States.” If a supply agreement has already been
authorized by a government agency, documentation of the
authorization and consent should accompany the certification.
In all likelihood, the patent owner will sue the first generic
applicant that seeks an approval for the exclusive purpose of making
sales to the government. Any competent Federal District Court will
be compelled to summarily dismiss any such lawsuit on the basis of
the precedents cited in this memo. Indeed, it would be appropriate
for the ANDA applicant to specifically request and for the court to
grant, an immediate final judgment compelling the FDA to grant
approval of any ANDA for the purpose of allowing the applicant to
sell product to the United States government. At least two generic
manufacturers with tentatively approved ANDAs for ciprofloxacin
are already engaged in litigation with respect to the Bayer patents.
Those parties are in a position to file immediate motions for
summary judgment of non-infringement based on the legal theory
outlined herein and to by-pass the loss of time that would occur
before litigation begins if the normal patent certification process is
followed.
4. Timetable & Risk
Assuming that one of the two generic companies now involved
in litigation with Bayer is willing to proceed, a motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement could be filed, on an expedited or
emergency basis, in a Federal District Court in a matter of a couple
of days simply by relying on the legal arguments in this memo.
There would, however, be no point in doing so without a firm
commitment of the US government to make a substantial purchase
at a pre-negotiated price. Obviously that price would be heavily
discounted as compared to the current wholesale price of the
patented product. The contract commitment is essential from both
an incentive standpoint and to eliminate any possibility of a legal
skirmish on the issue of authorization and consent.
One significant stumbling block could be the issue of who
assumes the risk of paying “reasonable compensation” in the event
Bayer sues the U.S. for patent infringement and the patent is upheld.
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The generic manufacturers will be highly reluctant to assume any
portion of that risk since a large award could destroy their business.
Moreover, the risk may be real. On February 9, 2001, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a motion for
Summary Judgment by Mylan and Schein to declare the basic Bayer
patent to be invalid and specifically held the patent valid over the
challenge asserted in that motion. At this time, it is unknown
whether there are other grounds for challenging the patent or
whether the summary judgment decision would be affirmed on
appeal. Moreover, there is a substantial question as to whether the
patent will ultimately be enforceable in view of the antitrust issues
surrounding the settlement with Barr Laboratories. Given the
significant benefit to the government of assuring the existence of an
adequate supply of ciprofloxacin and the ability to procure that
supply at a relatively low cost, the government may wish to consider
waiving or limiting the usual indemnification provisions in federal
procurement contracts.
Preliminary investigation reveals that a supply of bulk active
ingredient is available from reputable FDA-approved sources
abroad and that delivery of significant quantities of finished product
could commence within 60–90 days assuming the legal obstacles
have been cleared away and FDA approval is in hand.

